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1. Introduction

In his report on the first phase of the project "Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity: Differing Diversities", Tony Bennett has already sketched the basic methodology and terminology for an in-depth analysis and study of cultural diversity policies in Europe, has described key terms on cultural diversity, the organisational and administrative background, as well as the funding procedures. He has outlined a general theoretical structure and practical agenda for all the forthcoming reports of the future phases of the project. There is hardly anything to add or comment on regarding these basics. Although explaining and describing most phenomena and debates on cultural diversity from a distinct Northwest European angle and terminological background, he nevertheless argued that the concrete politics of cultural diversity nevertheless has to be viewed and analysed in its territorial, historical and cultural political context within Europe.

On the one side, the patterns of international population movements and cultural flows have initiated and launched greater diversity in the social, ethnic and cultural composition of many European countries, on the other side, the make-up of the population in other European countries has been affected more by regional than by global population flows. This - as well as the fact that citizenship regimes, especially in terms of their implications for (im)migrants differ significantly between most European countries - means that questions of cultural diversity tend to be posed in different ways in specific national contexts - just as culture itself has different meanings in different historical, social and geographical contexts. Evidently, this does not mean that no concrete joint actions pointing beyond limited national policies could be taken or that schemes, programs and projects could not be evaluated on common grounds and ideals. There definitely are identifiably common tendencies to the emerging research agendas in this area:

- What are the consequences of different understandings of citizenship for the ways in which cultural policies address the members of culturally diverse societies?
- What role can policies concerned with regulating the media environment play in encouraging a diversity of media that will sustain the identities and cultures of minorities and groups marginalized by homogenising and dominant factions?
- How can employment and training regimes make positions in the media more openly accessible to people from a broader diversity of backgrounds?
- In what ways do the new media and national institutions contribute to the ongoing development of diasporas as a consequence of their

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2 ibid., 23.
ability to facilitate new international forms of point to point rather than centre to point communication and cultural flows?

- How can cultural industry policies support minority and marginalized cultures?

- And it "is also clear that the agendas of cultural diversity are beginning to have a significant consequence for that cultural policies might have in relation to indigenous minorities, such as the Roma, resulting in some interesting cross-fertilisation with the field of indigenous cultural policy development and research in non-European post-colonial settings."^{4}

In this second phase of the transversal study on cultural policy and cultural diversity the experts had to deal with countries from two very distinct European regions, namely East Central Europe and Eastern Europe. In many respects, these two regions cover similar, nevertheless differing historical, cultural and ethnic backgrounds - compared to Western Europe as well as compared to each other. Therefore they could be regarded as a testing arena for the above mentioned theses.

In spite of all differences, Romania, Hungary, and Russia share many common structural, social and historical traits: They are more or less multiethnic and -national (evidently, this is a question of definition, but also political will), they dispose of large ('accidental') diasporic communities^{5}, they share the experience of having been a part of Eastern Europe in its Cold War sense, in their transformation processes their cultural lives had to adapt very strongly to so-called market needs, and not the least - and very important for all aspects of cultural diversity in the past decades - all of these states and cultural politics had been and still are strongly engaged in nation (re-)building processes. And also not to forget: Since the collapse of the Soviet system, religious and spiritual issues again play a very distinctive issue in the societies of East Central and Eastern Europe - which are (since many denominations are closely linked to the concept of the specific nation and very often to the state itself) in many respects also related to the questions of nation building. The (Russian, Serbian, Romanian etc.) Orthodox Churches - much stronger linked to the state than the churches of most Western European countries - signal a specific not only private but societal marking of religious and spiritual issues after the opening of 1989.

It should become "a commonplace for national cultural policies to eschew the restrictive implications of high or aesthetic conceptions of culture by embracing the so-called anthropological definition of culture as a way of life and then pluralizing this to define, as the remit of cultural policies, a concern with the ways of life of all of the different groups in society: different social classes, different ethnic groups, different

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nationalities, and so on. Indeed, this extended sense of the scope of cultural policies is an essential prerequisite for cultural diversity policies inasmuch as these are typically concerned with forms of artistic and cultural expression that have usually fallen outside the purview of official hierarchies of the arts which, historically, have been ethnically and racially discriminatory in their marginalizing and denigration of non-European cultures and, within Europe, of the cultures of ethnic minorities. However, there is no reason to suppose that the more extended scope of contemporary cultural policies is sufficient, in and of itself, to curtail the influence which such hierarchies of the arts exercise upon and within the policy process. There is, to the contrary, evidence that they still exert considerable influence on what gets funded, by how much, and how what gets funded is classified owing to the ways in which — often through the interpretation of criteria of excellence — they are embedded in the operating routines of cultural institutions, funding agencies and granting bodies. These are matters that require continued investigation and monitoring if the extended scope of contemporary cultural policies is to lead to greater parity of esteem across and between the competing cultural tastes and values of different sections of the community in culturally diverse societies.\(^6\)

Since the authors of this report suggest some varieties on the theme of cultural diversity between Northwest Europe and the area reported on (but do not argue for fundamental differences), the report on this second phase will (have to) make a terminological step back from *Differing Diversities, First Phase*, trying to retrace the origins of some of the earlier approaches, putting them in a new order, reinterpreting them and discussing the questions of the classical approach towards diversity in the region — the national and ethnic minorities in the countries of East Central and Eastern Europe — to a broader extent than it might look functional, thus at first omitting some novel approaches towards cultural diversity. Especially in the focus of the national reports submitted by the cultural ministries and research groups of Hungary, Romania and Russia, various comprehensions and interpretations of cultural diversity from different angles have to be taken into account and interpreted to come to meaningful conclusions. This will be useful for elaborating a truly European-wide concept for implementing possible policies on cultural diversities.

Stepping back or at least halting for a moment after the first two phases of the transversal study also means making visible the ethno-cultural or ethnicity approach towards cultural diversity in the Western discussion. By re-examining this approach, by contributing its East Central and Eastern European variants and dissolving some blind spots on the European map, we would like to suggest a more appropriate approach for the future policy debates. In a way, we would like to return to the original thread in favouring or bringing forward the urgent necessity of cultural diversity politics in national context again — or at least help to put this

through the needle's eyelet of East Central and Eastern Europe: "Cultural diversity, in all its forms, is posing a profound challenge to traditional formulations of cultural policy, and to our understanding of the public interests served by this policy. In most countries the artistic and cultural landscape has not evolved to reflect the realities of a changed social landscape. This rift threatens to undermine the legitimacy of cultural institutions and the public policy that supports them. The shift from homogeneity to diversity as the new social norm requires a rethinking of the processes, mechanisms, and relationships necessary for democratic policy development in diverse societies." 7

In a strictly ethnical sense, cultural diversity focuses on four components: the sub- or multinational, the autochthonous, the diasporic and the indigenous level. 8 These levels could be summarised in two major components: one associated with the patterns of migration that have characterized the post-war period (of Western Europe), and another associated with in-situ forms of cultural difference that have resisted assimilation within dominant national cultures over extended periods of time. It is the ratio between these two components which in many respect is decisive for the comprehension of cultural diversity in the West and East. Nevertheless, both sides place ethnical issues in the foreground, thus making ethnicity the almost exclusive basis of diversity politics.

And due to the very differently framed legal, political, administrative and civil circumstances and provisions, which are decisive for formulating the strategies to foster cultural diversity, many different types in handling these forms of cultural differences could be presented in the course of the first phase. Although the number of countries involved in the second phase are significantly lower than in the first one, certainly the same applies to this study. Approaches and presented are very similar compared to those of the first phase. Cultural diversity policies in the West are separated along the lines territorial autonomy and language rights for minorities 9, multicultural rights and policies for immigrants, and resource claims for indigenous peoples (while the questions of transculturality and decision-making power are in general up to now excluded from the debate). At the same time, issues of ethnicity have gradually moved out of the 'security/loyalty' framework into the agendas of standard politics: Today, belonging to a minority and/or marginalized group means taking part in the lobbying and bargaining of everyday politics. The Western discussion on cultural diversity(ies) principally was initiated by the movements of ethnic and minority groups and fractions themselves: immigrant minorities, black, indigenous and aboriginal movements, and not the least feminist, gay and lesbian groups as well as the various groups of the disabled. It was only later that these demands were picked up as policy issues by various administrations and official policies (for very different reasons). Altogether, cultural diversity -

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linked to social and political issues - can be regarded emancipative for these groups of the 'rainbow coalition'. But still, the discussion and the demands placed and places ethnicity and ethnic marking very much in the centre of the perspectives of cultural diversity - which evidently also is a positive and not to be neglected or underestimated result of the social movements against discrimination of non-white persons. Nevertheless, and at least hypothetically, the report on the second phase wishes to question this dominant 'Western' ethnic approach towards cultural diversity, while suggesting

- that this approach - in re-interpreting and re-arranging the basic modules - could have a different meaning and practical outcome in East Central and Eastern Europe, and

- that it could be - at first sight paradoxically enough - the East Central and Eastern European countries - with their different historical and structural background and therefore a different understanding of diversity - which can help de-ethnifying some questions of cultural diversity and re-formulating cultural diversity by placing other forms of diversity than ethnic ones equally and evenly in the foreground; or: which can make de-ethnifying diversity politics in nation-(re-)building societies sometimes more adequate.

2. Outlining the questions, methods and approaches

2.1. East Central and Eastern Europe seen from the West: The di-Vision of Europe

Reporting on countries of East Central and Eastern Europe, one always has to keep in mind who is talking and who is able or allowed to talk. The authors of this report, although coming from the Western periphery of these regions, nevertheless in many ways share the traditional hegemonic Western discourse on East Central and even more Eastern Europe: The vision of a united Europe very often is also a di-Vision of Europe10 - and seen from the Balkan, sometimes even a tri-Vision. In this, the European region east of some imaginative north-south borderline across Europe, mainly along the late Iron Curtain has long been a source of wonder and surprise. The East perceived as the 'exotic other' originates in the 'long sixteenth century'11, carries on in the prejudicial imagination of the Balkans12 in the 19th century, and culminates in the imagination of the malevolent anti-World in the era of the Cold War. Then, the East became defined as outside the palette of European qualities and themes, considered mainly in terms of political threat, social problems, collective phobias, ethnographic exotica, and contrastive differences. The per-
spective on the Eastern part of Europe has been shaped by the narratives on the politics of backwardness, lateness, misery and disillusionment that characterize(d) the region in mainstream political (and academic) discussions. The East's otherness is taken as given: "Most significantly, the reproduction of the category 'East Europe' also produces a tendency for those working both in and outside the region to see that subject as something different and a thing apart from the socio-economic processes characterising Europe as a whole. While this Eastern exceptionalism is necessary at one level, at another it shapes an outlook that colours what on looks at in a scholarly sense, how one defines it, analytical processes, and the like. These views are often caricatured and centred around social problems, familiaristic social relations, Byzantine politics, mystical ethnic and national identities and other similar questions."13

The example of the neglected literary mastery discourse by the author Dubravka Ugrešić indicates the big divide we are confronted with: "After my novel had been published in England in 1991, the critic finished his review with the question: 'Anyway, is it this, what we need?' Only later did I understand, what he wanted to say with that. Always on travel, I did not realise that the label 'Made in Balkan' was tuck upon me. And if somebody comes from the Balkan, we do not expect that she or he presents literary sovereignty, but that he or she complies with the stereotype that WE have of THEM, of the Balkan or the places where THEY all come from. I completely had forgotten where I had come from, or in other words, I failed to notice the fixed codes between cultural centre and periphery. I was expected to certify the stereotypes of the periphery not to spoil them. I could forget about my literary sovereignty, in only irritated the foreign milieu."14 East Central and Eastern Europe – culturally – always has and had to comply with the expectations of the West – or it was simply ignored.

So, explaining these regions as something different, sometimes even based on something inexplicable like the "differences in mentality"15 always has the risk of thinking within the framework of a "Categorical Orientalism": As Edward Said suggested, authors writing in an Orientalist mode devalued their subjects relative to the West while denying them their voice and the validity of their perceptions. "This is not totally the case, however, as it applies to Eastern Europe. In 'Categorical Orientalism' subjects retain their voice, though those voices that devalue their own lives, or at last those aspects of them organized by the state, have the greatest credibility. Furthermore, the devaluation of Eastern life is

not because 'they' are totally different, but rather because 'they' have fallen into difference over time. The Orientalist assumes the enduring difference between the West and Orient. The Categorical Orientalist holds out the possibility of redemption for the fallen through capitalism, democracy, civil society, privatisation, and the like.\textsuperscript{17}

"Nesting Orientalism"\textsuperscript{18} is an additionally worth mentioning proceeding in many non-central-western societies. Under the labelling of various "Easterns" the looking towards less or more eastern countries is argued to depend on their territorial space from the centres of power and interpretation of the hegemonic west; but (nevertheless) and most convincingly, nesting Orientalism is a result of global cultural (and economic) development.

While on the one hand trying to avoid traditional perceptions of the East, this report will (provide a more sensitive understanding of) introduce categories which still (carefully) define East Central and Eastern Europe as being different, or at least in some respects diverse. On the other hand, it will argue that the differences are not so fundamental that a dialogue, an exchange of notions could not be possible, and will try to talk about the old Second World by which the First and the Third can be insightfully analysed and understood. A coming together of the two or three or more Europes is one of the most important challenges European civil society politics has to face in linking and thus overcoming national (his)stories, which since centuries portrait and represent only so-called 'own' national historical traces.

\textbf{2.2. Cultural policy discussions seen from the East}

Ever since the 1960s, cultural policy has been the subject of public controversy and debate in most of the countries of Western Europe, to discuss cultural policy signalled societal change and new strategies to bring culture to the people and vice versa. Taking cultural policy seriously was not least one response of the Second World, so to say a response to social and cultural needs formulated by the youth and alternative scene generally. The fundamental changes, developments and results within the culture and art support systems in this process have already been well described in the literature on the history of the development of Western European arts and cultural policy models:\textsuperscript{19} In total, they adopted different, but in the end more and more similar and interchangeable modules of cultural policies and planning regimes.

\textsuperscript{17} ibid.
In a nutshell: After World War II and especially in the late sixties for various reasons (new social movements and emergence of pop and youth culture, decreasing and/or less strict separation between high and low culture), a systematic public cultural policy (which was not state controlled but in some responsibility of the state administration) no longer had the mission of homogenising societies as in the 19th and early 20th century, but rather had to make differences and ambivalences within very complex societies more bearable, administrable, thus fostering social cohesion. Within that construction, culture was assigned a multifunction. Collective and individualistic identities were cautiously and slowly negotiated along pluralistic fault lines, which also should take regional, gender, generational and ethnic differences into account and even placed them − sometimes − in the limelight.

On the other side of the continent, the one-party-ruled countries of East Central and Eastern Europe evidently at that time were engaged in different processes. Here, the arts and culture and all forms of expression of artists and cultural workers traditionally − and the more after the one-party-systems took over − were, in various layers and with very different expectations some kind of surrogate for political dispute, argument and the feeling of community, and therefore in many respects overburdened to deal with questions of diversity in a broader sense (except the limited endeavour to formulate a political alternative). While on the one side evidently those in power intended to eliminate any kind of autonomy in culture and the arts, on the other side − even in the harshest Stalinist type dictatorships − some kind of unintended and informal artistic and cultural activities − maybe on the peripheries but nevertheless within official institutions − were still possible (e.g. the former Eastern German writers who used classic plots for their story boards to discuss issues at stake), thus preparing new forms of artistic expressions from the peripheries when the changes were about to happen. Although the histories of the cultural policies for most of these countries and their fundamental differences between each other (and within these countries) have not been written yet, it is clear that at the end of the eighties there was a gap between cultural planning processes, needs and resources within the East and between the East and West. It has to be noted though that especially in the cultural field some 'liberal' countries of the former East bloc − often in the very limited civil sphere closely connected to the democratic opposition movements of the 'Samisdat'20−activities for uncensored, free publications − could respond to or follow some of the current processes in Western cultural life and so had developed some limited and embryonic publicly perceivable expressions of diversity − but not cultural alternatives.21

20 *Samisdat*: Russian word for self-publishing, a term generally used for oppositional and dissident magazines and newspapers, published in illegalised printing and publishing houses in the former Eastern Europe.

In this respect, the history of cultural initiatives and movements actually is not a common but rather a divided history on both sides of the continent: "Communism did not mean to retard modernisation, but instead claimed to accelerate it. Urbanisation, mass literacy, and industrialisation were all pushed. What was lacking was the more essential part of modernisation, teaching individuals how to operate in markets rather than in traditional communities. By leaving out that part, communism created the physical structure of modernity without sufficiently changing people's attitudes." Which means not even giving them a chance or opportunity to become self-organised, responsible subjects, who are the very fundament for a democratic cultural policy.

But after 1990, East Central and much of Eastern Europe caught up very quickly especially after the cultural markets opened or rather were opened up. This also meant that what in Western Europe had had been a slow and more integrated process, or synchronous step-by-step processes going on for decades, linked to intensive public debates, here had and has to be achieved in a very rapid, asynchronous, and often contradictory way, resulting in many confusions, misconstructions, tensions and problems: Not the least because some liberal economic basics have been taken much more seriously in cultural practice than in Western countries ever (e.g. cultural sponsoring, the way sponsors are present in the art works and cultural events, liberal enterprise taxation). In this process, the new democratic (and not nationalist) cultural policy administrations had to cope with the questions of nation-building and/or new identity building, democratisation of cultural associations, financing problems, opening to a yet not existing market, new sponsoring models, securing cultural rights of minorities and were confronted with a massive influx of Western mass cultural goods, with no policies or recipes to respond - all at once and in a very short period of time.

In the radical changes after 1989 East and Central Europeans had to learn various new roles in the cultural, social, political, gender and economic sphere: at one time they were flexible actors, making choices, enjoying media and cultural variety, in the next moment they were nostalgic, remembering the socialist welfare state offers, retreated to patriarchal passiveness; and sometimes they felt closeness to developments in the West, while their distance to their own locality was growing or seemed to be unbridgeable, because the gap between high income and prestige groups and those who are the losers of the reforms widened. "In this everyday carnival, we realise that we live in a liminal phase and in a transitional space and inhabit a world in which definitions of identity seem to be painfully necessary and inherently problematic at the same time." In a broader context, the citizens of the Eastern part of the continent live cultural diversity and (have to?) (re)build national, institutional and administrative homogeneity at once. And at the same time, all these vari-

ous identity projects already take place in a rather binding EU-European institutional context and setting, which does not provide too much space to experiment on their own, the main guidelines already given and defined: A process which in general is referred to as Europeanisation. At the same time we are witnessing the establishment or imposing of another hegemonic discourse within these societies which carries the external label of 'democratic' but refuses to enter into a dialogue relation with the past\textsuperscript{24} - so crucial not so for coming to terms with history but to find new paths. Instead, in spite of all the post-modern evidence a new grand narrative, equally epic and autocratic, and in answer to the challenges and anxieties and risks linked to the opening-up processes, writing itself on an illusory \textit{tabula rasa} is constructed: an ahistorical Historicism, a simulation of looking back in history. In the 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, traditionally, socio-cultural trends and innovations were co-formulated from the Eastern edges of the continent as well, and after forty years of isolation, East Central and Eastern Europe - like in so many fields - opened up to latest trends on cultural policy discussions in the West. But as a result of the decades long isolation and the multifaceted inability of East Central and Eastern Europe to talk-back, to contribute to the discussion, the discourse on constructing, imaging, and therefore in the end di-visioning Europe still mainly comes from the - geographically seen - north-western peripheries of the continent: And so, the speech on cultural diversity is dominated by these - structurally seen - European centres. But cultural diversity is a concept that cannot be simply imposed exterritorially\textsuperscript{25} (without loosing its meaning). The future and inexorable economic cohesion of the continent will without doubt contribute significantly to overcome these gaps again. Possibly it also will in the long run redefine the periphery-centre relationship. Only this social and mental cohesion of continent, and a vibrant and more egalitarian cultural exchange between Eastern and Western Europe will develop adequate standards of intra-European communication, among others in the field of cultural diversity.

It has to be recognized that there is a necessity to balance out the current unequal ability to speak from different positions within Europe, and it has to become a public debate why an adjustment to local (and very often innovative) cultural traditions to East Central and Eastern European regional perspectives has been rejected for such a long time within these regions themselves - independently of the hegemonic discourses from the West.


\textsuperscript{25} It is very much clear that particularly (the maintenance of) cultural diversity has been one of the strongest EU arguments in the GATT and GATS negotiations.
2.3. Cultural diversity: A term seen from both (or three) Europes

Many and various meanings of cultural diversity, a term adopted by Western European cultural policy makers in the mid-nineties, are in circulation in the academic and political discourses. Altogether, they are proposals to manage the fact that the traditional formations of cultural policy - which (after WWII) have worked for more than fifty years adequately - could not provide an adequate and rational response to the new social and political realities in post-modern multicultural societies anymore. The "whole language and conceptualisation of contemporary cultural policy is bound up in nineteenth century European assumptions about the existence of discrete, homogeneous and historically-based communities. This has profoundly affected our view of 'identity', 'ethnicity', 'centres and margins'. These assumptions have established narrative forms, intentions, and practices that, despite claims to the contrary, act to deny difference. These traditions are increasingly at odds with the post-modern perspective of multiple identities, identities that are both situational (i.e., dependent on which social role is judged by the individual to best suit the given context), and relational (i.e., identity defined in relation to, and through interaction with, others)."

The societal standards of diversity are largely based on models of religious tolerance and respect for national minorities - while the idea of cultural and ethno-cultural diversity is rather new. "It is only in the past few decades that we see a clear trend towards accepting the identity an institutions of such nations within. (...) It is only recently that western countries have (somewhat, A.E. and B.R.) abandoned earlier policies of excluding or assimilating immigrant groups." Today it is increasingly accepted that the integration of immigrant citizens is more than a one-way-street. In the past, it was assumed that the burden of integration fell entirely on immigrants, who were accepted to assimilate to existing norms and practices. Today, however, it is recognized that while immigrants must adapt to the institutions of their new society, so too must these institutions - such as schools, hospitals, public media, the police - adapt to reflect the identities and practices of immigrant groups. The emerging model of a new form of citizenship for immigrants then requires that immigrants have access to citizenship, and that public institutions make various kinds of accommodations for immigrants groups and/or national minorities.

But while in theory, cultural diversity should be connected more offensively to larger themes of equal access for multiple groups within society regardless of origin, class, race, sexual orientation, ethnicity or gender and for the self-expression of cultural, political, and social

26 Heiyl, Cultural Pluralism, op. cit. 2002, 75f.
ideas, it is in practice very often reduced to a limited and restricted interpretation of ethnic and/or national — often ignoring the fact of diversities (e.g. gender and/or generation) within ethnic and national communities. In this regard, cultural diversity shows a large variety of interpretations not only from country to country but also within countries and policies themselves: Almost too much is understood under cultural diversity, it has to comply with so many policies and cultural political strategies that the core message sometimes seems to disappear behind a fashionable, easy, and quickly used and adopted post-modern terminology addressing an urgent need to cope with the fact of changing profiles of societies. It is in the interest of all — the majority and minority people — to come to terms with the many new demands we are facing in that process of societal re-figuration.

The usage and actual practice of the term 'cultural diversity' is a distinct expression of the political, social and cultural history of each European (and non-European) state and/or society beside its common roots in a globalised world (economy). In general, it remains open in each direction and therefore also reflects the continent's diversity itself: But in spite of all discrepancies, there is a basic consensus that cultural diversity signifies the visualization and materialisation of interests of all various types of groups in culture, societal and public space as well as representation of culturally diverse issues and people in habitual cultural mainstream-organisations and institutions. Cultural diversity politics so go cross-section and reach into many fields: social policy, citizenship matters, internal affairs, security policy, legal policy, equal opportunities and anti-discriminatory measures, education, science, arts and culture policies. And not the least to forget: In EU-Europe, during the GATT and GATS negotiations, the term 'cultural diversity' has become a massive response against the high import rates of cultural products from the USA, particularly, the audio-visual sector and film production are in the centre of this political fight.29

It is here, in this variety where the real issue of cultural diversity begins, actually cultural diversities begin, but also can get lost in simple commonplaces and empty formulas. The main difficulty probably lies in the absence of any discussion of relation of power in which both 'the economic', 'the cultural' and 'the social' are situated. In a political-economy context, relations of power would include, among others, those between capital and labour but also definitions of economy and its constitutive components. In a cultural studies context, where the discussion of multiple identities and acceptance of 'others' predominate, such relations would include definitions of culture, constitution of identity, determination of self-other — none of which is a matter of choice, or

formed in a political and social empty space.\textsuperscript{30} And according to their basic approach, cultural studies should and could consider socio-economical and political background of a culturalistic discourse.

The issue, seen from a historical point of view, as to when the category cultural diversity first emerged as a positive reference in cultural policy decisions within a socio-political discourse is reflected in the unequal speed of the emergence of political, social and cultural national state infrastructures. Western integrated and orientated European countries exemplify the slow emergence of social politics' claim on cultural diversity (a term which we can only use retrospectively) running parallel to the new social movements: feminist, peace, lesbian and gay movements, the ecological movement and parallel to all of these the accompanying popular culture interest groups - all together formulating new demands towards culture and politics, overcoming the traditional approach towards the high culture notion of the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century. Cultural politics and culture in the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century more and more had the task of bringing different political subsystems to a level of sensitivity that allowed a constant flow of cultural, social and political innovations through the pores of the political and economic system. The 1980s introduced the originally Canadian and Australian conceptions of multiculturalism to Europe. Migrants - who for a long period of time have been seen as a pure labour force - more and more also needed to be accepted as bearers of ethnic cultures, and were reluctantly accepted as a part of national society. With their usual time lag, political theorists have addressed this phenomenon during the 1990s in a broad ranging debate on multicultural citizenship. "In the context of globalisation discourses this concern appears somewhat old-fashioned, or even reactionary. The prophets of globalisation announce the end of the nation-state and of democracy, as we know it. From this perspective both the demands of multiculturalists for special minority rights and those of integrationists for common values and national identities are outdated. In the world to come, states will be increasingly incapable of regulating migration, and migrants will no longer be disadvantaged minorities. Cultural hybridity will become an asset rather than a burden. States that try to retain closed societies and a homogeneous national culture will be the losers of global competition for investment capital as well as for human capital."\textsuperscript{31}

At the same time, variability became the condition for stability in (post)industrial societies, and one function of cultural policy has become to provide the structural guarantee of this variability with an ambivalent outcome: "The sense that there are plural histories in the world, that there are diverse cultures and particularities which were excluded from Western modernity's universalistic project, but now surface to the extent that they cast doubts on the viability of the project, is


one particular outcome of the current phase of the process of globalisation.\textsuperscript{32}

Modern (and even more traditional) societies are multicultural in themselves, encompassing a multitude of varying ways of life and lifestyles, of vertical and horizontal divisions. Middle-class and working cultures, gender divisions, differences between male and female, or between straight and gay and the various ethnic cultures can constitute quite different cultural patterns and life-styles. So, a traditional approach towards 'culture' will be unable to cope with the inner complexity of modern 'cultures'. Also pure ethnification, a simple reduction of these differences to any kind of ethnicity defined from the outside of communities themselves alone seems to be more and more unreasonable, and - in many respects - always was quite risky for a cohabitation of people with different needs and traditions. The debate on multicultural states - e.g. in the abstract liberal tradition of the USA or in the former British Anglo-Saxon and since the seventies openly supported multicultural tradition in Australia provides points of reference for the today actively driven discussion on Europe's future under the heading 'unity in diversity'.\textsuperscript{33}

As a result of migration and social movements of the new migrants, in the eighties and nineties concepts of (ethnic) multiculturalism and (ethnic) interculturalism in Northwest Europe at least tried to overcome some of the flaws of the traditional concept of culture by advocating a mutual understanding of different ethnic (collective) cultures. But this intercultural model still dragged along - as Wolfgang Welsch notes - the unchanged premise of the traditional conception of culture which creates by its "primary trait - the separatist character of cultures - the secondary problem of a structural inability to communicate between these cultures."\textsuperscript{34} The model of multiculturalism started from the point that different cultures have to live together within one society. It proceeded from the existence of clearly distinguishable, in themselves homogenous cultures - only that these differences exist within one and the same community. "The concept seeks opportunities for tolerance and understanding, and for avoidance or handling of conflict."\textsuperscript{35} Paradoxically, multiculturalism so accepts and even furthers cultural barriers and clearly defined division lines: Its more or less conservative approach towards cultures in a way petrifies particularistic cultural identities, leads to ghettoisation and finally to cultural fundamentalism and essentialisation of culture. Cultures today are no more homogenous islands nor spheres, on the contrary: cultures pass through traditional boundaries and are characterised by mixes, fusions and permeations. Cultures today are extremely

\textsuperscript{35} ibid.
interconnected – are in a way networking with one another with no nod or hub necessarily to be found, or rather constantly changing.

The reality of culture is always a consequence of our conceptions of cultures. The new forms of entanglement are a consequence of migratory processes, as well as of worldwide material and immaterial communications systems and economic interdependencies and dependencies, a consequence of globalisation being dealt with at a local level. It is here where the question of power has to be posed (and which many conceptions of cultural diversity often fail to do), since power, access and availability is the major key of understanding these processes.

Another concept, the one of transculturalism seems to be more consequent of the inner differentiation and complexity of modern cultures. In this approach, all are becoming cultural hybrids at a cultural level. "The concept of transculturality aims for a multi-meshed and inclusive, not separatist and exclusive, understanding of culture. It intends a culture and society whose pragmatic feats exist not in delimitation, but in the ability to link and undergo transition." Historically seen, transculturality is nothing really new, since all European cultures themselves were shaped in a network linking states, regions and individuals. But at the same time a new kind of diversity is created, as well as new spaces for producing diversity. The competing and mixing of cultures occurs not only across the boundaries of nation-state societies, but within them too: "For diversity, as traditionally provided in the form of single cultures, does indeed increasingly disappear. Instead, however, a new type of diversity takes shape: the diversity of different cultures and life-forms, each arising from transcultural permeations." The concept of transculturality so can help to understand the new uniforming processes as well as the processes of diversification and seems to be applicable – with different backgrounds and different 'audiences' – for all parts of Europe, too.

3. The Central and Eastern European region: From caught-between empires and multinational societies to socialist modernisms and latecomer nationalisms

3.1. The 'East' as a special region within Europe

Coincidence or not, the majority of the countries of the second phase of the cultural policy and cultural diversity-project (and subsequently the third phase) are coming from the East Central, Eastern and South Eastern part of Europe. For historical and political reasons, this area of the continent is not only one of the many regions within Europe, comparable to the Northern or the Benelux countries, but – also in its diversity – a

38 ibid. 203.
special case: While other parts of Europe in a way have become equivalent though distinguishable elements, East Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe were and remained more than that.39 The metaphorical iron curtain is gone and societies on both sides of the old continent have become less exotic for each other. As European history gradually turns onto a united track as a slowly coming together of many different national (his/her)stories, Western paradigms, policies, research concerns, theoretical trends, consuming behaviour and political demands have - in the last decade - changed whole traditional and habitual (worn-out) discourses in the Eastern regions. The discourse on democratisation, integration and economic development(alism) could replace the romantic and unproductive ideas about the mythical, fundamentally different Central East and Eastern Europe.

But some kind of a split running across the continent will remain in the minds of the continent's population at least for a while: The East Central and Eastern European countries still need to be specifically explained and understood, and consequently referred to differently. Historically, this is applicable for other European regions as well, as the edges and margins of Europe always were a matter of negotiations and went far beyond today's understanding of Europe's borders: A glimpse into the 18th century on the imaginative exclusion of Spain from Europe Ð as happens today at the moment similarly with the Balkans - (marks that the perception of (Western) Europe as a unity is only a very recent development.40

But while cautiously reiterating East Central and Eastern Europe as a very special European region, and arguing for differences in the regional approaches in perceiving and political handling of cultural diversity, there is no need to reproduce the old East-West divide of the continent along the lines of a developed, upper region and an immature lower region: After all, the particularity of the Second World history is about to dissolve among the many regional histories in Europe.

3.2. Different starting points, similar outcomes

It is a widely accepted approach to stereotypise and to hierarchise the roots of and for inventing and dividing the European nations in civic and ethnic ones41, by that reconstructing the above mentioned continental divide: While the civic components in the West supposedly provide sufficient unity for the functioning of the state (by that enhancing the administration of diversity), in the East Ð for historical reasons Ð these ties supposedly are supplied by ethnic, essentialised ethno-cultural and/or linguistic affiliations (thus preventing or at least aggravating

the development of tolerance and respect of any diversity or 'otherness'). East Central and Eastern European societies are in general portrayed to refer more to the symbolic, cultural and ethnic sphere in constructing their identities than Western ones. And the notion of a homogeneous, not diverse culture is widely connected to something 'national'. It is true, that the nationalist movements in these regions, in general, overstressed the ethnic component of nationhood at the expense of the civic one: Largely because these countries emerged and developed out of opposition to their peripheral status within landlocked imperial structures with the purpose of establishing an alternative kind of political organisation that is a nation-state. The political fragmentation of territorial states has created a distinct administrative variety of institutions (e.g. cultural ministries vs. arts councils), in terms of state strength and (de-)centralisation, as well as duration of democratic practice. This diversity has strongly influenced citizens attitude towards the authority, either reinforcing or inhibiting traditions of self-government and political participation, and influencing the civic character of participation which consecutively influences institutional performance. In the above argument, a civic identity is portrayed as something rational and voluntary — modern, based on laws and a juridical system — while the ethnic identity construction as something which cultivates an attachment to the nation with great emotional resonance provided by tribal — archaic and chaotic — elements. In this stereotypised engendered image, Western Europe as a whole is the rational and active male, Eastern Europe as a whole the emotional and passive female: a discourse that is the result of and depends on political and economic power relations in practice.

Academically, this approach is deeply questionable, since, in most cases, it is difficult to differentiate the so-called 'nationalising' practices of East Central and Eastern European states "from earlier processes of 'nation-building' that occurs in the putatively 'civic' states of the West." The more, empirical researches on forms of national identity in Europe, do not support this clear-cut division along the suggested civic/ethnic line, since Western states also have promoted a homogeneous linguistic and cultural identity, precisely due to the ability of these elements to provide cohesion for populations in an environment in which civic elements of nationhood alone were not up to the task. Also the "assumption that Western 'civic' nations have transcended all forms of ethno-cultural particularism has been strongly challenged by recent

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liberal pluralists.⁴⁵ Before stressing their diversity, Western Europe had eliminated all forms of ambivalences, had 'stream-lined' diversity to market, power and controlling needs. Historically indeed, many Western countries have been very aggressive in their attempts at nation-building. On the other side and apparently weak, there definitely exists a civic attachment to communal values and cultures in East Central and Eastern Europe - the velvet and lawful 'refolutions' (the combination of reforms and revolutions as Timothy Garton Ash has formulated) of 1989/90 have only deepened these so often interrupted or perverted processes. With few exceptions the democratic changes in East Central and Eastern Europe have been peaceful, lawful and civic ones.

In order to soften this antagonism, some authors suggest to introduce a third focus, to define national identity through a community's or society's attachment to cultural values and traditions⁴⁶. But when we regard a nation rather as consequence of cultural technologies and inventions, and the nation as a product of a hierarchical and hegemonic cultural apparatuses (a tool which produces differences, diversities which only have been levelled by the fixity of 'the nation') this definition also has its drawbacks: When 'culture' is attached with such a strong social function (a role it traditionally had in East Central and Eastern Europe), diversity in general and cultural diversity in particular will be made extremely vulnerable. In this context, culture always will have to be defined as something integrative, something which links together, is common, is genetically given and therefore is neither ideologically nor psychologically by any means diversifiable: It is the cement glueing together, forming the nation. And so if 'culture' - and what culture? - becomes the adhesive which holds societies together, then diversification ultimately will lead to the collapse of the nation - which exactly is the historical and mythological narrative of most of the small East Central and South East European nations: The pure and simple 'horror vacui' which has to be avoided by any means. "Whereas the English sing 'there will always be an England', the Poles comfort themselves with the lyrics 'Poland is not yet lost while we are alive'.⁴⁷

This is also the reason why the nightmare of the imagined possibility of losing cultural and national identity, achieved or worked for over centuries for so hard, is one of the main agendas of the new member states in joining the European Union. When the nation and the nation's culture are something set so absolutely, it is hard to follow the necessity and need of diversifying culture. As the national reports document so clearly, almost all cultural political thinking in these regions has the basic theme of a dominant or defining culture⁴⁸, a Leitkultur - to which all other cultures are compared to, measured with. Therefore, a traditional

definition and terminology in this respect and in the best-case scenario will only be capable to accept multiculturalisation of a state culture (in the sense of the definition used above), but not of any cultural diversity.

But in the end, is there really such a huge difference between the West and the East? Stuart Hall⁴⁹, for instance, suggested to re-define the (British) nation: For him, this redefining process, the inclusion of the experiences of culturally (and politically) marginalized groups into the 'national cultural heritage', is a huge challenge at the moment for cultural politics in general, and especially for mainstream cultural organisations such as museums, galleries and other national flagship institutions within the areas of theatre and music. While diversifying the cultural mainstream is an important goal of the new cultural diversity policies in the West, this suggestion remains in the framework of a 'national' or 'dominant culture', in simply including the marginalized into the project of 'nation-building', that means at the end also opening it up for broader participation. But is this enough to make the voices of the long subaltern heard - and is such an extension enough or do we need to re-define culture pointing beyond these frameworks? So in East and West alike, the question remains: Which of society's groups are authorized to contribute to what is understood as 'national identity' or as 'cultural diversity' and how can the power of any definition - mainstream, alternative or insubordinate, rebellious - be safeguarded (and fostered) through the influence, and therefore control, of (mainstream and 'alternative') cultural and political institutions and non-institutions, alike?

3.3. Traditional cultural and new diversity politics in East Central and Eastern Europe

After 1990, most Central East and Eastern European democracies were engaged in a process of 'catch-up nationalisation' for making up for suppressed national identity. The tensions involved in forging a nation by initiating cultural projects are abundant in the newly independent states: they are marketplaces of identities and the competition among groups to capture the allegiance of individuals is conspicuous.

In this context, the issue of cultural diversity could not receive the same cultural policy relevance as it did already in Western European cultural policies at this time, at best this was reduced to ethno-cultural justice: On the formal side, rather the classic issues of cultural politics as state-subsidies for mainstream culture, exploring new funding mechanisms, institutional decentralisation and the question of granting cultural autonomies arose. On the ideological side, the construction for a new 'national identity', the symbolic rebirth of the nation, pros and cons of building 'national' theatres and concert halls or reconstructing

⁴⁹ in his keynote speech for the Arts Council conference 'Whose Heritage?' in November 1999
torn-down icons of the past in 'national' architectural styles, adopting cultural policy to new market needs, and protectionism against the mass influx of popular cultural goods from the West were the main momentum of almost all cultural policies debates in East Central and Eastern Europe: And it is undeniable that these debates strongly have influenced the public, the needs and demands in cultural production and consumption in the past decade and have turned down attention towards newer, more innovative trends in cultural policy discussions.

But East Central and Eastern Europe also has a centuries old – invented or not – tradition, a specific form of cultural diversity deriving from the preservation of the heterogeneity of the populace as a result of the weakness of the ruling powers which did not have the interest, force or incentive – as did the Western empires – for homogenising their subjects in linguistic, religious or cultural ways:

- So East Central and Eastern European nation states were formed with much more noticeable efforts as clear and outspoken political projects as answers to the long domination of the Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian Empires
- Being more remote, East Central and Eastern European countries and societies were less exposed to political and social modernisation,
- And one party dominance after WWII did not accept the most trivial uncontrolled forms of 'diversity' besides central party rule (but made possible wide range accessibility to (high) culture in a classical sense).

But evidently, in forming their nation-states these countries used many of the same tools Western democracies use or have used. These include and included official language policies, attempts to create a uniform system of national education, the invention of a national history and culture, the codification of migration and naturalization policies, requiring migrants to adopt a common national identity as a condition of naturalisation, the association of minority politics with questions of loyalty and security, the redrawing of administrative districts to dilute the weight of minorities, the centralisation of power, so that all decisions are made in a context where the dominant group forms a clear majority.50

For a long period, East Central and Eastern Europe were multiethnic and multicultural regions with complex historical developments and complicated (multi-)identities oriented along the power logics of dominant empires. The questions, tactics and strategies of ethno-cultural power-play, justice and diversity always were present here51: It is no coincidence that major theories and models on introducing and maintaining

ethno-cultural justice, cultural autonomy, minority rights regimes, and ensuring cultural diversity still discussed or probed today originate from these regions themselves52 (e.g. the concepts of the Austrian Socialdemocrats Otto Bauer und Karl Renner53 at the beginning of the 20th century). "Rightly foreseeing the dangers of trying to apply the Western model of the 'homogenising' state to the multi-national patchwork of Central and Eastern Europe, more prescient political actors stressed the need to recognise ethnic diversity and to seek to manage it rather that seeking a definitive 'resolution' of the problem."54

At the same time, the cultural and scientific achievements of these historical forms of heterogeneities (and cultural, ethnic ambivalences) are outstanding and well documented. They are the unsurpassed products and artefacts of cultural diversity at its best, best illustrated on the ambivalent phenomenon of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: Although its structure missed any kind of nation-state content, at the same time paradoxically it seemed to be predestined - by its heterogeneous political and cultural ideologies as well as by its cultural diversity - to construct and enforce special forms of modern multiple and hybrid identities. The fragmentation and diversity of life stories was a constant constituent of this region, and - in a way - certain conditions of post-modernity were tested here55. Experiments, which had to fail under illiberal circumstances. On the other hand, evidently, such a situation - due to its complexity always was in need of stability or at least stabilising elements56, needed to be managed (which in a way also contributed in shaping modern cultural bureaucracy at a very early stage). The accelerated social differentiation - comparable to similar processes today - ensured the awareness towards the 'other' within society, within individuals, of alterities and influenced the individual and collective mentality and mind. The systems of reference along which individuals orientated themselves, got more and more complex, the search for identities more diverse and arbitrary.

But the existence of multi-ethnic environments did not mean the acceptance of the 'other', did not provide any help to overcome differences and social conditions did not change, on the contrary it was stereotyped and in a way petrified - exactly because the ethnic differences were maintained, even more: namely constructed, and not dissolved. This process would have demanded a constant de-legitimisation of traditional cleavages, the constant adjustment to different and diverse value systems and patterns of order, a clear policy. So, the feeling of insecurity al-

52 to be named: Karl Renner, Otto Bauer, Oszkár Jászai, István Bibó, Petru Groza.
54 David J. Smith, Framing the National Question, op. cit. 2002, 6
ready endorsed by modernisation processes was even reinforced. And as a result, the cultural memory of this region is packed with different heterogeneous codes, which on the one side are the source of the wealth of the regions' culture - or at least the resources cultures and cultural and tourist industries refer to until today - on the other side the basis for their tensions, internal as well as external. Although around the turn of the last century methods to analyse and to explain individual and collective crises were already given, the crises and conflicts as a consequence of cultural heterogeneity could not be eliminated, only - by making them conscious (a term also deriving from the region) - somewhat alleviated. The example of one segment of East Central Europe's history helps to understand the possibilities but also the threats of differences and diversities in cultural contexts - as opposite to the sometimes one-dimensional views on multiculturalism as a cordial, harmonic interlock of various and diverse cultural codes - under the guidance of a dominant one.

So, the complex cultural (diversity) system of Central Europe - besides its achievements - also was a source of insecurities, individual and collective crises and conflicts, tensions, anxieties and nervousness which politically could not be resolved and finally lead to the dissolution of the unstable balance of this region. Nevertheless, the political crises were the central conflicts not the cultural ones. Consequently it (was) steered into the 'ambivalence of modernity', into a series of historic catastrophes, construction of so-called nation-states, their failure, and in some cases their ultimate break-up. If we like the term, with cultural nationalism modernity came to the region, with all its ambivalences.

By today's standard, ethnic and (ethnically marked) cultural diversity was suppressed and disregarded by the Stalinist and post-Stalinist systems in East Central and Eastern Europe. But it was not the repression of ethnic or national difference(s), it was the negation of all kind of diversity, the atomisation of society Stalinism was about. The post-communist era, the establishment of new states and tendencies to (re-)build 'national' states since 1989 have revived nationalism, old ethnic stereotypes and dangerous ethnocentric myths.

Since the era of instrumentalised state culture has not yet been forgotten in East Central and Easter Europe, any kind of intervention by any state institution, cultural policy or cultural planning regimes into furiously freely working cultural initiatives is looked at suspiciously. The current 'euroconforming' structures are securing a new set of opportunities and constraints that need to be reckoned with in the process of discovering, or rediscovering, patterns of stability within a new political environment. But altogether they also could reproduce the old patterns of

57 Csáky, Pluralistische Gemeinschaften, op. cit. 1999, 47.
constant antagonisms and contradictions if not implemented and used care-fully.

4. Mapping diversity in countries of East Central and Eastern Europe

The authors of the three national reports of Hungary, Romania, and Russia - following the guidelines and questionnaire of the transversal study approach - portrayed the thematic complex of cultural diversity in their own country in a rather narrow sense, almost exclusively restricting it to the question of national, linguistic, and ethnic, sometimes religious minorities. According to the framework of ethnically marked diversity and taking into account the traditional Western image of East Central and Eastern European as a traditional ethnic conflict zone, all reports try to overcome these prejudices by illustrating all possible positive examples of minority rights regimes in the given cultural politics that in general follow European guidelines and recommendations. The recognised - and only these - national minorities receive widespread support from governments and this support is maintained (as evident from not only the report but also the visits) and legitimised partly based on the historical, partly on a European and domestic integration perspective. Interestingly, none of the reports tried to give a definition diversity in the specific countries' cultural political context. Therefore, it can be concluded that cultural diversity not only as a term, but as a policy pointing beyond ethnic and national differences, is not a topic on the cultural policy agenda of the countries reported on: almost no special measures, schemes, projects and programs for cultural diversity which go beyond ethnic and/or national minorities and include the new minorities are addressed in the reports.

Hypothetically, nevertheless it becomes evident from the reports that the main aims of the given cultural policies at the moment are nation-(re)building (which - on the level of the concept of multiculturalism - includes granting rights to certain minorities). The new immigrants, gender questions, sexual orientation issues, the question of diversity within urban and rural cultural patterns etc. still are not so evident, or at least so evidently discussed and challenged than in Western European countries: Nationalising and ethnically marking a public sphere goes parallel to less recognition of other forms of diversity. Looking from the West, on the one hand this might look as a simple theoretical and semantic gap or some kind of time-lag (which might be true to some extent), nevertheless it seems to be more reasonable to look for broader explanations. Being aware of the fact that the countries of East Central and Eastern Europe are within themselves culturally highly diverse, there remains the essential question why cultural diversity - not only as a fashionable term - is not on the agenda of cultural politicians of the region.
4.1. Hungary

4.1.1. Mapping diversity

According to the census of 1990 Hungary ethnically seen is a more or less homogeneous country: 97.8 percent of the inhabitants are Hungarians (Magyars), while 98.5 percent have Hungarian as their native tongue. According to estimations of Hungarian authorities the number of nationalities and ethnic communities is considerably higher: they may comprise as much as eight to ten percent of the population. So Hungary, on very official grounds can be regarded both as a monolingual and a pluri-ethnic state. These statistical differences are related to the fact that most persons belonging to a minority for historical reasons fear to disclose their ethnic, linguistic, religious or national affiliations. Hungarian citizens therefore are not obliged to answer any of these questions in the course of a census.

Hungary's national and ethnic minorities live widely spread within the area of Hungary and not in settlement blocs, while the rate of minorities within any given settlement is generally 3 to 5 percent. The officially recognised 'historical' minorities are: Armenians, Bulgarians, Croats, Germans, Greeks, Gypsy/Roma, Greeks, Polish, Romanians, Ruthenians, Serbs, Slovaks, Slovenes, and Ukrainians. Some of these minorities are remnant communities with hardly any relevance, some of them large and very lively and energetic societies.

According to census and estimations the Roma minority is by far the largest ethnic (national) community. Interpreting the number of Roma in Hungary, Hungary is the fourth among 38 countries having Roma population, after Romania, Bulgaria, and Spain. As in many other East Central European countries, from 1949 to 1980 authorities did not recognise the Hungarian Roma as a separate nationality or ethnic group. From the 1950s the government aggressively eliminated the traditional self-governing voivode system thus laying grounds for the collapse of social networks of the Roma.

Due to a international work force of the former Socialist Bloc, students from the third world and (rather new) immigration to the country, Hungary also has – officially not recognised as minorities – still rather small, but sometimes visible 'new ethnic minorities' like Arabs, Chinese, and Vietnamese.

Hungary is also a country where – for historical, ethnic, religious, political reasons – very different cultural patterns compete and struggle with one another forming, not without severe conflicts, a vibrant and diverse cultural scene, especially in the capital of Budapest.

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4.1.2. Governmental and constitutional provision for diversity

Within the Hungarian administration (and the political sphere) treatment of minority issues and minority affairs has a very prominent place – not the least because of many Hungarians living as minorities outside of the Republic proper. Several ministries and offices are involved with minority affairs, and most ministries have special divisions for minority and ethnic affairs. The National Office of Ethnic Minorities, created in 1990, coordinates, as an independent administrative body with national competence, all tasks related to national and ethnic minorities living in Hungary: it prepares all laws with effect on minorities, elaborates minority policies in general, co-ordinates the implementation of governmental responsibilities with all ministries. A newly installed minister for securing equal rights will safeguard the civil rights of minorities, disabled and women. Also, the Hungarian Parliament has installed an Ombudsman to protect and survey minority and ethnic rights.

In 1993, parliament accepted the Minorities Act, which defines the concept of national and ethnic minorities. Officially, the definitions national and ethnic are not used to differentiate but are rather two names each having evolved differently in history, expressing the same idea: Though there certainly is a semantic difference between the two terms which needs to be analysed. In accordance with the law following groups are regarded as ethnic or national minorities with full legal rights, including the establishment of self-governing executive bodies: Armenians, Bulgarians, Croats, Germans, Greeks, Gypsy/Roma, Greeks, Poles, Romanians, Ruthenians, Serbs, Slovaks, Slovenes, and Ukrainians. Other minorities are entitled to establish their own civil organisations, cultural associations, institutes and schools, but they are neither allowed to establish systems of self-administration and cultural autonomy nor entitled for normative financial support.

The system and structure of the minority self-governments is the key element of the minorities act. Every citizen committed or belonging to any minority elects these self-governments bodies in the course of municipal and local general elections. A minority municipal government or local minority self-government can be established in townships, towns, and in the districts of Budapest. On the local and national level the respective bodies of these minority self-governments have to be consulted in any regulations in regard of the minorities.

4.1.3. Cultural policy and diversity

According to the goal to create a minority-friendly environment, Hungarian governments sought to pursue minority and cultural policies which enable national minorities to preserve and strengthen their cultural identities. Hungary regards the conscious fostering of the culture of national and ethnic minorities not only as an international duty, but also as a long-term national interest. Hungarian minority policies at the same time cannot be detached from the fact of more than two million Hungarians living outside of the country's borders.
Without public support, no independent minority institution network can be maintained on a local level. Besides the public political help and support given to NGO's, another condition of the realisation of this policy is a organisational as well as financial strengthening of civil organisations. This, however, is entirely dependent upon the broadening of the organisations' independent financial resources as well as the support for economic enterprises which includes the cultural and other ventures set up by the different cultural groups. In the recent decade, a prosperous entrepreneur and trading branch has developed within most national minority groups.

4.2. Romania

4.2.1. Mapping diversity

Romania regards herself - in her own understanding - as "Europe on a small scale", rich in diversity and at the same time a unity, a unifying nation-state. The territory of today's Romania traditionally was inhabited by a large number of ethnically and linguistically very diverse groups, peoples, nationalities, and nations, some of them by now vanished or almost completely assimilated, like the small ethnic groups of the Huzuls or the Aromuns. Also most of the other minorities - numerically seen - form only very small groups within the country: Albanians, Armenians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Croats, Greeks, Italians, Poles, Serbs, Slovaks, Tatars, Turks, Ukrainians, each of them accounting from 0.01 percent 0.2 percent of Romania's population. One of the historically strongest minorities, the German-speaking one, with around 4.4 percent of the population in the 1930s has at the end of the 1990s almost completely disappeared. Decimated by the mass exodus, beginning in the Ceauşescu years until after 1990, the minority today and - according to estimates - only accounts for 0.3 percent of Romania's population.

The two strongest minorities in today's Romania are the Hungarians, living mainly but not exclusively, in two settlement blocks along the Hungarian border and in parts of Transylvania, and representing 6.6 percent of the population, and the Roma with - officially - 2.5 percent. The Roma did not have any minority status until 1990. In the chapter on ethnic and linguistic minorities, the national report also specifies a Jewish minority, accounting for 0.015 percent of Romania's population.

4.2.2. Governmental and constitutional provision for diversity

On the cross-roads of diverse cultures of Europe, Romanian cultural policy has the chance to reflect on a variety and richness of its cultural heritage in a national, European, and a transnational setting. In 1950, under the pressure of the USSR, Romania accepted to create a Hungarian autonomous region in Transylvania, which was dissolved in 1958. Though

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officially nationally and ethnically neutral, the Communist regime tried to homogenise the population by transfer of Romanians in areas mainly populated by minorities or by a reduced use of minority languages in the public, and by closing of minority schools and universities.

After 1989, during the period of transition to a democratic society, the cultural sector in Romania suffered from a variety of serious problems based on over-centralised structures inherited from the former system as well as under the rapid changes in domestic and international cultural production modes. In accordance with the principles of the European Charter of Regional and Minorities Languages and the Frame Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the Educational Act – codifying the rights and privileges of the minorities was passed.

The Intercultural Institute of Timișoara – established in 1992 – is an autonomous, non-governmental institution with cultural and scientific activities, adhering to the principles and values of interculturality.

4.2.3. Cultural policy and diversity

Currently, the Romanian Cultural Strategy – formulated by the Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs (sic!) – identifies the main objectives and priorities in the development of social cohesion through partnership at local, regional, and central level, in the sustainable development of culture from a synergetic and integrative perspective of education, culture, regional development, tourism, cross-border and regional cooperation, as well as the preservation and conservation of monuments. The administrative priorities of the Romanian cultural policy currently are decentralization, institutional reorganisation and restructuring, building up partnerships with local public authorities in order to harmonise the national cultural policy with the local ones, and finally finding possible partnerships with the structures of the civil society.

The main functions of the Ministry of Culture and Religious affairs include regulatory functions, in initiating and developing specific legislative programmes; representational functions, in which the ministry cooperates with other ministries; an organisational function as well as a control function. A long-term cultural strategy is currently being elaborated.

Euroart, the 'Fund for the Development of Arts and Civil Society', supports special projects in intercultural communication. These include rehabilitation of public spaces in the city of Cluj (Kolozsvár) to encourage cross-cultural understanding by involving people from different ethnic groups, the development of museums of ethnography and libraries. Future programs include the setting up of National Councils against Discrimination, and for Research on Interethnic Relations.
4.3. Russian Federation  

4.3.1. Mapping diversity

Russia is a country of extraordinary cultural (and ethnic) diversity. The recent census registered 130 ethnic groups. With more than eighty percent, the Russians indisputably though dominate the make-up of the population, and in spite of a high level of assimilation by minorities to the Russian culture and language, a great part of these minorities for the most part still have the fundamentals of their own ethnic culture. The cultural pluralism in the Russian Federation is based upon historically developed distinctive traits of ethnic groups. The majority of peoples in Russia are indigenous. The number of the new minorities is estimated by independent experts to be around two to three million persons, mostly illegal and from Afghanistan, China, Vietnam, Iraq, Nigeria, Bangladesh and CIS countries. These migrants settle first of all in the cities of the Russian Federation, thereby contributing to their cultural diversity and calling for greater government support to the system of extraterritorial ethnic and cultural autonomy.

In general, the notion of cultural diversity in the Russian Federation is very much concentrated on the fact of ethnic diversity; other questions are largely ignored or not dealt with. Questions of diversity, access and self-responsibility pointing beyond the questions of pure ethno-cultural justice, e.g. media diversity, are severely limited in the Russian Federation or under heavy state control.

Yet, the cultural or better ethnic diversity of Russia is a much more all-encompassing concept than a list of non-Russian minorities: It is associated with ethno-linguistic, religious and status varieties, powerful ethnic diasporas that originated from demographic and migration processes. Different concepts of possibly approaching the variety of diversity dominate – and have to dominate – the federal discussion, separating the different groups with the help of different terms and definitions, but also securing a wide range of rights and possibilities based on territorial, diasporic, personal, cultural, religious and ethnic principles.

4.3.2. Governmental and constitutional provision for diversity

On the whole the ethnic and cultural policy followed by the Russian Federation is based on a sound legislative framework. It includes provisions on the inalienability of the rights and freedoms of human beings, including in the ethnic and cultural area, the federal structure of the country, including ethnic criteria to define this, guarantees to develop and preserve all peoples' languages and culture, safeguards the protection of the rights of ethnic minorities, as well as the original environment and traditional way of life of small ethnic and indigenous communities, and the right for self-governing bodies. But in many respects, these laws

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also follow a paternalistic policy in respect of minorities and ethnic groups.

The legislative framework underlying the cultural policy pursued by the government of the Russian Federation is targeted at managing the cultural development of society on the whole, including the allocation of authority between different levels of governance, the requirements of minorities within the framework of ethnic and cultural autonomy, the specific problems of the development of indigenous small peoples, and according to the report, the religious life of Russian citizens. In the mid-1990s a range of principal laws for the guidance of cultural institutions in a general framework were enacted. The legislative framework to pursue the government policy in respect of ethnic and cultural development comprises the following main normative acts: the law "Concerning the rehabilitation of repressed people" (1991), the federal laws "Concerning the independent ethnic development of the USSR citizens living outside their national entities or not having them on the territory of the USSR" (1990), "Concerning the languages of the peoples of the RSFR" (1991), "Concerning the fundamental principles of the legislation of the Russian Federation on culture" (1992), and "Concerning the ethnic and cultural autonomy" (1996). Numerous presidential decrees also regulate questions of cultural rights.

According to the critical Russian report, problems with the current legislation arise primarily of the fact that it does not provide a single legal package to manage relations between ethnic groups, to preserve and develop ethnic cultures and languages. The most elaborated law "Concerning the languages of the Russian Federation" is incomplete; the law "Concerning the legislation on culture" structured according to international legal norms looks at the issue of ethnic and cultural autonomy from a very fragmented perspective. The law "Concerning the ethnic and cultural autonomy" does not set forth government obligations in respect of ethnic and cultural minorities in a unambiguous and explicit form. The effective laws do not provide a clear interpretation of how authority in the ethnic and cultural sphere is assigned between the federal and subnational governments.

Thus, the current legislative framework limits opportunities for the reproduction and development of ethnic cultures and languages of minorities, in particular those living outside traditional places of residence, and does not bind executive authorities to follow an efficient ethnic and cultural policy to forestall potential conflicts. The most serious problems in the current legislation are those of systematisation of the rights of peoples and minorities, and obligations of the federal state to implement these rights, ambiguous wording of the legal status of ethnic and cultural autonomy, as well as the absence of a unequivocal definition of the concept of 'ethnic and cultural association'.

4.3.3. Cultural policy and diversity

Despite the considerable number of regulations and other conceptual documents, there is no clear strategy of cultural policy aimed at the mainte-
nance of cultural diversity of the country. This is manifested only at
the level of the values where the general question is posed how to com-
bine the value of cultural pluralism with the need for stability and a
high degree of the social integration.

Most important political decisions are not put into life or are distorted
in the process of implementation. The diversity, variety and a jungle of
terminologies\textsuperscript{64} in Russian laws regulating the ethnic and cultural life
of and therefore cultural diversity as well as the discrepancies between
them call for the codification of current legislation.

This work may help fill up some gaps in the legislative acts, lay the
foundations for shaping the state ideology in the ethnic and cultural
sphere and endure efficient distribution of the powers among the major
subjects of the cultural policy. There is though a general call for mod-
els for further possible development: It is the goal to take into account
the experience of the Soviet times when the cultural diversity of the
country was preserved and a wide network of educational and cultural es-

tablishments was set up, while developing democratic principles of cul-
tural pluralism; it also should bring into life the cultural reproduction
of separate peoples and minorities, while the system of territorial
autonomy typical of Russia should be organically supplemented by exterr-
torial forms of cultural self-activities.

The Russian Federation in many ways is an exception to countless Western
European rules on diversity. The complicated composition of the popula-
tion with its complicated hierarchies, traditions and narratives within
the ethnic and national minorities altogether would be a challenge for
any policy makers and legislatives anywhere, not only the Russian federal
ones. The key question is whether the Russian Federation is ready to take
that challenge: alone, the constant curtailing of the diversity of the
media, the civil war in Chechnya does not show in this direction.

5. Diversity, citizenship, cultural policy: comparative perspectives
5.1. Differences, old and new challenges

For historical as well as reasons of current events, East Central and
Eastern Europe, are regarded as ethnic and territorial patchworks, loci
of permanent and apparently irreducible tribal hatreds and ethno-cultural
tensions where peoples are obsessed about their ethnical heritage(s). In
fact - major parts of the Russian Federation and some distinguishable
regions and territories excluded - the populace of East Central and East-
ern Europe is not an entangled, intertwined, and highly diverse ethnic
mixture anymore.\textsuperscript{65} Mass exoduses, emigration movements, waves of politi-
cal refugees, forced emigration, pressures to adapt and assimilate, popu-
lation exchanges, deportation, and the Shoah, but also 'internal coloni-

\textsuperscript{64} Birgit Kainz, Zum Schutz ethnischer Gruppen in der Russischen Föderation. Ein Dschungel
\textsuperscript{65} László Szarka, Typological Arrangement of the Central European Minorities. In: Minorities
Research. A Collection of Studies by Hungarian Authors. 2. Budapest (Lucidus) 2000,
24-32.
sation', economic demands and structural development, different demo-
graphic behaviour, vertical mobilisation and the thereof resulting need
to rethink cultural and linguistic survival strategies have made these
regions of Europe in a relatively short period ethnically more homogenous
than parts of Western Europe. East Central and Eastern Europe in many re-
spects have very similar 'ethnoscapes' than Western Europe - only the pe-
riod of time in which this has been achieved was extremely shorter. A
century ago about half of the population of the area under consideration
was identified with one ethnic minority or another; sixty years ago the
proportion was about one-quarter. Today, it might be estimated that no
more than one-tenth of the population in East Central Europe belongs to
an ethnic minority. Minorities in East Central Europe are living testimo-
nies to the meanders of the past, and perhaps also to the uncertainties
of the future. They are like archaeological layers they recount a his-
tory: It is the negation of piously cultivated narratives of continuity
and of identity between a land, a state and a majority people. Minorities
are a disturbing reminder.66 Unlike at the beginning of the 20th century
when the regions' minorities could be classified as politically 'enforced
minorities' (or 'accidental diasporas'67) created by border changes and
shaping of new nations, today the still remaining ones all can be charac-
terised as some kind of remnant communities: "The main cause of all this
can undoubtedly traced back to the historical fact that, save for a few,
very short periods, the nation-states of Central Europe all tried to ter-
minate, assimilate or perfectly abolish the minority groups, instead of
recognising and integrating them as equal partners."68 And so the collec-
tive memories and traded experiences of almost all societies in East Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe regarding ethnic or cultural diversity is least
to say ambivalent: Being diverse, belonging to 'the other' means being
identifiable, means being endangered, is a perilous status. This is one
of the reasons of some popular reservations towards diversity, towards
ambivalence and for the recognizable cult of conformity. The newly
achieved, blood-spattered homogeneity and in many respect its accom-
panying monotonous and monochromatic environment meant and means 'safe
haven' (evidently this will only last - as we learned from so many coun-
tries - as long as discussion about how this homogeneity was achieved is
banned from the public sphere).

But even if we are faced today with more or less ethnically homogenous
societies, this does not necessarily mean that those are in any way cul-
trally not diverse and homogenous, since traditions, habits and memories
of a gone era remained alive - even under the surface, in spite (or maybe
exactly because) of repression. Slowly again, they are reactivated for
various reasons, not the least on the grounds that diversity, diverse
traditions, differing identities can become an important asset in the
economic race. And most recently, the processes of integration into new
common values and habits, the re-evaluations of the past, the construc-

66 Liebich, Ethnic Minorities, op. cit. 1998, 1 and 3.
68 Szarka, op. cit. 2000, 25.
tions of new social and democratic consensuses or dissents, the rapid emergence of new consumption and social behaviour patterns have produced all kinds of new diversities, a new layer above the older ones, still existing though spilt.

It is not the actual existence or missing of cultural and autochthonous ethnic minorities which show differences in regard of possible comprehensions and interpretations of diversity within Europe: It is the cultural and public coding concerning minorities which still differs and therefore in many respects also the concepts and ideas of and about diversities. To simply state that the questions of cultural diversity on Western Europe originate mostly from exogenous features like mass immigration while cultural diversity in East Central and Eastern Europe derives for endogenous rationales like autochthonous minorities would though oversimplify a very complex question (since the immigrant societies already have become an integrated part of the Western societies and in East Central and Eastern Europe the old minorities are only one module of cultural diversity), nevertheless it is here where the crucial points of the differences could be found.

One reason for the diverse approaches to diversity is an important historical reminiscence diametrically different in Western Europe on the one side and East Central and Eastern Europe on the other: The experiences of the European societies in respect of the great overseas properties and colonies of the empires and consequently contact with non-European civilizations are fundamentally different. Without doubt, the history of colonialism and the process of de-colonisation have (had) a strong impact on the current approaches towards cultural diversity on the different discourses on cultural policies. The statement - "As a consequence of its belligerent, imperialistic and colonialist history, Europe now contains a rich diversity of cultures and identities." only applies to peripheral Western (and later Southern and West Central) Europe, since only this part of the continent took part in the great European enterprises like the great discoveries, colonialism, de-colonisation and transnational integration. "It will be useful to remember that, (...) as recently as two generations ago, nine of the fifteen states that constitute the European Union today directly controlled 31 percent to 46 percent of the land surface outside of Europe and Antarctic." As the nation state proclaims its triumph throughout the world, it finds itself undermined on its own home ground – exactly by all kinds of diversities the homogenising concept wanted to overcome. (durch die diversities? oder wie ist das zu verstehen? – danke! GENAU) Even as the metropolitan states have given up their empires to concentrate on domestic homogeneity, they have found themselves living with remnants of empire in the form of new

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post-colonial minorities: Empires have gone but all kinds and forms of 'minorities' or better: 'diversities' have returned.

So while Western Europe societies were colonising, East Central and East Europe were surfing between a status of a-wannabe-half-colonisers and a status of being colonised by landlocked empires - a fundamental discrepancy in shaping so many mentalities, practices, and discourses within Europe, among them the discourse on cultural diversity. Much of Central and Eastern Europe's (non-verbalised and often imagined) anxieties and reservations towards the European Union result from the experiences of having been a periphery within hegemonic empires with imperial habits and behaviours, anxieties and fears which exist independently from the actual discourse and communication within the Union herself.

Much of Western Europe's understanding of cultural diversity in the last forty years derives from external intentional immigration, mostly but not exclusively a result of a colonial past - which in the end evidently is an ethnically marked understanding of diversity. Much of East Central and Eastern Europe's understanding of cultural diversity derives from some kind of a negative reminiscence of a multi-ethnic society, to be exact: internal migration, non-migration or often forced resettlement on ethnic grounds - which finally evidently is also an ethnically marked understanding of diversity.

Germany, West Central Europe and Northern Europe - not having had a substantial colonial past and not equating national socialism with colonialism in a narrow sense - might be regarded as an exception of this rule (while de-nazification as a - though imposed - process of coming to terms with a racist, violent and terrorist past obviously carries some elements of the process of decolonisation). But in this respect 'post-colonialism' does not mean a simple 'after' in the sense of a linear, chronological progression, but rather a reconfiguration of the whole field in which the colonial discourse flows into. It is in this reconfiguration when the post-colonial talk becomes of interest for the cultural diversity discourse: Sociologically and culturally investigating the real phenomena of the post-modern world - mass-emigration, global circulation, signs and information.

While in Western Europe the national cultures are beginning to be co-produced from the perspectives of the new 'rainbow-coalition' minorities, postcolonial history very slowly becomes inherent to Western national identities, in East Central and Eastern Europe a very different setting is launched under the multiculturalism paradigm which - in the best case scenarios - allow parallel nation-buildings within states and/or widespread cultural minority rights. In a way this is exactly the flipside of the colonialism paradigm: As East Central and Eastern Europe do not share the memory of colonialism, these regions are missing the recognition and

appreciation of the process and necessity of de-colonisation, the experience of coming to terms with a colonialist, racist past, a mass influx of immigrants from the former colonies, and the familiarity and almost everyday experience of (ethnic and sometimes also visual) cultural diversity in a post-colonial meaning: In this vague sense, any small town in North-west Europe shows more diversity than any metropolis of East Central Europe – which might be at the same time superficial though but also in a way real. The lack of historical encounters or contacts of these countries with non-Europeans shapes a fundamental difference between countries with and without overseas colonies.72

In Western Europe most immigrants – up to now – have not resisted to integrate into the mainstream society, and – if the possibility given – took part in the nation-building and/or communal civic projects of their host countries: What those immigrants have tried to do – once the rights for it granted – is to renegotiate the terms of integration. Indeed, recent debates over cultural diversity in immigrant countries are precisely debates over renegotiating the terms of this integration. Immigrants are demanding a more tolerant or 'multicultural' approach to integration that allows and indeed supports immigrants to maintain various aspects of their ethno-cultural heritage even as they integrate into common institutions operating in the majority language or according to the cultural codes of the majority. So, revising the terms of integration, not abandoning the goal of integration is still the aim. In this process, the mainstream societies also have renegotiated their own heritage, history and habits, in a way starting to dismantle the concepts of minority and majority. But obviously: It is still unclear, how the mainstream societies should deal with groups which are not ready to accept these or terms or any term of integration, exclude themselves from widely accepted value systems.73 And it is still unclear how cultural policy should handle population factions not ready to accept the given rules of cultural diversity (which are set up according to the demands of the – still existing – majority societies and their elites). And after all, representation of identity or culture of any subculture or minority group still has to express itself in the symbolic order which still dominantly is marked by the discourses of the principal dominant culture(s).

On the other side, East Central and Eastern Europe hardly ever were confronted with migrants; it was rather the East Central and Eastern European peasants and workers who provided the masses for transcontinental, lesser intra-continental migration. These men and women gave the next generations – the ones who left, and the ones who stayed – a specific perspective on questions of integration and assimilation, and – since emigration flows never have been a one-way street – the possibility to form early transnational communities. Looking at these century old emigration flows from a transnational angle, one can clearly state that the émigrés themselves have also influenced their home countries regarding cultural diversity. E.g., in the socialist era, while being cut off of

72 Bar_a, Ethnocultural Justice in East European States, op. cit 2001, 248.
73 cf. Pál Nyiri's research paper in this volume.
the official information streams by a controlled media, most of the East Central and Eastern European countries obtained their information on much of the developments in the cultural field in 'the West' through émigré groups and family ties in Canada, USA, Australia or Western Europe. The cultural needs and desires of these regions were not only formed by official media, but also by very early forms of these communities. These transnational networks initiated modernisation processes in the European peripheries, and commenced border-crossing Europeanisation at a very early stage.

At the same time, East Central, South Eastern and Eastern Europe were the major sources from which the traditional immigrant countries got their resources in building their nations and their wealth, not the least their cultural diversity. Up until today, these countries stayed a traditional emigration, and in consequence a 'brain-drain' area. The flipside of this cultural reciprocal cultural enrichment, in East Central and Eastern Europe again, is the phenomenon of self-victimization which prevents a reasonable discussion on migration, forming of innovative and culturally bargaining transnational communities, accepting other ones and working with them in their own societies. Only the re-evaluation of this traditional cultural self-image of Central East and Eastern European societies (which also means the hard work of reassessment and reinterpretation of many classical cultural masterpieces of the national high cultures) will make possible new approaches and policies in so many a policy field for the future within the Union.

When talking about cultural diversity, East Central and Eastern Europe place the emphasis – as we have seen in the three national reports – almost 'naturally' on the national and ethnical minorities – not referring to any post-colonial experience. In general, these more or less autochthonous groups demand nothing more than any comparable minority in EU-Europe – and it seems plausible that the same principles should apply in evaluating those demands. Minority right regimes and laws once formulated have been very beneficial to minorities in East Central and Eastern Europe – especially in highlighting the existence of certain minorities at all and thereby promoting some form of multiculturalism – within the field of a dominant national culture. But in many respects, these acts also reified the exclusion of non-white, non-straight, non-mainstream minorities from the diversity (and minority) discourse. The new 'euroconforming' structures are in the long creating a new set of opportunities and constraints that need to be reckoned with in the process of discovering, or rediscovering, patterns of ethnic and non-ethnic balance within a new political environment.

And again the feeling could arise that – once the ethnic and national minority assignment more or less turned in – there is the next imposed homework to be done: Refugees or asylum seekers along the EU Eastern border are mostly transit migrants on their way to the Union proper. They do not really intend to integrate in these societies, while most cultural (and most important: integration and social) policies in the future member countries as well as in the states to the East and South of them handle the migrant question strictly from the aspect of internal security,
and hardly are prepared to develop or even to discuss any viable models regarding cultural, social, and societal integration and rights of these men and women for the present and the future.

But even in a narrow sense, the long history of wars, imperialisms, and the forced displacement of peoples have created many groups with complex relationships to the land, the neighbouring groups, and to the state within these two regions. There are many 'anomalous' cases in East Central and Eastern Europe pointing beyond mere classical minorities which could be a starting point, a chance for adapting models of cultural diversity and cultural diversity politics in a broader sense not using or adopting international experiences but trying to find genuine and innovative answers for questions which yet have to be posed in a way that allows these answers.

The given and evident obstacles — that Western models can not be imposed or easily and quickly adopted, that there is a very weak tradition of a liberal state and a civil society — cannot be the argument for being inactive or to poise in the minority paradigm.

5.2. Ethnicisation processes in the age of globalisation

The roots for the demand for cultural diversity in Western Europe — a policy becoming virulent during the 1990s — are a distinctively emancipatory set of social, political and economic interests of and for minority and marginalized groups — a cultural and social policy which in many respects has been formulated, developed, demanded by the respective groups themselves — though not exclusively and not always. The implementation very often, but not always stayed in the hands of the mainstream institutions. In this regard cultural diversity is more than the ordinary multicultural city centre event or tourist festival, making folklore and ethnic food consumable (and profitable) and in which any political subject can enjoy his or her correctness, openness, cosmopolitan understanding, and post modern lifestyle through consuming 'the other'. It is or rather should be a strategy in which national, ethnic, cultural, sub-cultural, generational, life-style, gender and sexual differences can be used and produced productively, creatively. As a tool for self- and group practices of social movements from below, cultural diversity is also a possible policy aimed to guarantee social cohesion from above, from cultural policy administrations as well as internal security agencies. Cultural diversity as anything else is also about the possibility to talk and talk back, to raise one's voice and reject another.

Although originally — in picking up gender, generation and social class issues — pointing beyond the question of 'pure' cultural rights of ethnic, immigrant and national minority and marginalized groups, the diversity discussions often (not only in the West) altogether nevertheless in general focus on cultural rights of ethnic and (im)migrant groups. A limited interrogation or concept of ethnically marked cultural diversity which does not incorporate gender, sexual orientation, age, urban/rural differences and diversities will ultimately lead to (the democratically not desirable effect of) ethnification of cultural diversities, and an
essentialisation of ethnic difference(s). Indeed, the opposite way of dealing with differences is to be achieved.

Ethnification of cultures, cultural determinism, which declares that this irreversibly marks all members of one culture, does not have an exclusive tradition in the East, but it is also not so unfamiliar to the West. The "fact of difference is not an autonomous cultural fact but the product of the practice of building walls, fences and boundaries"74 and a high degree of interpenetration of ethnic groups can coincide with a high consciousness of boundaries. Narratives on ethnicity construct and in the end petrify ethnicity – in the same way as nationalism constructs, invents nations and enshrines those. Altogether the process of ethnification could take away the concept of diversity its dynamics and innovation. While there is a growing recognition that the idea of ethno-cultural neutrality of the state and of cultural politics conceptionally as well as historically is and was a myth of the liberal state, we are recently witnessing a growing ethnification of all kinds of questions as ambivalent contradiction to the process of globalisation in the economy. To stress the success of ethnic businesses75 and the recognition of "ethnic entrepreneurs"76 in EU programme schemes signals a shift in addressing economical resources in Europe. This is also the result of ethnic self-attributions and ascriptions from outside. (Not least this is an outcome of a demand of progressive societal groups to take closer attention of inequalities due to ethnic differences in the realm of bureaucracies.) So to say, to find a 'safe haven' in ethnifying society is a broad phenomenon of today's Europe in the East and the West alike.

On the other side of the continent, the expression of or demand for cultural diversity in a broader sense – pointing beyond basic or more elaborated minority rights for autochthonous groups and mostly in lack of major immigration groups who are socially and culturally demanding – hardly can be ethnified. So, paradoxically it is East Central Europe (less so Eastern Europe or South Eastern Europe) where the questions of cultural diversity in a broader sense are not evidently and automatically linked to – or can be detached from – questions of ethnicity: E.g. most arts and cultural communities would regard the addition of their ethnical background, of their minority status to their profession – except cultural expressions linked to language – as an obstacle (or at least labelling) for their career. Here, the British experience of the 'ethnic arts' movement, where the perception of artists of migrant and non-white families has been a major political demand since the 1970s, if existing at all, shows a rather folkloristic or touristy representation than an innovative

and emancipative trend (e.g. the Roma music businesses). Ethnification here rather is a marker for an out of date and antiquated cultural programme. Cultural diversity in the East Central and Eastern European countries is not a programme, a concept coming as a social, political or cultural demand from the margins of immigrant societies or nation states with large ethnically marked labour forces but is a (with the exception of the concept of labelling traditional minority politics as diversity politics) need coming from the inside of mostly urbanised and industrialised societies – equipped with an ambivalent reminiscence of ethnic diversity and about to produce new forms of diversity.

Nevertheless, the reports from the three East Central and Eastern European countries are defining cultural diversity overwhelmingly in ethnically marked and multicultural terms (as did most of the reports of the first phase following the outlines of the transversal study). There seem to be major interests involved in maintaining the old minorities as the crucial point of diversity (and identity) politics. Evidently, the groups representing new forms of cultural diversity, not the least ethnically marked, are more challenging, much more difficult to handle, require innovative policy regimes and strategies, and are for that reason almost invisible in official (policy) terms – which does not mean that they are invisible in the cultural scenes themselves. Both the nation-state institutions and the organisations of the old minorities seem to be interested in keeping up this situation and in denying other marginalized groups access to policy makers, diversity policies and thus resources. Obviously, gender and generation play a crucial role in maintaining male dominance in the decision-making of the old minorities.

Once the fact accepted that all forms of cultural expression carry traditions in the form of images and symbols which evoke response and help frame interpretation and action, that culture in a broader sense can be an important source of identification, a resource of images and sounds that prompt political behaviour\textsuperscript{77}, then cultural diversity actions limited to pure ethnic minority rights in the above manner do not result in any pre-political or sub-cultural action, the least politically motivated actions – and so cultural diversity measures loose their innovative strength and brisance. Cultural diversity does not have any meaning when not connected to social relevance and communal plausibility and local demands – otherwise it becomes some kind of monumental protection, heritage policy in the field of minorities.

Stratification and homogenisation of the population, thus suppressing several kinds of diversity was the main notion of politics of the real socialist countries – not only regarding ethnic minorities. 'Ethnostratification' – stratification and streamlining of societies according to the economic and political 'value' of ethnic groups – was a by-product and result of these politics. Whether intentionally aimed against ethnicities or not, and whether in the long run successful or not, the minori-

ties of each of the countries of the former Eastern Bloc were incorporated into the industrialisation, urbanisation and modernisation processes, which lead to markedly new social, economic, and least to forget cultural structures, thus paradoxically preparing diversification of these societies as any other Western one, too. On the other hand, the results of these policies (regardless of their results in the long run) very often were - and still are - the musealisation of any minority's culture, the fossilisation of cultural structures by which an ethnic groups cultural needs in the end lack of any present-day social plausibility. In such a simulated cultural diversity cultural needs and programs must superficially be re-invented and revived - for tourist, commercial or (ethno-)funding reasons and thus depriving minorities of their demands formulated within the framework of cultural diversity: in the worst cases East and West can meet again - with different backgrounds but similar outcomes.

5.2.1. An European transnational (minority) culture: The Roma in East Central (and Eastern) Europe or "How to gain equality and still remain different."

In many, but not all cases, the classical (ethnic-cultural) minorities of East Central and Eastern Europe are hardly ever linking their cultural heritage and current cultural production to any form, expression or media of the innovative cultural economy or modern cultural entrepreneurship. They mostly - or their elites - rely on the redistribution of goods and services - and therefore identities, and almost never can be associated with being part of bottom up emancipative social movements. Hardly any minority in this respect could develop a new strategy pointing beyond reiterating its grievances and thus the mere but gone facts of history: On the contrary, overwhelmingly they are engaged in parallel nation, homeland and institutional network building projects or in cultural heritage campaigns which very often miss social plausibility for a larger community - both inside and outside the communities proper. Evidently one can regard even this as a progress against earlier decades when there was no strategy at all besides pure assimilation. Nevertheless, the further elaboration of diverse projects of cultural diversity which develops new forms of dissemination and evaluation of cultural products could give the old (and new) minorities a change of renewing - and not only reiterating - their cultural needs, renegotiate the terms of cultural rights, of financing and administering those - once an adequate overall policy could be formulated.

The only minority group - for many reasons oscillating between the status of an old and the one of a new minority - and which represents a diamet-

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79 Cf. Council of Europe Cultural Entrepreneurship project in Bulgaria and Russia; e.g. in general the Council of Europe programme "Creating creative cultural capital" (cccp).
rical opposite to these cases - are the Roma of East Central Europe. For three main reasons:

- traditionally and currently, on the habitual palette of the minority policies, the Roma always were objects of integrationist strategies, in which for a long time even the possibility of an own cultural input was denied, and therefore no whatsoever policy formulated;

- the Roma minority gives a unique possibility for concerted political actions - among them cultural policies -, and offers the chance of linking the question of cultural diversity to an embryonic social movement, to social needs and demands, to all forms of social and political questions which touch culture (e.g. access, availability), thus equipping and furnishing diversity with social plausibility and a possibly self-formulated political programme;

- the Roma communities are very fragmented and dispersed over many countries, their members hold diverse and contradictory opinions, therefore they face major challenges (and chances) in defining their cultural space within Europe.80

In most of the countries reported on, and in the socialist era, the Roma were denied even the (very limited) rights of an ethno-cultural group. While other groups at least were rewarded some forms of cultural rights, the Roma always have been de-culturalised, and thus excluded or 'integrated' in the sense of overcome. But despite the efforts undertaken by various regimes to assimilate the Roma, these policies turned out to be largely ineffective in their own goals. While some Roma groups remained culturally distinct, the majority of the communities, even as they continued to be segregated residentially and socially, found their culture and traditions undermined.81 Their traditional social and cultural networks collapsed or were completely distorted, while they could not build up new ones or have not been integrated into any other ones. In the process of newly forming social inequalities, the "Roma appear to be the 'loser' of 'transition', massively affected by this process of impoverishment. Statistics and observations confirm this impression: Already in a disadvantaged position under the communist regime, a significant portion of the Romany population is now in poverty."82 The Roma population in all of East Central and Eastern Europe are almost unmovable fixed firmly on the very lower end of the societies of the regions. Since their opportunity for vertical mobility is extremely limited, it seems that the Roma will reproduce the lower, uneducated classes for generations to come. In East Central and parts of Eastern Europe the Roma therefore form a very distinct 'ethnoclass': a sub-culture of the underprivileged,

81 ibid., 4.
formed of the cross-section of a horizontal formation of a class, and a vertical formation of an ethnicity\textsuperscript{83} which makes them very different of any other minority in the region. Thus, the high valued artistic and music knowledge and tradition in Roma communities is the other side of the underprivileged - this 'creative capital' is of interest for building up stronger and sustainable economic resources.

Sometimes and for various reasons, the East Central and Eastern European Roma minorities are compared to the US-American Black communities and their fight for political, social and cultural rights. African-Americans are said to be unlike any other ethno-cultural group in the Western hemisphere\textsuperscript{84}, which require\textit{sui generis} approaches, involving a variety of measures. These may include historical compensation for past injustice, special assistance in integration (such as affirmative action), guaranteed political representation (for example through redrawing electoral boundaries to create black-majority-districts), and support various forms of Black self-organisation.\textsuperscript{85} But regardless of similarities and/or differences between the African-American and the European Roma population in the context of cultural diversity\textsuperscript{86}, the emancipative attempts of African-Americans to link cultural industries and cultural-political movements\textsuperscript{87} have to be kept in mind and looked at as a chance for East Central and Eastern European Roma: as an approach which gives diversity politics social plausibility.

While an older Black generation still was compelled to the ideals of high culture to integrate, "the new generation was working out of its own aesthetic, something that would form a central part of the cognitive praxis of its collective identity-formation."\textsuperscript{88} Members of the Roma minority, who engage in new cultural movements, are linked to social demands, to new media, and who progressively fuse and mingle all kinds of cultural elements, seem to be able to break out of the negative tendencies of their segregated lives by self-determined action - and to get the attention of the addressable and culturally open groups within the majority societies. Here cultural diversity when becoming an intentional policy turns into a chance.

The Budapest Roma broadcasting project of 'Radio ©' for instance wants to create a new form of Roma audience, to raise awareness within the community itself.\textsuperscript{89} It also wants to build a new image of the Roma in a wider public, so to say in Hungary itself - by creating and managing new Roma stars. 'Radio ©' defines itself also as a community, a public and commercial radio in one. But it also clearly shows where in East Central and

\textsuperscript{83} Mihok, Ethnostratifikation, op. cit. 1990, 298.
\textsuperscript{84} Kymlicka, Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, op. cit. 2001, 46.
\textsuperscript{85} ibid., 47.
\textsuperscript{86} e.g. the question of institutionalisation (while the Black always were institutionalised the Roma were and are lacking of this possibility, on the other hand Roma - unlike the Black population - have not been segregated by law), the functioning of an own public sphere.
\textsuperscript{87} Eyerman, Moving Culture, op. cit. 1999, 124.
\textsuperscript{88} ibid., 126.
\textsuperscript{89} György Péter cz, Rádiócér [Radio C]. In: Élet és Irodalom, 2003.06.27, 3.
Eastern Europe cultural politics and diversity policies have to intervene - since the market forces - which might function in traditional market-oriented countries - prove to be too weak. As shows the example of the encouraging and courageous radio project in Budapest, independent media projects even in dense urban settlements cannot survive commercially and always stay on the edge of bankruptcy since advertising revenues still do not cover the costs of the programme.

But altogether among many others the example of 'Radio ©' illustrates that the Roma communities and their elites are in transition to an ethically mobilisable group, having a common stance and common interests. Bearing in mind that any identity is constructed, the Roma have some options from which to chose: inventing a Roma nation, pledging for a Roma minority status, or becoming separate Roma national minorities in their respective home territories. Also, there are tendencies from some policymakers as well as the Roma minority itself to declare the Roma to a European transnational minority - which in the end evidently could lead to dismantle the Roma from the right of a concrete citizenship90 and the concrete responsibility for political action: On the one hand this reflects very clearly that most communities remain in the concepts of parallel and/or competing nation-building without trying to extend the framework of diversity, on the other hand it also demonstrates that the Roma - regardless of the good intentions - are still regarded as a social issue rather than a political issue requiring social answers as well as overall political framework programmes (not only reduced to the question of cultural diversity).

The Roma minorities of East Central and Eastern Europe could be the monitoring or measuring point of many policies and directives of cultural diversity because any approach, any serious questioning will have to broaden the whole framework, the whole set of widely-accepted parameters of diversity for various reasons. Regarding the Roma essentially as something culturally diverse or different, evidently could also appear as a more acceptable form of racism, since it no longer alludes to the 'genetic' traits of Gypsies but to their 'culture', while applying traditional policies of integrationist policies will sooner or later streamline, functionalise Roma culture. So, there is a trap: on the one side the acceptance of a fundamental difference of cultures could lead to total exclusion of the Roma as being the social outcasts, the not-integrated societal members, dyed-in-the wool 'other', the denial of fundamental diversity on the other hand could lead to termination of the unique Roma cultures. "Thus again, this is the core of the dilemma: how to gain equality and still remain different."91

But here, the Roma themselves standing at the beginning of their fight are divided in the factions which desire to integrate or to search for respect and acknowledgment of their specific culture: "In both cases, we see some leaders promoting a civil-rights-oriented approach, which fo-

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91 ibid., 18.
cuses on the elimination of discrimination and downplays issues of cultural diversity; while other leaders promote a more ethno-cultural oriented approach, which demands positive recognition and accommodation of difference." This reflects—as Sheila Benhabib formulated very convincingly—a decision between the politics of redistribution versus politics of recognition.

5.3. Multiple transitions: Where civil society can be found: emerging of new public spheres and a new self-understanding of citizens

Looking at cultural diversity policies all over Europe, there is obviously a need for going beyond traditional minority rights regimes, going further than constructing limited spaces with clear barriers where any minority or marginalized group can develop its own and specific, in many ways fragmented isolated modes of expressions. These are the questions on the condition of cultural spaces in which global and local citizenship and diversity (rights) can develop, thus changing the structure of former public spheres, their interaction and communication, thus reshaping public spaces of whole entities. The hazard here could be that in most of these cases these places and entities will merely react to a global economy and are incapable to act. This applies even more to East Central and Eastern Europe—for evident reasons. Therefore cheaper, easier to handle, less regulated or less adjustable, more open forums and spaces have to be found and or constructed to mediate, to strengthen processes of diversifying the public, everyday practices and businesses. Raising social and civic mobilisation is challenged by emphasising cultural practices, "hence collective memories which are reinforced through ritual practices along with art and music, become more important emotional resources for sustaining allegiance to social movements. The way in which social movements seek to use cultural resources reflexively to create tradition suggests that the distinction between cultural movements and social movements may be more difficult to sustain than previously envisaged." These new transcultural networks—materialising most markedly in urban spaces, the micro and small entrepreneurs of the cultural industries and the new electronic media—seem to be more capable to link and affiliate—through various interfaces and connections—various forms of cultural expressions than were the (former) traditional cultural identities which needed a much more sophisticated ideological, institutional and financial background—in short: more or less centralised state (public) funding and support (which evidently does not exclude per se state funding). This

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envisions a possibility to overcome the traditional, and unhelpful division along an imaginative border. Cultural scenes and milieus in the European urban agglomerations link up to new initiatives. These new affiliations include segments also occurring in other networks and thus representing points of exchange and communication between different transcultural forms, helping to overcome traditional gaps in inter-European communication. So, the new type of differentiation by its very structure favours coexistence rather than combat.

5.3.1. The role of the media and new technologies

The creation and increase of new cultural spaces – produced and mainly maintained by new medias and technologies and new ways of dealing with cultural industries – provide one important reason to re-think the notion of 'public sphere'. It is a general and almost unquestionable demand that the social dynamics of diversity has to be propelled by market mechanisms, if they are to prove sustainable. In general, these market mechanisms concern

- firstly the role of cultural entrepreneurship in using existing markets or developing new ones for cultural production of minority and marginalized groups members and cultural activities,
- secondly the significance of connections between cultural diversity and cultural tourism, and
- thirdly the activities of audiences and consumers rather than producers.

"The preferences of culturally diverse communities as consumers in the media marketplace are clearly of relevance to the role that the development of future policies for the new media can play in enhancing cultural diversity."95 New media technologies can provide both: They in fact can create these new cultural spaces or just generate a range of only quasi-public spaces – just as early television created a national (homogeneous) media sphere and nowadays also becomes a dominant destroyer of this space by providing digitalised special purposes channels for a segmented audience. While modern communication and information techniques have the potential to enhance and to revitalise democratic discourses and to facilitate the shaping of networks that transgress national, cultural and other boundaries, they also show the tendency – due to the rapid technological progress and digitalisation – of fragmenting, virtually atomising traditional 'national' audiences, making diversity possible on a level, where one does not even have to register the 'other' anymore – neither virtually nor medially. Minority and alternative community radios therefore can create parallel public spheres – where the communities communicate and negotiate the questions of diversity, identity and difference.

The media creates a common domesticated picture of a community, and in this respect it is always the minority group which has to ethnify, has to

draw lines and borders of differences. The dominant media culture in this respect will always portray itself as something universal, and the political space then does not become white, but colourless, does not belong to the majority voice but is neutral: Ethnicity, diversity, 'otherness' so becomes not only private, but offensive, even deviant for the mainstream. The question of the rationale to strengthen the presence of minorities and marginalized societal groups in the public sphere or to create special spaces for all forms of alternative, oppositional and independent expression is still discussed - since creating special spheres could also mean the strengthening of the homogeneity of public stations.96

All these hierarchies, again are developed mainly along case studies of Western Europe: The transformation processes of East Central and Eastern Europe were and are a double transition from state-socialism to capitalism and a transition from modernity to post-modernity which within a very short period of time on the one hand has completely changed major parts of the East Central European societies and on the other hand has left wide parts of these societies and whole geographical regions virtually untouched. In many respects, the same - the double transition as well as regional asynchrony and fragmentation - applies to the media of the region: "In the name of pluralistic market they brought plain consumerism to a field where previously the values of integrity and a meaningful life, promoted by state elite, had been the norm."97 Nowadays, in almost every country of the former Eastern Bloc we have a very wide range of - mostly multinational - media providers, and a collapsing or already collapsed public broadcasting system: But radio and television, the electronic media are still key media in East Central and Eastern Europe where in many cases it forms the almost exclusive admittance to any form of cultural event - regardless of high, low or popular level. The fight for control over these media, the so-called media wars in almost every transitional society were also fights for cultural (and political) hegemony in the field of the most important nation-building tool of the 20th century. Ownership of, control over and access to these forums remain the crucial questions for shaping and representing cultural diversity, for forming autonomous spaces with the help of new technologies. Due to the economic back-log demand and instability, smaller and weaker markets, these issues have to be posed much clearer than in Western Europe. East Central and especially Eastern Europe are equipped with very limited and rather poorly embedded local (cultural) markets. The primary interest of cultural industries or retailers - mostly global companies - is (in a very economical logic) not enhancing and fostering cultural diversity but to make short-term and quick profits. Increasing competition in the media

and popular cultural sector, the deregulation of the audio-visual arena, an increasing segmentation of the audience, both in an economic and a cultural consumption sense, and the lack of experience of resistance and alternative models block the very modest attempts to promote cultural diversity by policies – if any are taken at all. However, of course there is also the chance, too that private media fosters cultural diversity issues, e.g. as the Toronto City TV98 represented a new open space for diverse urban groups.

Innumerable studies on media representation of minorities but not on marginalized groups in the media suggest that the crucial point is not the diversification of news rooms as far as ethnicity, religion, age and gender is concerned or any form of access opportunities, but the representation of minorities and marginalized groups in the majority media. This process can multiply societal perspectives to deal with new challenges. The question of the meaning of media for the construction of migrant identities and the increasing transnational character of 'mediascapes' stand in the centre of research.99 In the Western media, it took decades until minorities and marginalized groups were not exclusively connected to social problems but were allowed to be represented as so-called full and therefore 'normal' members within or as part of mainstream society. Medial public spheres are locations and spaces where power positions are preserved and petrified, but also places where these positions can be renegotiated: The diversity of the media is a central part of cultural diversity. To prevent a self-referred and ethnocentric interpretation of the right to communicate by special groups, one needs the right to be understood – including the responsibility of citizens to struggle for such an understanding.

Since in a very narrow respect there are only few and rather limited domestic mass culture productions in East Central and Eastern Europe, generally new minorities are only represented by import products and thus seem to be outsiders and exotic. For East Central and Eastern Europe the common pattern of minority and Roma representation in media is that they seldom are given the chance of actively expressing their own opinions. Instead the Roma are usually projected as passive characters in Eastern European news and commercial media has already also not changed this fact.100

It was the idée fixe of the early years of transition that in many respects the representation of minorities (and of diverse political views) will improve through the possibilities of commercial media: While in the

socialist state media, the minorities were - with guaranteed air-time - enshrined in their roles as minorities, the commercial media was said to find market-oriented solutions to present the minorities and thus cultural diversity for a national audience. None of this really became true: Already at an early stage of media privatisation it became clear that "it would be nonsense to expect market actors to take a moral stance, at least until civil society finds a way to coerce them to take up the cause of minorities. On its own, civil society is too weak to interfere with market forces. (...) These pressures might take the form of recommendations and self-inflicted regulations, stipulating observance of moral standards in the portrayal of cultural diversity in the society."\(^\text{101}\) But it is not a question of moral stance, it is a question of niche markets, so to say of economical reasons that minority or marginalized groups needs are covered by the private media.

While community-based local media and radio projects seem to work - though only with a limited audience - commercial projects trying to present cultural diversity and/or minority issues with a professional background and intentions regularly fail because there does not seem to be a large enough advertisement market for this initiatives in East Central and Eastern Europe so far. So, if not regulated at an early stage, globalisation processes and modern information and communication techniques may undermine societal structures by making them increasingly fluid, unstable, invisible, and, hence, difficult to be subjected to control in a democratic way. These goals can be achieved most efficiently by means of recommendations and self-inflicted regulations. They should stipulate standards and discuss (perhaps) quotas for the representation of minorities (and gender) in the media. "Civil society therefore should not pursue the emerging market forces to abandon their will to profit making but to motivate market agencies to realise their profit in a socially supportable manner. This seems to be plausible, though not very probable outcome. But it is a vision worthwhile to work for."\(^\text{102}\) But if the media or anything in East Central and Eastern Europe is left purely to the market, it will most likely give the governments and the majorities what they want.

It was exactly the example of Hungary, one of the countries which (in a way) already has finished its transition, which in the course of our on-site visits confirmed our scepticism towards the chances of better representation of cultural diversity with the help of market forces and entrepreneurship: While it is true that "it is only Roma artists who are offered a platform for playing an active role in the media production"\(^\text{103}\), it is also true that the first commercial Roma Radio project "Radio ©" went bankrupt. Also one of the most promising and commercially strongest


\(^{102}\) Dessewffy & Benda, Television, Minorities and the Upcoming Market Forces, op. cit. 2001, 44.

\(^{103}\) Gábor Bernáth & Vera Messing, As Cutaways, only in Mute – Roma in the Hungarian Media. Budapest (Office of National and Ethnic Minorities) 1998.
cultural enterprises of the region, the alternative "Sziget Festival", in 2001 was about to surrender political pressure not to give gay and lesbian groups the possibility to represent themselves on the festival. It was exactly the pressure by civic groups which in the end made the presentation of 'sexual diversity' possible - and not the local market forces but the global Pepsi Cola company.104

5.3.2. The (significant) role of urban societies for diversity politics

The last decades were marked by large migration which essentially have made the metropolises and the large urban agglomerations of the world to culturally very diverse spaces. So it is in the large cities, these indispensable hearts of the nations where the hybridity of modern societies becomes best visible. The (state-of-the-art) structure of the metropolis itself makes possible different rationalities and referential systems, differences which cannot be reduced to common coordinates but which nevertheless fit together.105 This is neither a special feature nor a danger to be avoided, but the trait of any urban culture - thus turning against all ideas of an autochthonous and homogenous national or centralised culture.

In accordance with more recent theories of urbanity, the city stands for both: for chaos and for order. There is a delicate but consistent contrast between reaching multiculturality - as a means for differences to coexist in tolerant respect - and becoming intercultural - a vague but nevertheless distinct mix overcoming the shape and power of existing traditions, but creating new ones between which it is easier to switch. Urban structures always have (had) a role to play here. The challenge of the city is to establish a communication that will provide a common ground for negotiating shared concerns at the same time respecting the value of difference. In the "Use of the disorder of the city", Richard Sennett argued that there was a tendency to build an image or identity that coheres, is unified, and filters out threats in social experience. Against this ordered identity, the attempt to deal with otherness, to become engaged beyond one's own defined boundaries, is the essence of mature identity and mature culture.106 The city thus offers the best basis for a new maxim of opening up to other cultures, by creating a community, a common entity, but at the same time defining the conditions for such opening up107 - while it remains open who and not what is defining these conditions.

The metropolis is a special fabric, with different textures - reception, distribution and production alike - which need to be negotiated: The (European) city has always served as a magnifying glass for understanding the processes of social and spatial re-compositions. The more heterogene-

106 ibid., 88.
ous a community, the more accentuated the characteristics associated with urbanism will be.\textsuperscript{108} If the city can retain public spaces which harbour the cosmopolitan life, it can offer opportunities for people to develop forms of sociability based on tolerance and self-distance, qualities which form the basis for an active public as well as a good socio-economic background should support this. Yet, this means that cities need to find some way to meet new demands, become more open: Cities have become more than something like a big town, they are a random field of opportunities, key nodal points.

The city, the contemporary metropolis, has become for many the preferred metaphor for the modern and the post-modern experience of the world. Beyond the relatively stable structure of architecture(s) and technical infrastructure, a city in general also is very open, structured by immaterial things, where heterogeneous elements, plurality and disorder, cultural hybrids, internationalism and cosmopolitism are all present at once. Metropolises thus can be interpreted as resources in which the interaction of the political, economic and social factors in cultural processes and artefacts can be analysed according to various paradigms: as Arjun Appadurai proposed that one could see the 'global cultural economy' as involving the five dimensions of ethnocapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, finanscapes and ideoscapes.\textsuperscript{109} Both, the tremendous acceleration of the flow of goods and capital, parallel to global migration of impoverished economic refugees, and mobile management elites have opened up new ways of acknowledging an interplay between locality, identity, and ethnicity. However, migration of people and capital and its resulting cultural diversity in the context of urban ethnoscapes increases not only the possibility of cultural self-representation and autonomy, but also leads to new possible conflicts, and social inequalities, which are reflected in the growing distinction between social groups, lifestyles, and (urban) territories.

But in the last fifty years cities also "have become fragmented and each fragment is like a homogeneous ghetto - the mall, the housing estate, the industrial park are isolated, self-contained spaces. The consequence of this that class, gender and racial differences, economy and governance are social facts which we experience passively, as spectators of the mass media: we do not live the complexities of society directly and physically, in where we walk, whom we see, or what we touch."\textsuperscript{110} In Western Europe, touristification of the city centres has only completed a process of functional differentiation of space that had developed in the context


of modern city building. But at the same time this sort of gentrification had little to do with the European city as a historical location of social conflict and cultural competitive representation: The function of disneylandifying of major urban centres was quasi-diversifying cities to make them competitive and to stage social cohesion in the very centres while the peripheries played another role. Touristification and cultural event policy are often used surrogates of cultural diversity and urban cultural mobilisation.

The controversy between rural versus urban textures and structures, the cultural fights between the urbanites and the narodniki, the general criticism of the city, and the idealization of the village and the countryside as source and expression of national cultures, has a century long and intense tradition in East Central and Eastern Europe. It is still present where urbanisation was a very awkward process, often – as quantitatively measured development successes – in clear contradiction to the qualitative urbanisation processes in the West. In socialist Europe it was a controlled and one-dimensional process: e.g. minorities and marginalized are starting repossess 'their' cities: Tatarstan, which represents a distinctive model of the evolution of a Muslim society and its relations with "national" Russian culture in general, is engaging in a large-scale urban renewal project of its capital: Although Tatar-speakers are beginning to repossess Kazan, the authority behind this repossession is tenuous and, furthermore, diffused by divergent opinions concerning what it should consist in: redefining the city as the place of urban diversity or (mis)using it again as a place of crude nation-building: "For, Tatar-speakers continue to have to accommodate 'Russian' desires in constructing their own national institutions and to adhere to 'Russian' fictions when they publicly recount the history of relations between the two communities."111

But in the case of East Central and Eastern Europe (as anywhere in the world) there is the possibility of divided cities with a bifurcated social structure. At the top the 'cybergosie' living incyburbia on the urban edges which are teleintegrated through state-of-the-art transmission to form interactive virtual communities. At the bottom 'protosurps' who live in cyberias, the mulces of chop on-call labour, along with the various groups of the excludes: the homeless, vagrants and criminalized – restricted to the basic telephone services.112

The countries of Eastern and Western Europe have had different trajectories in their experiences of urban cultural policy-making. Leading edge cultural policymakers in Western Europe are increasingly adopting a holistic framework, in an attempt to maximize the potential of the connections between cultural, social, economic, education, training, tourism, city marketing, planning and environmental policies, while cities of East

Central and Eastern Europe are confronted with more basic policy making, like housing, social affairs, securing basic public mass transport. In Western Europe, one important inspiration for this more holistic approach has been the experiences of the 1960s and post-1968 movements. By contrast, East Central and Eastern European countries have some important traditions which in part can discourage creativity, innovation, holistic thinking and integrated planning. Under the old regimes, the realisation that information is power and often effectively the only form of capital available led to a marked reluctance to share knowledge. In addition, there is a legacy of organizational structures which are too hierarchical, and inadequate to present needs, to respond to change, foster human development potential and harness creative talent and ideas. Thus, culture policy officers (as many civil servants) are poorly paid and the most talented among them tend to seek employment in the private sector. Urban cultural policies and strategies hardly exist, and are continually designed and redesigned as politicians come and go.¹¹³

Altogether information is fragmented, policy makers are extremely specialized, and often not able to grasp their connection with wider strategic development issues (due to many reasons). Ironically though, it is exactly the old cultural policy strategies which are successful in the East: event and touristifying(ication) can provide some kind of survival, heritage assets. Furthermore, while in the West the emerging recognition of the contribution of cultural policy to human development is part of a wider attention to social networks and other sustainable 'soft' societal infrastructures, while - since it has been uncared for for such a long time - in the East the main focus tends to be on 'hard' infrastructures.¹¹⁴ In real socialism, the very much ideological exploit and utilization of cultural policy as a tool to build a "socialist" cultural environment has negatively influenced today's understanding of new chances of an innovative cultural policy strategy for the democratic development of transition states.

Particularly, urban spaces provide visible and sustainable civic participation for old and new minorities and marginalized groups. It is one of the most important tasks of urban cultural policies to recognise the new demands of a mixed society dealing with conservative(traditional) and progressive emancipative wishes of participation and providing adequate infrastructure to those. Due to the fact that "democracies cannot survive as 'separate but unequal' societies"¹¹⁵ the dynamics of social and cultural integration and social exclusion is in the centre of present-day administering of differences of peoples and cultures and economies in larger urban contexts. These are also the new places and spaces of trans-


¹¹⁴ ibid., 186.

nationalism: "Cultural, political and economic processes in transnational social spaces involve accumulation, use and effects of various sorts of capital, their volume and convertibility: economic capital (for example, financial capital), human capital (for example, skills and knowledge) and social capital (resources inherent in social and symbolic ties)."  

6. Changes of insights: From minorities to diversities

Culture which was assumed to possess a coherence and order, enabling it to act as the basics for the formation of stable identities, no longer seems to be able to perform this task adequately. "The linkages between culture and identity have become more problematic as the sources of cultural production and dissemination increase, and the possibilities of inhabiting a shared cultural world in which cultural meanings function in a common sense taken-for-granted manner recedes." Globalisation does not result in the homogenisation and unification of culture, but rather in the provision of new spaces for cultures to compete, be at odds, but also to complement each other, while offering new patterns of identity. But this mixing and fusing of cultures do not occur across the boundaries of nation-state societies, but within them and independently of their ethnic and tribal composition.

In a postmodern perspective, modern living is to be understood as a migration through different social worlds and as a successive realization of a number of possible identities: that all have multiple attachments and cross-cutting identities. In this process, gender, race, ethnicity, generation and all forms of disabilities have become a motor of building up a new understanding of a post-modern subjectivity.

There are societies in which ethnic, cultural, societal etc. interactions and mutual influence are so intensive that the outcome of these relation(ship)s could structure a new type of cultural and ethnic configuration. These societies have a new quality due to their more severe interactions between diverse ethnic, cultural, religious, social, and regional characteristics. Pluri-ethnic and pluri-cultural and/or trans-ethnic and trans-cultural societies are not a boring melting-pot, in which all single elements are completely dissolved. The ethnic and cultural differences, the 'other' of each of the diverse cultural codes remain recognizable, while all codes and single elements form a new very specific configuration and thus become a constitutive element of a new entity. New formations come to the fore, new forms with their on (re)sources. The transcultural webs are, woven with different threads, and in a different manner. "It's just that now the differences no longer come about through a juxtaposition of clearly delineated cultures (like in a mosaic), but


result between transcultural networks, which have some things in common while differing in others, showing overlaps and distinctions at the same time. The mechanics of differentiation has become more complex, but it has also become genuinely cultural for the very first time, no longer complying with geographical or national stipulations, but following pure cultural interchange processes."\textsuperscript{118}

Currently, Western Europe is more and more being transnationalised by ethnically mixed immigrant and migrant societies and groups, and at the same time being transformed by different social, cultural and political needs. Evidently, all these processes require some cement of integration and pulling together, in short: social cohesion, which can be achieved by erecting a fortress called Europe or an opening up of the societies towards the new challenges. For a long time culture seemed to have the power to create the latter form of integration (of bringing together the tastes of the working class and the middle class culture in providing high culture for all in the post-war welfare state and on the other hand in providing resources to build up new popular youth cultural expressions, e.g. pop concert areas etc.) while it remained which and who's culture. Implicitly, this integration always was understood as some kind assimilation into a majority and/or mainstream society: But this attitude has dramatically changed since proceeding in a multi-ethnic context also the micro-cosmos of immigration societies and cultural diversities within any society came into focus. Public culture in societies of immigration must be self-transformative. In a way this is the very opposite of a defining culture that sets the terms of integration, although both share the assumption that democratic societies exposed to migration need a common cultural framework that is supported by their political institutions.\textsuperscript{119}

East Central and Eastern Europe is for a rather long period now forming (or remaining in) a nationally and ethnically mostly homogenous status equipped with remnant, classical old ethnic and national minorities, hardly having any immigrant societies or ethnically different work forces. But this will probably change after the accession of parts of Central East Europe to the European Union. But the societies of East Central and Eastern Europe also are being transformed by different social, cultural and political needs and desires, by new diversities, while ethnic backgrounds again – or still – are kept in evidence. So – though in different contexts but with very similar outcomes – on both sides of the European continent cultural diversity in its broader sense and ethnicity in a rather narrow sense is an everyday experience.

While in Western Europe cultural politics has shifted gradually from the politics of redistribution and relocation of cultural values and patterns to the politics of identity and acceptance of the new minorities, in East Central and Eastern Europe the question of cultural diversity stays to be a question of resources like accessibility to cultural production and

\textsuperscript{118} Welsch, Transculturality, op. cit. 1999, 203.
\textsuperscript{119} Bauböck, Public Culture, op. cit. 2001, 5.
consumption on all levels, shaping and expressing cultural needs of new and old diversities alike. Evidently, the new option of discussing classical minority issues after 1989, has put - for a while at least - segregating forces to the fore. But at the same time, this approach has the chance to overcome all forms of ethno-politics of the old minorities. The assumption that an individual's cultural formation must be determined by his or her nationality or national status is slowly overcome (with the exception of former Yugoslavia). The different cultural needs and approaches, and the cultural differences are not necessarily reflected on the ethnic level - although it is the easiest and least risky way to reduce the notion of cultural diversity to an ethnic approach, or to reiterate classical minority rights by means of the politically nowadays fashionable term cultural diversity.

"It is rarely possible or appropriate to simply transplant institutions or policies from one country to another, particularly when these countries have such different histories and economic conditions as those in Western and Eastern Europe." Theoreticians will understand the rules of a political theory, practitioners will be able to adapt and adopt them, but concrete implications will turn out differently - and most importantly the actual outcome will differ. While cultural diversity is still a challenge for Western societies and cultural policies, it is the more in the countries of East Central and Eastern Europe: The classical interpretation(s) of minorities and the need for equality must be expanded by the notion of diversities and democratic equity. Not tolerance seems to be the answer but justice, respect and rights.

A restructuring of cultural policies along these guidelines seems to be a tremendous challenge for countries which in general tie(d) their cultural politics to concepts of nation-building (by accepting multiculturalisation to a certain extent). For the development towards equal societies it really needs the establishment of cultural diversity politics as structurally important to all political spheres. The development of new culturally diverse forms of democratic governance and cultural politics will be one among many other players to cope with strategies of inclusion, social and cultural citizenship.

But if it is our goal to retain ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity just for itself, we risk to subordinate (moral) autonomy under the aesthetics of plurality. Lifestyles which are unjust, brutal or authoritarian can be beautiful, interesting and fascinating, too. Traditional lifestyles are sometimes based upon (unrecognised) racist, euro-centric, and patriarchal structures - which include suppression and sometimes physical violence. It cannot be the task of the state to maintain the beauty of traditional lifestyles for the sake of diversity, the state rather can provide spaces for the realisation of rights, in which the civil societies and the public spheres can enter in disputes, dialogues, and discussions by which all players and participants care enabled to (re)present

their narratives of identity, congruency, difference, and diversity by and on their own. Spaces need to be provided where everybody can construct and/or invent his or her diversity and/or congruence/homogeneity. These forms of communication are risky and unforeseeable. They cannot be pre-designed, and it is unpredictable whether they will improve the understanding of cultures as well as ethnic and linguistic communities or whether they will aggravate the already existing and coming polarisations. They can lead to a full standstill of traditional environments and lifestyles or can result in their revival, rejuvenation and renewal.\footnote{Benhabib, Kulturelle Vielfalt und demokratische Gleichheit, op. cit. 1999, 68.}

It is a commonplace that Europe – remaining unclarified and unclear which of the many Europes – is about to build her new identities. In the end, this European identity could be very restricted and particular, based on specific features that distinguish the continent from everything which Europe has projected outside herself or conquered or denied. There is also a risk that – once the own 'other' overcome and integrated – it could be a mere construction of new frontiers and boundaries towards something new 'other' – and that talking about cultural diversity could thus become smokescreen-policies to simply conceal these efforts.
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