

**Council of Europe: Transversal Study on the Theme of Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity**

**Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity  
Report : Austria**

The views expressed in this paper do not represent official positions of the Government of Austria.

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## PREFACE

The following report refers to the historical development of cultural policy and cultural diversity in Austria. We decided to stress two different levels of discussion in particular, that is, different ways of discussing the issue in question. Firstly, cultural policy development in general (mapping cultural policy) which includes notes on the impact of media diversity for advanced cultural diversity, and secondly, to concentrate on the participation rights of ethnic minorities and immigrants in Austria. Section 1 is a short general statement on the context of cultural democracy and cultural citizenship. Section 3 „Mapping Cultural Policy“ includes cultural diversity effects, and section 4 „cultural policy responses“ refers to the general overview of ethnic minorities given in section 2.

The texts were written before the new ÖVP-FPÖ government was installed in February 2000 against a background of nation-wide protests from the „other“ Austria in the course of which new forms of organisation and communicating civil resistance emerged, thus many crucial questions concerning the new political situation cannot be answered adequately in this report. In this respect, some of the conclusions have acquired a new dimension, cf. a weakly developed civil society owing to the extensive influence of political parties in „mapping cultural policy“. The protests marked an emergence of a new critical public in Austria. Arts and cultural institutions, artists and intellectuals have been intensively involved in this new movement. Protecting and fighting for „cultural diversity“ is a central argument in the new protest culture (discourses and campaigns). Putting civil society values at the centre in the second stage of this Council of Europe project we – the team of the *Kulturdokumentation* supported by experts in the field – will comment on the interdependencies between (general) policy guidelines (and practices) of the new government, new cultural policy decisions and its impact on cultural diversity currently at stake in Austria.

The authors of parts 2 and 4 – Gerhard Baumgartner and Bernhard Perchinig – are well-known researchers in the field of minority and migration politics. David Westacott translated sections 1 and 3 from the German.<sup>1</sup>

österreichische kulturdokumentation, February 2000

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<sup>1</sup> Some remarks on specific terms: In Austria's policy and research discussions the term *demokratiepolitisch* is very often used and means something like „important for the further development and consolidation of democratic structures“, something to strengthen the agencies of civil society. A comparable term does not exist in English, and we have used „democratic“ or „politico-democratic“.

## SUMMARY

1. Following the study outline of the Council of Europe, we start with chapter 1 „Cultural diversity, cultural citizenship and cultural policy“ to bring in a present a broader interpretation of cultural diversity in Austria. We point out that in Austria as well as in other German speaking countries issues surrounding basic legal rights are crucial in debates about cultural diversity. It is not a problem to organize cultural events in Austria but full citizenship rights and access to political participation at a national, regional and local level are difficult to achieve for (immigrant) minorities.

2. In chapter 3 "Mapping cultural policy" we provide an overview of the development of cultural diversity issues in post war Austria which centered on general broader participation in arts and culture. Important developments eg. gender imbalance are not sufficiently covered because they were not central to Austria's cultural policies of the last decades. Nonetheless, gender issues were raised and gained political importance due to the activities of the women's movement. It should be noted that the women's movement has been active since the 1970s as a crossover between cultural and political levels. In this sense, we want to emphasize that the entirety of cultural diversity should be discussed in a broader sense. Media diversity is very much part of general cultural diversity of all communities because we live in media democracies which are reliant on everyone's ability to deal with, or rather, to find a way to express cultural needs. The Free Radio scene – on air since 1998 - opened up new possibilities of cultural participation and cultural diversity for social communities at the local level. Cultural development is heavily based on social policies, the so-called social cohesion in a country. In "Mapping cultural policy" we focus on activities which were and are supported by administrative bodies responsible for arts and culture because only 2 percent of the Austrian cultural budget is provided by private bodies.

3. Chapters 2 and 4 provide information on cultural diversity policies concerning ethnic minority and immigrant groups in particular. In the Austrian case, the „Law on Ethnic Groups,, (Volksgruppengesetz) was the most decisive factor for a reorientation of Austria's autochthonous language populations to organise along ethnic lines. Whereas in the 1970s ideas of intercultural action and a critical approach towards ethnic organisations prevailed among the organisations, the early 1980s brought a new emphasis on the respective ethnicity and culture by the ethnic minority organisations in order to secure funding. Intercultural activities were significantly reduced.

4. The development among the various immigrant groups differs. The break-up of Yugoslavia led to the break of the former Yugoslavian immigrant organisations into organisations affiliated with the new nation states and which in most cases support the respective national government. Within the immigrant communities from Turkey, ethnicity plays a major role in the self-organisation of the Kurds, whereas Turkish organisations are most often formed along the political lines dividing the Turkish political system. Here the growth of religious affiliation and the development of an organisational network of Islamic centres and mosques - fostered by the strong legal position of Islam - is the most recent development.

5. The Austrian state has not yet developed a concise approach towards the accommodation of group rights and a political framework in regard to cultural diversity. Most of the rights granted to „autochthonous,, ethnic minority groups are by-products of political bargaining procedures lacking continuity and conceptual clarity. Not only right-wing populists, but nearly all mainstream-parties do not consider immigrant minorities as a relevant part of Austrian society. Discriminated in most areas of public life, immigrant minority groups are not seen as a part of Austria's cultural diversity in public discourse and politics, the framework of immigrants' policy fosters social exclusion and cultural assimilation, not diversity.

6. Facing the new challenges of future cultural policy which promotes cultural diversity we have to broaden the frameworks of traditional cultural diversity policies to meet new global developments. Currently, cultural diversity is on the top agenda of the Portuguese EU presidency – under discussion are protection measures for European culture confronted with the global flow of cultural products, the AV industry in particular. In this sense, it is important also to emphasize ethnically marked diversity in the context of media diversity as an issue of cultural diversity. The question of representation of all social minorities in public or private TV and radio is as crucial as arts and culture programmes running or supported by public bodies, etc..

## 1. CULTURAL DEMOCRACY, CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP AND CULTURAL POLICY

„The second constitutive feature of the ‘postsocialist’ condition concerns a shift in the grammar of political claims-making. Claims for the recognition of group difference have become intensely salient in the recent period, at times eclipsing claims for social equality. This phenomenon can be observed at two levels. Empirically, of course, we have seen the rise of ‘identity politics’, the decentering of class, and, until very recently, the corresponding decline of social democracy. More deeply, however, we are witnessing an apparent shift in the political imaginary, especially in the terms in which justice is imagined. . . . The result is a decoupling of cultural politics from social politics, and the relative eclipse of the latter by the former.“<sup>2</sup>

Cultural democracy – cultural citizenship refer to the classic questions of participation, rights and obligations of the inhabitants of a country. Access to the levels of participation – political, social, economic and cultural – determines the living conditions for all social groups, for majorities and minorities, women, men and children.

Cultural democracy, interpreted as the equal right to participation of the many (all) in cultural life, in production, distribution and consumption of art and culture, inquires after the general political conditions that facilitate and promote production, open channels of distribution and provide consumption opportunities.

In Austria since the 1970s, „cultural democratisation“ has first and foremost meant liberalisation of government arts and culture support. This means the support and subsidy practices in arts and culture changed structurally to the benefit of previously neglected cultural fields: the declared and emphatic promotion of contemporary arts and culture<sup>3</sup> is worthy of mention, as is the much broader range of education and the beginning of support for new communications areas such as, for example, open cultural centres, women’s centres, workshop culture . . . (cf. the chapter on „Mapping Cultural Policy“). The integration of ethnic minority forms of cultural expression into the cultural mainstream has been pursued with comparatively less commitment. It was precisely in the 1970s, too, when the Carinthian town-sign conflict (1972) made the tension between the German-speaking majority and the Slovenian-speaking minority visible. The minority’s claim to equal „cultural and political“ participation was not accepted and for the first time had to be loudly demanded. It was the start of a formation process of, above all, cultural consciousness, which was able to appeal to Article 7 of the 1955 Austrian State Treaty, on the rights of recognised minorities. Today, in the year 2000, the question of minority rights has shifted from the autochthonous minorities to the new minorities, the immigrants (cf. „Mapping Cultural Diversity“).

„Cultural citizenship“ further sharpens the question of cultural democracy and points to cultural – and thereby also social and political – participation of different population groups. Here, the varying conceptions of „citizenship“ according to the widely differing historical conditions of each European country become relevant. On the one hand it is a question of guaranteeing cultural rights, and, on the other, of the form in which social communities (ethnic minorities, social groups) are accorded or entitled to rights and (public) spaces. The relationship between democracy, cultural democracy and cultural policy is certainly an old one; that of „cultural citizenship and cultural policy“, however is a relatively new question. In Austria in the 1990s, „cultural citizenship“ was not a subject of public discussion, although „citizenship“ in the political sense was. And returning to the thesis, that the cultural policy development is among other things a sensitive expression of the general policies of a country, it remains to be noted in association that at the beginning of the 1990s, even if more reservedly than other countries, the debate at the political level on the desirability of a multicultural society in Austria, too, was answered, i.e. countered, with a „foreigners debate“ that has dominated Austria’s internal political discussion ever since. The immigration laws became more restrictive by the year; the Schengen agreement additionally aggravated the situation and at the same time Austrians’ general political dissatisfaction deepened despite the best economic data.<sup>4</sup> Since its introduction in 1812, the

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<sup>2</sup> Nancy Fraser, *Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the „Postsocialist“ Condition*, London 1997, 2.

<sup>3</sup> The media and culture critic Armin Thurnher adopts a very pointed position: „A sense for the arts and liberality, better openness for the arts, became virtually a symbol of social democracy after the Kreisky years too. One could say that the *raison d’être* and the objective of arts policy did not go beyond the defence of this symbol. Nevertheless, remains of this stance proved itself in the face of populist agitation . . . .“, Armin Thurnher, *Das Trauma, ein Leben. Österreichische Einzelheiten*, Vienna 1999, 270.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Heinz Fassmann, Helga Matuschek, Elisabeth Menasse (eds), *abgrenzen ausgrenzen aufnehmen. Empirische Befunde zu Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Integration*, Klagenfurt 1999.

descent-oriented principle of Austrian citizenship has formed the basis for the granting or application for full citizenship rights.<sup>5</sup>

What does the claim to „cultural diversity“ mean for those who are not citizens of the state or the European Union? Seyla Benhabib characterises precisely this strained relationship between separation and integration processes as follows: „The discrepancies between rights and privileges of foreigners who are not members of the [European] union, and those who belong to the EU are both legally and politically increasingly difficult to justify.“<sup>6</sup> Since the fall of „real socialism“, the West has lost its most important antithesis – „the other“ – and ever since many have occupied themselves with seeking, and finding, a new „other“. The ethnicising or re-ethnicising processes that can be seen in parallel to the policy of (political and cultural) recognition can also be seen as the other side of the claim to difference, and their effects on the co-existence of „cultural difference and diversity“ should be critically questioned. The question of „inclusion and exclusion“,<sup>7</sup> as it is negotiated in EU Europe, and above all in central, southern and eastern Europe, is a political, social and cultural question in this sense it is also ours: we are inquiring into the structural context of the development possibilities of cultural diversity in different European countries and face a task which for this (short) report is unanswerable: what is the relationship between civil rights and cultural rights?

And how to discuss cultural policy without taking in the whole political, social and economic context?

The following is intended to elaborate the relationship between cultural policy and cultural diversity more clearly. We proceed from the assumption that this relationship nevertheless takes a very different form in the different states participating in this Council of Europe study: The interpretation of what is understood by „cultural diversity“ is due on the one hand essentially to the political, social and cultural history of the country. On the other hand, however, it is also the classification tableaux of the respective authors of the reports, who describe and analyse the development and the status quo of interdependence between cultural policy and cultural diversity. So what is categorised under cultural policy, and above all under the field of „cultural diversity“? What is included or excluded?

The beginnings of the development of governmental cultural policy concepts can be dated parallel to the nation-state consolidation process. That is to say that cultural policy, among other things, made an essential contribution to the development of nation-state identity formation. Today, at the beginning of the 21st century, the position and legitimation of cultural policy strategies and activities has shifted from homogenisation to herogeneity and – far from the homogenisation which was achieved in the western countries some years ago – remains discernible in an overview of European, i.e., western, eastern, northern and south-European countries in their different political and economic contexts. The differences between EU and non-EU countries, which have taken specific effect in the 1990s, should be particularly reflected in a transverse European project like this one.

The question of when the historical category of „cultural diversity“ emerged as a positive, or first as a reference measure of cultural policy decisions in socio-political discourse relates to these differing speeds as well as historical emergence conditions of the political, social and cultural environments of nation states. In the European countries integrated into or oriented on the West, the slowly emerging socio-political claim to „cultural diversity“ showed itself parallel to the new social movements that arose after 1968.

With the EU claim to „unity in diversity“ postulated in the 1990s – i.e. cultural diversity and political unity – in a representation of plurality in multiform and polyphonous cultural diversity, it acquired a central importance for the further development of the Union. Economic harmonisation was to a certain extent contrasted with the heterogeneity of culture (however defined). What is interesting in this connection is the question of the way in which precisely cultural industry developments always fulfil the claim to „cultural diversity“ in their specific logic of exploitation on the one hand, and on the other hand have never recognised it.<sup>8</sup> Confronted with this insoluble

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<sup>5</sup> Cf. Dilek Cinar, „‘Geglückte Integration’ und Staatsbürgerschaft in Österreich“, in: *L’Homme. Zeitschrift für feministische Geschichtswissenschaft*, vol. 1/1999: „Citizenship“, 45-62.

<sup>6</sup> Seyla Benhabib, *Kulturelle Vielfalt und demokratische Gleichheit. Politische Partizipation im Zeitalter der Globalisierung*, Frankfurt/M., 85 (Horkheimer Vorlesungen) (German original).

<sup>7</sup> Inclusion-exclusion is one of the central questions of political philosophy in the 1990s – cf. work of Chantal Mouffe. The issue is taken up precisely in the arts, too: *Inklusion-Exklusion. Kunst im Zeitalter von Postkolonialismus und globaler Migration*, ed. Peter Weibel, Cologne 1997

<sup>8</sup> Cf. at the highest political level „cultural diversity“, „safeguarding cultural diversity“ were very important arguments for the European Commission in the GATS negotiations (Uruguay round) (exceptions to the MFN clause, art. XIX) and

paradox of a discussion of „diversity“ and even any discussion of „cultural diversity“, this description of „cultural diversity in Austria“ should obviously be read as a bringing together of very different levels of politics, economics and culture, which on the one hand assigns the situation of ethnic minorities and immigrants, but on the other, also media diversity and diversity of opinion (in general) to the field of „cultural diversity“.

In Austria since the 1970s, the call for and subsidy of cultural diversity, „broad cultural support“ under the heading „democratisation of the cultural sphere“, has counted among the basic constants of government cultural policy to achieve a more culturally diverse society. This specific form of cultural democratisation, in Austria as in other western-integrated European countries, has been carried out in parallel to the development of the welfare state. In this decade it was often social democratic or socialist governments that actively promoted a „democratic cultural offensive“ in the sense of an „opening up of society“, possibly in recollection of the workers' cultural movement at the start of the century. „Culture for all“ was the new slogan, and, after or parallel to economic betterment of broad population groups, it meant the facilitation of participation in politics and culture, and also meant an active share in political and public discourse.

The culture and arts sphere, with its general high culture and bourgeois connotations until well into the 1970s, was now to be made more easily accessible to social groups that had long been noticeably less able to participate in „cultural life“. A massive build-up of access to „cultural education“ was consequently one of the central concerns of the new political dawn of the 1970s. The decades long demand – partly since the beginning of the First Republic – for equal access to knowledge and education „regardless“ of class and gender and the major structural reform of education, first implemented in the 1970s (dismantling of the feudal hierarchies in the universities (democratisation of the universities, 1975 university reform), free access to universities/colleges and new subsidies in basic schooling) as well as the reform of family law, were pivotal preconditions for a successful implementation of the new socio-political claim to an egalitarian participation in art and culture. A recently published report on „Women in the Culture and Media Sector in Austria“,<sup>9</sup> however, obviously shows, just to mention one example, the limits to, and precisely the slow, evolutionary pace of the realisation of equal gender participation in arts and culture production and creation.

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are crucial for the Millennium Round too. The Finnish EU presidency and now the Portuguese EU Presidency put „cultural diversity“ on their agenda. Cf. Andrea Ellmeier, „EU Cultural policy - European cultural policy? Economy, Politics and Culture in Context“, in: the same / Béla Rásky, *Cultural Policy in Europe - European Cultural Policy? Nation-state and transnationale concepts*, Vienna 1998, 87-160.

<sup>9</sup> Mediacult, *Frauen in Kunst, Kultur- und Medienberufen in Österreich*, authors: Elisabeth Mayerhofer, Klaus Draskowitsch, project manager: Robert Harauer, Monika Mokre, Vienna 2000. A European project in cooperation with the European Institute for Comparative Cultural Policy and the Arts (ERICArts, Bonn) und der Europäischen Union (GD V) (forthcoming)

Cf. also, Edith Almhofer, Gabriele Lang, Gabriele Schmied, Gabriela Tucek, *Die Hälfte des Himmels. Chancen und Bedürfnisse kunstschaftender Frauen in Österreich*, study for the Federal Ministry for Women Affairs and Consumer Protection, unpublished paper, Vienna, May 1999 (forthcoming)

## 2. MAPPING CULTURAL DIVERSITY

### 2.1. Introduction

In the last twenty years cultural diversity has re-emerged as a major topic in current politics. Understood in an anthropological sense, „culture,, denotes the values and ways of life of groups. Thus the topic of cultural diversity is intrinsically linked with the question of group rights and the role of communities in society.

Although cultural diversity is most often discussed in connection with ethnic and religious groups, the term „community,, can designate different forms of group affiliation and the concept of cultural diversity might well be extended to communities of age, gender, lifestyle, religion, disablement or sexual orientation, among others. Many different kinds of groups may develop and transform specific ways of life and specific cultural markers that designate belonging to the group and adherence to its norms and rules. The values, ways of life and cultural markers of different groups are neither static nor unchangeable – culture must not be understood as something given, but as a product of a continuous process of evaluation, conflict and reform within groups and between groups and society. Thus the „cultural content,, of a group may vary widely over time and space, even if the group members consider themselves to belong to a historically stable entity. On the other hand, people sharing the same cultural markers may well reject the idea of belonging to a specific cultural group.

The concept of „cultural diversity,, must certainly be aware of the historical embeddedness of its paradigms and definitions. Instead of defining cultural groups on commonalities of values, ways of life and cultural markers alone, it should concentrate on using cultural markers to designate group affiliation and difference and the self-awareness of the groups in question.

A critical understanding of the position of groups in society has to focus on the existing social, political and cultural framework, which may foster or confine the likelihood of culturally based claim-making and political organisation along the lines of culture and lifestyles.

Given the limitations of time and space, terms like „community,, „minority,, or „ethnic group,, refer only to groups whose characteristics might be labelled as „ethnic,, „national,, „linguistic-ethnic,, „minority-ethnic,, or „ethnic-religious,,. Since the speakers of sign-language do not see themselves as a linguistic ethnic group, the policy-responses towards this „linguistic,, group are not mentioned here. The same holds true for the Austrian Jews, who do not regard themselves as an ethnic-religious group.

Whereas the mainstream of political thinking in the seventies and eighties envisaged „class,, as the most decisive political cleavage would supersede ascriptive factors like ethnicity, the idea of „assimilation,, proved to be unrealistic. Regionalist movements with growing claims towards the cultural recognition of immigrant minorities have also resulted in the development of several models of accommodation of the cultural needs of ethnic minorities in nearly all Western democracies. It may be wishful thinking, that, according to Nathan Glazer, „we are all multiculturalists now,,<sup>10</sup> but nevertheless the idea of cultural group rights has found acceptance in many countries of immigration, especially in Canada, Australia, Britain and the Netherlands. The logic of cultural group rights implicates a reappraisal of ethnicity as an organising factor in the sphere of political interests.

Although the resurgence of ethnicity is one of the global tendencies of the late 20th and beginning 21st century, it is the political framework set by the state which forms the opportunity-structure for ethnic mobilisation. As Patrick Ireland<sup>11</sup> has shown, variables of citizenship law, naturalisation procedures and social, cultural and political rights shape the patterns of the collective organisation of minorities and immigrants. If the state sets criteria defining the rights of certain ethnic groups and minorities, it will be rational for them to stress these criteria and to organise along ethnic lines, whereas an assimilationist setting without specific rights for minorities might foster organisation on class or religious lines. As Paul Statham<sup>12</sup> convincingly demonstrates

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<sup>10</sup> Nathan Glazer, *We Are All Multiculturalists Now*. Cambridge/MA 1977.

<sup>11</sup> Patrick Ireland, *The Political Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland*. Cambridge/MA 1994.

<sup>12</sup> Paul Stratham, „Political mobilisation by minorities in Britain: negative feedback of ‘race relations’?,, In: *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol 25/4, October 1999, 597– 626.

for Britain, the framework set by the state is by far the most relevant variable to explain the way minorities organise themselves.

In the Austrian case, the „Ethnic Groups Act,, (*Volksgruppengesetz*) was the most decisive factor in reorienting Austria's autochthonous language populations to organise along ethnic lines. Whereas ideas of intercultural action and a critical approach towards ethnic organisations prevailed in the organisations in the seventies, the beginning of the eighties brought a new emphasis by the ethnic minority organisations on the respective ethnicity and culture in order to secure funding. Intercultural activities were significantly reduced.

The development among the immigrant groups was different. The break-up of Yugoslavia led to the splitting of the former Yugoslav immigrant organisations into organisations affiliated with the new nation states and in most cases supporting the respective national government. Within the immigrant communities from Turkey ethnicity plays a major role in the self-organisation of the Kurds, whereas Turkish organisations are most often formed along the political lines dividing the Turkish political system. Here the growth of religious affiliation and the development of an organisational network of Islamic centres and mosques – fostered by the strong legal position of Islam – is the most important development of recent years.

The Austrian state has not yet developed a clear approach towards the accommodation of group rights and a political framework in regard to cultural diversity. Most of the rights granted to „autochthonous,, ethnic minority groups are by-products of political bargaining procedures lacking continuity and conceptual clarity. Immigrant minorities are not regarded a relevant part of Austrian society, not only by right-wing populism but by nearly all mainstream political parties. Discriminated in most areas of public life, immigrant minority groups are not seen as a part of Austria's cultural diversity in public discourse and politics, the framework of policy on immigrants fosters social exclusion and cultural assimilation, not diversity.

Autochthonous and immigrant minorities in Austria face a completely different legal and social framework with regard to their cultural rights. The legal term used for autochthonous ethnic groups is *Volkgruppe*. Whereas the 1976 Ethnic Groups Act (*Volksgruppengesetz* BGBl. [Federal Law Gazette] 396/1976) and other legal provisions guarantee a set of cultural rights to the autochthonous minorities, there are no such rights for immigrant ethnic groups. On the contrary, the legal provisions governing naturalisation and the right of residence directly and indirectly demand assimilation to the „Austrian way of life“. The Ethnic Groups Act does not apply to immigrant minorities.

There are six officially recognised ethnic groups in Austria: the Slovenes in the provinces of Carinthia and Styria, Croatians in the province of Burgenland, Hungarians in the provinces of Burgenland and Vienna, Czechs and Slovaks in Vienna and the Roma in all of Austria. The main legal provision regulating their status is the above-mentioned Ethnic Groups Act and the additional provincial laws on minority education in two Austrian provinces. The minority rights of Slovenes and Croatians are further guaranteed by an international treaty, Article 7 of the 1955 Austrian State Treaty, the rights of Czechs and Slovaks in Vienna by a bilateral treaty with Czechoslovakia dating from 1920.

There are at least two legal provisions protecting the rights of non-German speaking Austrians. One is Article 19 of the *Staatsgrundgesetz*, the 1867 Constitution<sup>13</sup> which is still part of the Austrian constitution, the second is contained in Articles 66, 67 and 68 of the 1920 Austrian State Treaty of St Germain.<sup>14</sup> Although eminent constitutional law experts have repeatedly argued the validity of these provisions<sup>15</sup> they have been interpreted by provincial and federal legislators in the most narrow sense possible, sometimes denying their relevance at all.<sup>16</sup>

The Ethnic Groups Act guarantees the preservation of the ethnic groups (*Volkgruppen*) and stipulates, that their language and national characteristics (*Volkstum*) should be respected. An ethnic group (*Volkgruppe*) is defined as those groups of Austrian citizens traditionally residing

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<sup>13</sup> *Staatsgrundgesetz* 1867, RGBL. [Imperial Law Gazette] 142/1867.

<sup>14</sup> *Staatsvertrag von St.Germain*, BGBl. [Federal Law Gazette] 303/1920.

<sup>15</sup> Theo Öhlinger, „Die Rechtslage ethnischer Gruppen in Österreich“, in: Österreichisches Volksgruppenzentrum (ed.), *Volkgruppenreport 1996*, Vienna 1996, 157-172, Walter Kolonovits, *Sprache in Österreich*, Vienna 1999.

<sup>16</sup> Bundeskanzleramt- Verfassungsdienst (ed.), *Grundlagenbericht der Bundesregierung über die Lage der Volksgruppen in Österreich*, Vienna s.a., 64 - 67.

(*wohnhaft und beheimatet*)<sup>17</sup> in parts of the Austrian state territory who speak a non-German mother tongue and have own national characteristics (*Volkstum*). The federal state recognises its obligation to subsidise measures that safeguard the existence of the ethnic groups and their national characteristics (*Volkstum*).

The Ethnic Groups Act declares the rights of these groups to use their mother tongue in public in certain areas and under certain specific circumstances. In most cases these areas are either the province where the groups live or specific areas of this province with a certain percentage of minority population. The ethnic groups have, *inter alia*, the right to use their mother tongue in dealings with officialdom, i.e. the use of an interpreter, and the right to have documents translated into their mother tongue. Bilingual place names such as street-names and road signs may under certain circumstances be set up in the areas defined by law as bilingual, with at least 25 per cent minority population.

Special advisory bodies comprising representatives of the different ethnic minorities the *Volksgruppenbeiräte* were set up at the Chancellor's office to advise the federal government on minority policies and the distribution of subsidies for the organisations of the representative ethnic minorities the *Volksgruppenförderung*. This body is intended to safeguard the cultural, social and economic interests of the ethnic groups and is composed of representatives of the minorities, political parties and the religious groups.

There are no similar legal provisions safeguarding the cultural rights of immigrant ethnic groups. On the contrary, the naturalisation law and Austrian residence law implicitly favour assimilation. According to the 1988 Naturalisation Act (BGBl. 124/1998), the „integration of the applicant“ is the most important criterion for the granting of naturalisation. Whereas normally an applicant has *inter alia* to prove residence in Austria for at least 10 years, this period can be shortened, if she/he can prove a good knowledge of German and „sustainable personal and professional integration“ in Austria. As the law is administered by the provincial governments, there may be considerable differences in the understanding of this term. According to the internal regulations of the provincial government of Vienna, „complete integration“ is understood as fluent knowledge of German, a sound professional education and proven activities for the coexistence of the indigenous and immigrant population in Vienna.<sup>18</sup> Until 1998, the naturalisation law demanded „assimilation to the Austrian way of life“ as a precondition for naturalisation.

Until 1997, the law governing the right of residence of non-European-Economic-Area citizens stipulated, that applicants for family reunification who, because of personal circumstances will integrate quickly, should be treated favourably.<sup>19</sup> In 1996 and 1997, the Vienna authorities issued several refusals of residence permits for Turkish women arguing that „according to experience, even after a prolonged stay in Austria people from this cultural area do not show a complete integration in the areas of language and communication with the resident population and do not assimilate to Central European customs and ways of life.“ Although the Constitutional Court has revoked these decisions, they throw a light on the rather peculiar understanding of cultural diversity in the ranks of local and provincial authorities.

## 2.2. **Autochthonous ethnic groups**<sup>20</sup>

The most striking characteristic of autochthonous Austrian ethnic minorities is their substantially differing legal status.

### 2.2.1. *Slovenes in the provinces of Carinthia and Styria*

The Slovenes are officially recognised as an autochthonous ethnic minority in the Austrian provinces of Carinthia and Styria. They live in three valleys of southern Carinthia – the Jauntal/Podjuna, the Rosental/Roz and Gailtal/Zilia – and in the areas of the cities of

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<sup>17</sup>The term *beheimatet* cannot be translated into English. It has its roots in the right-wing and anti-liberal tradition of *völkisch* thinking, where *Heimat* (home) does not just mean place of residence, but also the adherence to traditional and exclusionary model of society. See also Jochen Blaschke: *Volk, Nation, Interner Kolonialismus, Ethnizität. Konzepte zur politischen Soziologie regionalistischer Bewegungen in Westeuropa*. Berlin 1985, 31 - 67.

<sup>18</sup> Wiener Integrationsfonds (ed.), *MigrantInnen in Wien. Daten&Fakten&Recht*. Report 98, Part II., Vienna 1999, 43.

<sup>19</sup> There is a quota-system governing immigration and family reunification in Austria. The quota is set up annually by the government, and people fulfilling the prerequisites for immigration or family reunification have to wait for a free quota-place.

<sup>20</sup> cf. Gerhard Baumgartner / Bernhard Perchinig, „Minderheitenpolitik in Österreich seit 1945“ in: Herbert Dachs / Peter Gerlich *inter alia* (eds), *Handbuch des österreichischen politischen Systems*, Vienna 1996, 628 - 640.

Volkermarkt/Velikovec and Klagenfurt/Celovec. The historical mono- and bilingual Slovenian-speaking area covers 41 local authority areas in southern Carinthia. The number of Slovenian speakers in Carinthia has – according to official censuses – declined from 66,463 in 1910 to 14,850 in 1991. Although Slovenian speakers are to be found in countless villages all along the Styrian-Slovene border, the bilingual area of Styria today comprises only a small number of villages and hamlets in three areas around the towns of Bad Radkersburg/Radgona, Soboth/Sobota and Leutschach, where the Roman Catholic provincial diocese still provides church services in Slovenian. By far the greatest number of Slovenian speakers live in the provincial capital of Graz/Gradec. Their official numbers have dwindled from 3,838 in 1934 1,695 in the 1991 census. The provincial government of Styria stubbornly refuses to acknowledge the existence of this ethnic minority on its territory in spite of its constitutional rights.

The fundamental minority rights for the Slovene ethnic minority were laid down in Article 7 of the 1955 Austrian State Treaty, one of the crucial constitutional acts of the Austrian Republic. The Slovene minorities were granted their own primary and secondary schools, bilingual place names and road signs, and the Slovenian language was declared to be an official language in the bilingual areas. These vaguely formulated promises were made in 1955 in order to win the backing of the bilingual Slovene population for the signature of the 1955 State Treaty, which was threatened among other things by Yugoslav territorial claims in the name of the Slovene and Croatian minorities in Burgenland. Very few of these measures have ever been put into effect. Primary schooling in Slovenian has been a bone of contention in Carinthian provincial politics for five decades, federally funded secondary schools became targets of anti-Slovene demonstrations by German-nationalist organisations, sometimes openly supported by provincial officials and government institutions. In 1972, in the aftermath of Austria's successful intervention on behalf of the German speaking minority in the Italian province of South Tyrol, when the federal government finally set up bilingual road signs in southern Carinthia, 17 years after the State Treaty, these were destroyed by German-nationalist mobs in 123 villages right under the eyes of the police, who deigned not to intervene in this so called *Ortstafelsturm*, storming of the road signs, one of the major political crises of Austrian post-war politics. Today bilingual road signs remain in 63 villages in seven local authorities. A special federal decree regulating the status of Slovenian as an official language lists 91 villages in eight local authorities.<sup>21</sup>

In 1976 the federal government passed a new law on the rights of autochthonous ethnic minorities in Austria, the *Volksgruppengesetz*, the Ethnic Groups Act, which significantly curtailed the rights granted in Article 7 of the 1955 State Treaty, but now listed five groups – later extended to six – as recognised ethnic minorities in different parts of Austria. Several Constitutional Court rulings have underlined the fundamental character of the constitutional rights of ethnic minorities and have overruled a number of provisions in the *Volksgruppengesetz* in order to safeguard the rights and to guarantee the existence of the ethnic groups. There is also an ongoing debate among the recognised ethnic groups that the provisions meant to safeguard their cultural heritage are not being properly applied and executed. Slovene organisations have long tried to fight the restricting clauses of the Ethnic Groups Act and have for decades refused to cooperate with the Austrian Chancellery's ethnic advisory boards.

Slovenian cultural initiatives and organisations are organised into two large representative organisations, the *Zveza slovenskih organizacij / Zentralverband der Kärntner Slovenen*, Central Alliance of Slovenian Organisations, mainly representing organisations with social democratic, communist or other left-wing views. Conservative, mostly Christian democratic organisations are represented by the *narodni svet koroskih Slovencev / Rat der Kärntner Slovenen*, the Council of Carinthian Slovene. The *Etnotna lista/Einheitsliste*, a Slovene/German election platform at local level, is represented in 24 local councils with 51 representatives in all.

The social background of the Slovene ethnic minority has been characterised by the telling phrase *Doktor und Bauer*<sup>22</sup>, people with PhDs and farmers. The rural population, for centuries the backbone of ethnic minorities in Austria and Central Europe in general, is rapidly disintegrating. Only some intellectuals and professionals emerging from university are carrying on the tradition; other professional and social groups are significantly underrepresented.

<sup>21</sup> *Gerichtssprachenverordnung* 1977, BGBl 307/1977.

<sup>22</sup> Albert Reiterer, *Doktor und Bauer*, Klagenfurt/Celovec 1986.

### 2.2.2. Croats in Burgenland

The Croats are officially recognised as an autochthonous ethnic minority in the Austrian province of Burgenland. They live in numerous villages in six districts of the province along the Austrian/Hungarian border. In the 1991 census a total of 19,109 persons declared themselves to be Croat speaking, with a further 6,300 in Vienna. Like the Slovenes, their number has steadily fallen, from an all time high of 44,753 Croat speakers in 1920. Like the Slovenes, too, they were granted substantial minority rights in the 1955 Austrian State Treaty, most of which have not been implemented for decades.

The census figures probably give a very unrealistic picture of the number of Croatian speakers in the area, since public use of the language became heavily politicised during the inter-war period. The bone of contention was the language of tuition and the introduction of Austrian educational law in Burgenland after its annexation by Austria in 1920. Most village schools in the new province were denominational schools, completely dominated by the fervently anti-socialist local clergy. When the provincial government of Burgenland voted for the introduction of the Austrian school laws – which would have severely restricted the influence of the clergy and turned the village teacher from the rather underpaid sexton-cum-organist-cum-teacher into a provincial official – the clergy argued that this would lead to strong assimilation in the Croatian villages – probably true – and the general collapse of Christian morals and values – probably untrue. The conservative Christian Democratic federal government thus revoked the Austrian school laws in the province and adopted the more conservative Hungarian Law in this respect. This led the Social Democrats to renounce the public use of Croatian. The Social Democratic oriented population withdrew from the cultural associations and organisations, which turned into front recruiting organisations for the Christian Democrats. Together with the support of the Roman Catholic diocese, a provincial minority education law making native language in the primary schools compulsory ensured the survival of these village dialects as dominant means of everyday communication in the villages. Social Democrats would send their children to school in German-speaking neighbouring villages, but would still speak their mother tongue in the village and family circles.

The Croatian speaking population of Burgenland thus became split into a Social Democratic oriented, assimilationist working-class or professional section and a Conservative-oriented, fervently Catholic and „nationally aware“ agrarian section. The most important Croatian organisation, the *Hrvatsko Kulturno Drustvo* / Croatian Cultural Association was thus for many decades regarded as the fifth column of the conservative Austrian Peoples Party-ÖVP. Croat politicians are to be found in most of the Austrian parties, in Burgenland, provincial and local representatives have organised themselves into two separate organisations along party lines. As of late the Social Democratic activists have rejected their fervently assimilationist point of view, started cooperating with their Conservative fellow Croatians, and have even started a big media campaign for the use and survival of their language, a change of heart undoubtedly supported if not initiated by the lure of ample European Union minority funds.

The new Ethnic Groups Act has been strongly rejected by Croatian organisations, who like the Slovenes refused to cooperate in the minority advisory boards of the Austrian Chancellery for more than ten years. The major changes in Austrian minority politics were actually brought about by legal action initiated by Croats from Burgenland who appealed to the Austrian Constitutional Court and in 1987 Croatian was ruled to be the second official language in six of the seven provinces of Burgenland. The decision did not really take federal and provincial authorities by surprise, since historical research has clearly shown that the authorities have knowingly suppressed ethnic minority rights granted in the 1955 State Treaty. The fact that nobody took them to court over it from 1955 to 1987 also illustrates the new confidence of Austrian citizens in the democratic machinery of the state, as opposed to their reliance on party affiliations in the decades after World War II.

The Croatian and Slovene ethnic groups in particular experienced a marked change in the make-up of their leading elites at the end of the seventies and early eighties, when young, well educated activists coming out of university brought new forms of political action to minority politics. One of the effects of this was the foundation of independent cultural initiatives apart from the big hierarchical minority organisations. The KUGA *Kulturna zadruga/Kulturgenossenschaft* was one such initiative among the Croats as was the *Oktobrski Tabor*, the October Camp, among Slovenes. The *Pannonisches Institut* PAIN in Burgenland is a fine example of such initiatives where Croats Hungarians and German speaking Austrians cooperate at regional level.

### 2.2.3. Hungarians in Burgenland and Vienna

Unlike the Slovenes and Croatians, the Hungarians were not recognised as an ethnic minority until the 1976 Ethnic Group Act. The Hungarian ethnic minority in Burgenland has shrunk from 26,225 in 1910 to 4,973 in 1991. The majority of the Hungarian speaking population of Burgenland lives in four villages in and near the two district capitals of *Oberwart/Felsőőr* and *Oberpullendorf/Felsőpulya* where they have probably lived for something like 1,100 years, since they were settled there as Hungarian border guards against the medieval German Empire. Whereas the census figures for Slovenes and Croatians are probably grossly underrepresent the number of speakers of these minority languages – because of a hostile atmosphere in the case of Slovenian and political implications in the case of Croatian – the census figures for Hungarian seem fairly accurate, if not overrepresenting the actual language situation in Burgenland. The Hungarian-speaking border guards and their families were accorded aristocratic status in the Middle Ages, a tradition upheld until 1848, which gave the language high prestige in the villages of the Burgenland so that even people who are hardly able to speak it any longer tend to declare themselves to be Hungarian speaking in the census. The Hungarian speaking population of Vienna has risen continually since the Second World War, from 1,039 in 1951 to 8,930 in 1991. Although a Hungarian speaking element of the town population is traceable back to the Middle Ages, the situation today was created by repeated waves of migration, especially around the turn of the last century and then after the Second World War, especially in 1948 and 1956, after the Hungarian Uprising. The number of Hungarian speakers has probably increased significantly through migration over the last decade through a great influx of Hungarian speakers from Romania, former Yugoslavia, Slovakia and Hungary proper. The Hungarian ethnic minority of Vienna was repeatedly refused recognition under the Ethnic Groups Act, but was finally recognised in 1992 after strong pressure from the newly elected democratic Hungarian government. The relationship between the different Hungarian organisations is characterised by a deep rift between the *Ausztriai Magyar Egyesületek es Szervezetek Központi Szövetsége / Zentralverband ungarischer Vereine und Organisationen in Österreich*, a Hungarian organisation comprising a number of cultural initiatives which mainly represent members of the emigration of 1956 on the one hand and the *Burgenlandi Magyar Kultúregyesület / Burgenländisch-Ungarischer Kulturverein*, The Hungarian Cultural Association of Burgenland on the other, together with the *Ausztriai Független Magyar Kultúregyesület Csucsszervezete / Dachverband der Unabhängigen Vereine in Österreich*, the latter being an association of traditional Hungarian initiatives in Vienna and Burgenland with predominantly social democratic and for some time and to some extent communist orientation. The right to native language tuition in Burgenland was granted under the 1937 and 1994 provincial education laws; no such legal provisions exist for Vienna. Although the Hungarian ethnic minority has been able vastly to increase its educational facilities in Burgenland, especially in secondary education, other provisions of the Ethnic Groups Act, such as bilingual road signs and place names, have never been put into effect despite repeated and forceful demands from the town and villages concerned.

#### 2.2.4. *Czechs in Vienna*

The legal status of the Czech ethnic minority in Vienna is based on a bilateral Treaty of Brno/Brünn in 1920 between the then young republics of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The number of Czechs – or rather Czechoslovaks – dwindled from 98,461 in 1910 to a mere 6,429 in 1991. This dramatic decrease was to a large extent due to mass remigration to Czechoslovakia after the First World War, and to a second wave of remigration after the Second World War. The question of minority rights for the Czech ethnic minority constituted a central problem of provincial politics in Vienna, so much so that after Austria's full independence in 1955 the City of Vienna refused to publish the 1961 census language data. The language data drastically underrepresented the number of Czech speakers in the city, who for a complex set of reasons, – partly because of the anti-Czech attitudes of the majority population, partly because of their Social Democratic orientation, similar to the Croats in Burgenland – refuse to declare themselves as Czech speakers in the censuses.

The major bastion of Czech cultural life in Vienna was and is the *Schulverein Komensky*, the Komensky School Association, which ran publicly recognised primary and secondary schools in Vienna. This school association formed a kind of link between the different ideologically warring – ethnic minority associations. Other meeting points are a Czech cultural house and a very successful Czech football club. The Czech organisations did not cooperate with the minority advisory board of the Austrian Chancellery until 1994. Financial problems with the last existing Komensky school brought about a change of mind and the school now receives funds from the Chancellery's *Volkgruppenförderung*, which covers about two thirds of its running costs. This financial crisis was brought about by the collapse of Central European communist regimes, which had always financed minority organisations of the Austrian Slovenes and Czechoslovaks, but their successors stopped doing so because of financial problems. Since 1990 there has been a new influx of Czech speakers into Austria, who work mainly in labour-intensive parts of the economy.

Although Czech is a recognised minority language there are no radio or TV programmes available, although Austrian state radio, ORF, broadcast programmes in Czech between 1948 and 1949.

#### 2.2.5. Slovaks in Vienna

The Slovaks in Vienna were always a very small group, ranging from 797 in 1923 to 619 in 1991. These census data are extremely misleading. There was a large influx of Slovak speakers into Vienna around the turn of the last century, but most declared themselves to be Czechoslovaks – a liberal, national identity construction propagated before and during the First World War – rather than Slovaks, who were considered to be anti-liberal conservative nationalists. The Slovak organisations, which openly cooperated with the Nazis and were supported by them, completely disappeared after the Second World War. The association active today, the *Rakousko-Slovenský Kulturný Spolok/Österreichisch Slowakischer Kulturverein*, the Austrian Slovak Cultural Association, was founded in 1983 mainly by recent expatriates from Slovakia who came in the wake of the repression of the 1968 Prague Spring, as well as later immigrants.

After Slovakia became independent in 1992, a separate Slovak minority advisory board was set up at the Austrian Chancellery in 1994, allocating funds to the tiny but now separate ethnic group. This example illustrates the general tendency of Austrian minority politics to react to international developments and foreign policy interest rather than to orient itself on actual needs and interests of the ethnic minority populations. Provisions for native-language tuition, media coverage or official recognition of the language do not exist. Only one secondary school in Vienna offers Slovak as an optional subject.

#### 2.2.6 Roma in all nine provinces of Austria

The Roma – a term used in Austrian administration for the Roma and Sinti groups of the formerly so-called „Gypsy“ population – are the only ethnic minority whose rights are recognised in all nine provinces of Austria. How many Roma live in Austria today is completely unknown and a bone of contention between officials and minority representatives. The figures vary from a several hundred to an estimate of 10,000 or even 40,000. In the 1991 census only 93 people declared Romany to be their first or second language. The census data are extremely misleading in this case, since for decades most Roma have refused to divulge their knowledge of their own language, which they regarded as a secret means of communication in a surrounding society which they rightly considered to be extremely hostile. Before the Second World War about 2,000 Sinti and some 8,000 Roma lived in Vienna and Burgenland respectively. The Roma in Burgenland settled there in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century and formed an extremely poor sector of the manual farm labourers. The economic crises pushed them towards complete destitution in the early forties and triggered a range of social conflicts with their home villages, which according to the poor laws of the time had to fund all the costs of medical treatment and other social services, even schooling. The hue and cry of the Burgenland local councillors was taken up by the then illegal Nazis, who in Burgenland fought under the slogan *Burgenland zigeunerfrei!*, Burgenland free of Gypsies! This programme of ethnic cleansing was barbarously put into effect after 1938 and about 90 per cent of Austria's Roma and Sinti population perished in concentration camps or as forced labourers in various detention camps.

Despite several initiatives, the Roma and Sinti were not recognised as an Austrian ethnic minority under the 1976 Ethnic Groups Act, legal experts declaring that since the Roma were by definition nomadic they could not claim to have a *Heimat*, a home, in Austria. The Lackenbach camp in Burgenland, where hundreds of them perished and from which thousands were deported from to Poland was only recognised as a concentration camp in 1984, and many former concentration camp inmates only received compensation payments under a special Austrian law for victims of the Holocaust after 1988. The first organisation, *Verein Roma*, the Roma Association, was founded in 1989 in Oberwart/Erbate in Burgenland. Soon afterwards various activists of immigrant Roma groups from the Balkans and Eastern Europe together with Vienna Roma founded their own organisation in 1991, the *Romano Centro*. The *Kulturverein Österreichischer Roma*, Cultural Association of Austrian Roma, was founded in the same year in Vienna and played a crucial role in gaining official recognition for the ethnic minority in 1993. The *Romano Centro* and the Cultural Association of Austrian Roma both run centres in Vienna, the latter catering exclusively to the needs of the Austrian Roma, who alone are recognised under the Ethnic Groups Act. Immigrant Roma who do not have Austrian citizenship are not eligible to any support and representation.

The education law of the province of Burgenland in its revised 1994 form created the legal framework for teaching of the Romany language in schools, after the language had been standardised and lexicalised in an internationally acclaimed linguistic project by the University of Graz. There are no provisions for media coverage of recognition as an official language.

### 2.3. Ethnic immigrant groups in Austria<sup>23</sup>

#### 2.3.1. Legal and social framework

No data are available concerning the cultural affiliation of immigrant minority groups. Two statistical sources can be used to provide an estimate, census data on the citizenship of the foreign population and on native languages spoken in Austria and the data on the citizenship of the foreign population in the population registers collected by the cities and provincial authorities. The last census was taken in 1991, with figures on the foreign population calculated for each subsequent year. Data on the citizenship of the foreign population provided by the population registers are regularly published only by the City of Vienna.<sup>24</sup>

Since citizenship does not necessarily reflect the cultural affiliation of a person, given the existence of ethnic and cultural minorities in nearly all countries of the world, data provided on the basis of citizenship can only serve as a very rough indicator for cultural diversity. In the absence of other data, the existence of immigrant minority organisations based on the ethnic affiliation of minority groups in the respective country of origin might indicate the presence of strong „minorities within the minority“. In Austria this is especially the case for the Kurdish minority from Turkey, Iraq and Syria, who have organised themselves in several Kurdish associations, and for Roma mainly from Serbia, Montenegro and Romania, who also have formed their own association. It is estimated, that about a third of the Turkish population belong to the Kurdish minority and about a quarter of the Serb population are Roma.

According to the Austrian Central Statistical Office, around 737,000 foreign citizens (9 per cent of the population) were living in Austria at the end of 1998. The majority, i.e. 56 per cent originate from former Yugoslavia and 19 per cent from Turkey.

Approximately 283,500 immigrants live in Vienna (17,6 per cent of the population), approx. 96,000 in Upper Austria and 94.600 in Lower Austria. Some 60.000 foreigners have taken up residence in each n the provinces of Salzburg, Styria and the Tyrol, with Vorarlberg (48,300), Carinthia (31,300) and Burgenland (12,700) having the lowest absolute numbers of immigrants.

The following table shows the composition of the registered population of foreigners resident in the City of Vienna in 1998

Nationality	Number
Former Yugoslavia	123,000
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	83,772
Turkey	45,708
Poland	17,501
Bosnia-Herzegovina	17,301
Croatia	16,159
Other EU-Countries	12,998
Germany	11,959
Iran	6,254
Former CSFR	5,816

<sup>23</sup> Further reading: Rainer Bauböck Rainer, *Nach Rasse und Sprache verschieden,.. Migrationspolitik in Österreich von der Monarchie bis heute*, Vienna 1996 (Institute for Advanced Studies, Reihe Politikwissenschaft no. 31); Heinz Fassmann / Rainer Münz, *Einwanderungsland Österreich. Historische Migrationsmuster, aktuelle Trends und politische Maßnahmen*, Vienna 1995; Peter Findl, Peter / Fraji Adelheid „Ausländer in Österreich. Ergebnisse der Volkszählung“, in: Statistische Nachrichten 11/ 1993; Gabriele Juen / Bernhard Perchinig / Patrik-Paul Volf, „Migrationspolitik - Zur Europäisierung eines Gastarbeitermodells“, in: Emmerich Talos/ Gerda Falkner (eds), *EU - Mitglied Österreich. Gegenwart und Perspektiven: Eine Zwischenbilanz*, Vienna 1996.-

<sup>24</sup> According to the statistic department of the City of Vienna, Vienna had 1.539 million inhabitants in 1991 and 1.606 million in 1998. The so-called „foreigners,, we can say immigrants, range at 12.8 per cent in 1991 and 17.6 per cent in 1998.

Hungary	5,370
Macedonia	4,973
Egypt	4,817
Romania	4,561
Slovenia	795
Others	45,486
<b>Total</b>	<b>283,470</b>

Source: *Wiener Integrationsfonds, MigrantInnen in Wien. Daten&Fakten&Recht*. Report 98, Part II., Vienna 1999, 8. In 1998 Vienna had 1.6 million inhabitants.

80 per cent of the foreigners living in Austria are under 45, compared with 60 per cent among Austrian citizens. 71 per cent of the families with at least one parent of foreign citizenship have at least one child, as compared to 63 per cent of Austrian families.

Foreign citizens have to face discrimination in many areas of life.

Access to the labour market is regulated by a separate system of labour-market –quotas, which de-facto excludes a high percentage of immigrants with residence permits from participating in the labour-market. Unless they have resided in Austria for more than eight years, prolonged unemployment may lead to the loss of the residence permit.

Because of this institutional discrimination, living-conditions of immigrant minority ethnic communities are rather poor. Whereas 37 per cent of the children with Austrian citizenship under the age of six attend institutional childcare, the figure is only 32 per cent for children with Yugoslav and 20 per cent for children with Turkish backgrounds. 45 per cent of children with a Turkish background cannot attend institutional childcare institutions owing to a lack of financial resources.

Children with foreign citizenship are much more likely to attend schools that do not lead to further education, i.e. lower secondary schools and *Sonderschulen*, i.e. „special schools“ for disabledIn cont, which do not allow the pupil to go on to higher secondary schools and are often not even accepted as basic qualification for vocational training. 24 per cent of all pupils attending these „special schools“ do not have the Austrian citizenship.

On an average, the income of foreign citizens is decidedly lower than of Austrians. Whereas 50 per cent of all Austrian employees and workers on average earned more than ATS 16,100 per month in 1998, the figure was ATS 13,000 for Yugoslav citizens and ATS 13,300 for Turkish citizens. Foreign citizens are more likely to become unemployed, According to Austrian calculation-method their unemployment rate rose from 5.9 per cent in 1989 to 8.7 per cent in 1998; the respective figures for Austrian citizens in 1989 being 4.9 per cent, in 1998 even 7.0 per cent. According to their concentration in construction, industry and tourism, the working conditions of foreign workers are generally worse than the working conditions for Austrians, with high rates of night-shifts and weekend working.

30 per cent of all foreigners live in flats without bathroom or toilet. Housing conditions for foreign citizens are particularly poor in Vienna, where only Austrian and EU citizens have access to council housing: 60 per cent of the Turkish, 55 per cent of (ex)Yugoslav and 20 per cent of foreigners of „other nationalities“, but only 8 per cent of the Austrian citizens live in flats without a toilet or bathroom. Despite the bad housing conditions, foreign citizens have to pay more rent per square-metre than Austrians. The average rent per square-metre for (ex)Yugoslav citizens amounts at ATS 64, for Turkish citizens ATS 47, for „other nationalities“ to ATS 56, whereas the average rent per square-meter for Austrians is ATS 37.

According to a survey conducted in the province of Upper Austria, 44 per cent of foreigners living in the province said they felt oppressed and exploited in Austria and 61 per cent said they were treated like third-class citizens<sup>25</sup>.

A tenancy agreement for council housing, which accounts for about 20 per cent of all housing in Vienna, is restricted to Austrian and EEA citizens in Vienna and most other cities, and in contrast to Austrians foreign citizens are not eligible for most subsidies in case of prolonged

<sup>25</sup> Austrian Central Statistical Office, press release, 14/10/99.

unemployment as well as other forms of social welfare. Exclusion of immigrant minority ethnic groups is not only to be found within the framework of civil society, but is reinforced by exclusion from many forms of state-welfare. This situation is worsened by the fact, that visible minorities in particular, especially groups with an African background, suffer racial harassment as „drug-traffickers“ in the media.

### 2.3.2. *The 1991 Austrian census*<sup>26</sup>

A short look at the census figures on citizenship and mother-tongue shows the need to rethink the concept of minority, which is often restricted to autochthonous minorities of a given nation state. A look at the Austrian situation may illustrate this necessity even further. Immigrants by far outnumber the autochthonous and bilingual ethnic groups, and although many of them would need the right to use their mother tongue in public just to be able to communicate with the authorities, they do not have this right.

Language of daily use	Austrian Citizens	Foreign Citizens
Croatian	29,596	30,258
Czech	9,822	9,636
Hungarian	19,638	13,821
Serbo-Croat	16,657	141,229
Slovenian	20,191	10,209
Turkish	6,193	113,908 <sup>27</sup>

#### Largest Immigrant Groups 1991 according to citizenship

(ex) Yugoslavia	197,886
Turkey	118,579
Germany	57,310
Romania	18,536
Poland	18,321
total	517,690

Source: Gerhard Baumgartner, *6 x Österreich. Geschichte und aktuelle Situation der Volksgruppen*. Klagenfurt/Celovec 1995, 162, own calculations.

As the figures show, the two largest minority language groups in Austria are the users of Serbo-Croat and Turkish. Minority language rights only exist for the Slovene, Croat, Hungarian, Czech, Slovak and Roma *Volksgruppen*, provided the person concerned has Austrian citizenship, and even then only in some districts of some provinces. The figures also show, that there is no clear-cut relationship between citizenship and language use and the figures thus challenge the all-too simple conception of a minority as a group of people sharing the same mother tongue.

<sup>26</sup> In 1998: Austria is a small country, 84 000 km<sup>2</sup> (territory) and had in 1998 8.078 million inhabitants.

<sup>27</sup> The 1991 census figures illustrate the problematic nature of Austrian census data. While the 141,229 foreign speakers of Serbo-Croatian include immigrants from former Yugoslavia, apart from Slovenian speakers, the 30,258 foreign Croatian speakers represent the already more nationalist segment among the immigrants who have given up the Yugoslav construction of Serbo-Croatian and have reverted to Croatian as a symbol of national and political affiliation, among them many not only from Croatia proper but from the Catholic regions of Bosnia. The 29,596 Croatian-speaking Austrian citizens represent the ethnic Croatian minority of Burgenland plus a largish group of Burgenland Croats in Vienna plus a number of naturalised Croats from former Yugoslavia, who have already given up their Serbo-Croatian affiliation, unlike their former fellow countrymen, the 16,657 Serbo-Croatian-speaking Austrians, who also represent naturalised immigrants from former Yugoslavia. As Serbo-Croatian was seen as the language spoken in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia until the break-up of Yugoslavia and many immigrants from the seventies and eighties still regard Serbo-Croatian as their mother-tongue, the group of foreign speakers of Croatian mainly comprises civil-war-refugees from Bosnia and Croatia and other Yugoslav citizens, who did not want to be counted as Serbo-Croatian speakers.

### 3. MAPPING CULTURAL POLICY

#### 3.1. Introduction

#### 3.2. Historical Background

The following brief historical contextualisation of Austrian cultural policy is intended to present the major political framework. This will be followed by a discussion of the cultural policy emphases of the 1990s. Finally, there is a short Appendix on the democratic aspects (cultural diversity – media diversity), which should indicate the structural interdependence between cultural and media policy essential to „cultural diversity“.

The history of the Austrian Republic (1918-1933 and 1945 ff.) is marked among other things by the fact that, relative to bigger countries, cultural policy has always played a more significant socio-political role.

In a brief summary, it can be said that the First Republic was marked by great political tensions between the two major parties – the Christian Social Party (later the ÖVP) and the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) – and the term *Kulturkampf* is thoroughly appropriate to the political climate in this short-lived First Republic. The Christian Social side pursued a policy of political Catholicism – a prelate was one of the most polarising Federal Chancellors of the inter-war period – with its Austria ideology based on a myth of a Catholic empire (particularly marked in the period of Austro-fascism and its relation to Austria's one-time great-power status (the Habsburg myth)). This was accompanied by anti-intellectualism, anti-Semitism and an agrarian romanticism directed against „bloated Vienna“. This Catholic Austria ideology was no longer officially pursued in the context of the development of an „Austrian identity“ after the end of the Nazi terror regime in 1945, yet remained a distinct presence in some aspects of the cultural policy of the first grand coalition (ÖVP-SPÖ, 1945-1966). The long unexamined personnel continuity between the cultural elites of Austro-fascism and Nazism in post-war Austria<sup>28</sup> are unavoidable aspects in any structural discussion of a longitudinal section of cultural policy. The Allies' cultural policy after 1945 (1945-1955) incidentally acquires a strategic significance here. Initially it did indeed consist of the hope of a common politico-cultural approach against the old cultural elites, but the cold war soon „withered the tender plant of 're-education and reorientation'“.<sup>29</sup>

On the other hand, the interpretation of cultural policy influenced by Austria's second socially determining party in the First Republic, the Social Democrats, also played a genuinely pivotal role: as a surrogate, as it were, for actual powerlessness in the body politic<sup>30</sup> the attempt was made to build an „alternative society“ to bourgeois society, in the form of an extensive apparatus of cultural, economic (cooperative) and political organisations for the whole range of life and work, which it was above all possible to realise in „Red Vienna“ (council housing, adult education, school reforms, cooperative projects, etc.). The metaphor „from the cradle to the grave“ reflected this all-embracing claim to political and cultural „(comprehensive) provision“ for the electorate. The dissolution of parliament in March 1933 and the Christian Social regime's subsequent ban on the Social Democratic Party after the fighting in February 1934 (civil war) brought an abrupt end to this reform movement. In summary, in the First Republic it can be assumed that there was a broad politicisation of every sphere of everyday life. Thus, for example, something so mundane as shopping was a thoroughly political act: there was the „red“ Co-op store and the „black“ or „brown“ grocer's. After 1945, of the workers' cultural projects realised in the First Republic, some such as the Vienna Adult Education Institutes or the trade-union federation cultural service were reactivated and continued.

Even though the extremely polarising parties of the First Republic were able to develop new forms of political dispute after 1945, a party-political connotation or classification of cultural activities reflecting the politico-cultural conceptions of the ruling parties, the ÖVP and SPÖ, was also retained in the Second Republic. The „third party“ in Austrian post-war history, the FPÖ –

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<sup>28</sup> Cf. Georg Schmid, „Der 'falschen' Fuffziger. Kulturpolitische Tendenzen der fünfziger Jahre“, in: Aspetsberger, Frei, Lengauer (eds), *Literatur der Nachkriegszeit und der fünfziger Jahre in Österreich*, Vienna 1984, 7-23.

<sup>29</sup> Oliver Rathkolb, „Planspiele im Kalten Krieg. Sondierungen zur Kultur- und Theaterpolitik der Alliierten“, in: Hilde Haider-Pregler / Peter Roessler (eds), *Zeit der Befreiung. Wiener Theater nach 1945*, Vienna, 1997, 40-64, 44. Rathkolb speaks of a reactivation of the Catholic cultural elites as a result of Soviet policy. Cf., too, Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonisation and the Cold War. The Cultural mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War*, Chapel Hill / London 1994.

<sup>30</sup> The SDAPÖ (Social-Democratic Workers' Party of Austria) was only a coalition party in government in the period of the foundation of the Republic, 1918-1920, and then remained in opposition until it was banned in 1934.

successor to the VDU<sup>31</sup> – has never been noticeable in the Second Republic for cultural policy conceptions, but rather through continual agitation against modern art and in recent years (1986 ff.) primarily for slandering artists and intellectuals. From the 1970s, parallel to the Social Democrats' winning of power, it was possible for some of the social-democratic workers' movement's conceptions of culture (education and culture as democratising and as a means of social advancement) to be more sustainably integrated in the generally legitimised image of Austria's cultural identity.

And it is actually true that in Austria after 1945, „culture and politics“ – though above all „media and politics“ too – have entered into a particularly close relationship; that is to say, the government and the administration bodies are seen as the major reference point of culture and politico-cultural concerns. This dependency on government is based not least in the particularly weakly developed liberal tradition in the country. Private support for culture in Austria is only 2 per cent of the government cultural support budget. The very active and pivotal role of the state in politico-cultural issues – the government of Austria was (is) responsible for a range of major national cultural institutions (theatres, museums) – is also based on historical circumstances which should be outlined in a few key words: counter-reformation; Josephinism; reaction and censorship in the Metternich police state; very limited development of liberalism; suppression of nationalist, and thus partly also of democratic stirrings in the „multinational state“; amalgamation of the state apparatus and the church in the anti-modern *Kulturkampf* during the First Republic, dissolution of parliament, 1933; civil war 1934; Austro-fascism, 1933-1938 and the racist propaganda culture under Nazism. Common both to Catholic and Nazi fascism was a structural anti-Semitism. After 1945 cultural and intellectual Austria was unable to recover from the „cultural exodus“, the „driving out of reason“ from Austria. „The mentality of exclusionism and expulsion, of restraint and suppression, has survived. This includes the castigation of intellectuals, something that became quite apparent in conflicts ranging from the Brecht boycott to the . . . pandemonium surrounding Thomas Bernhard's controversial play [*Heldenplatz*].“<sup>32</sup> Political-democratic and civil-society development in Austria has suffered greatly under these multiple anti-democratic political formations. Significantly, a recently published collection on politico-cultural discourse in the 1990s has the expressive and provocative title *Ende des Josephinismus* (the end of Josephinism).

The politics of amnesia (of Nazism) operated by the SPÖ-ÖVP political elites expressed itself in the first decades after 1945 primarily in the promotion of recognised „high culture“, of prestige culture (national theatres, festivals), above all in the performing arts. „Just no experiments“, could well have been the secret cultural plan that continued (high) culture practice in its conservative or restorative pragmatics. Post-war cultural policy saw itself, if simplistically, as „non-political“, and under the sign of the „Habsburg myth“ readapted from the inter-war period, the political elite put the great national institutions into operation – the opera, the *Burgtheater*, festivals, the Vienna Philharmonic and the Vienna Boy's Choir – economically (tourism) as well as in foreign policy. Contemporary trends in literature, theatre, fine arts and music were largely ignored, and even directly discriminated against. Above all, not bringing home the many artists and intellectuals driven out by the Nazis corresponded with the characterisation of Austria as „victim“, which allowed the somewhat massive involvement of Austrians in Nazism to fall into the background or, up until 1986 (the Waldheim affair) even made it taboo. A result of this „history-less“ cultural policy of the post-war decades was that to some extent one and the same artists were given prizes, honours and subsidies by the 1934-38 and 1938-45 regimes, and then again by the „new“ post-1945 Austria until into the 1950s.

“One may see the Austrian situation post-1945 as a kind of trap. One believes it is possible to forget the past, laden with unresolved conflicts, without grasping that one has simply repressed it. There is an optimistic social consensus as to how things should continue. But in the sphere of the arts, it continues as it used to be before the supposed caesura. The main trends are conservative to folklorist, the production attitudes traditionalist, the reception habits characterised by the idea of the 'gifted master'. Out of this amnesia there develops a fear of public discussion of opposing positions.”<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> The *Verband der Unabhängigen* (Association of Independents) was founded in 1949, the year in which former Nazi party members were allowed to stand in parliamentary elections again, and represented the interests of former Nazis, returnees and the so-called *Heimatvertriebenen*, „those driven from their homeland“. The VDU was then assimilated into the newly formed *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (Freedom Party of Austria) in 1956.

<sup>32</sup> Friedrich Stadler / Peter Weibel (Editorial) in: the same (eds), *The Cultural Exodus from Austria. Vertreibung der Vernunft*, Vienna / New York 1995, 8.

<sup>33</sup> Paul Kruntorad, *Phantastischer Realismus und Aktionismus*, Vienna 1990, quoted after Günther Dankl, „...über das Chaos des Augenblicks hinausführende Gedankenstöße...“ (Maurice Besset). Zur Rezeption der französischen Kunst in Österreich von 1945 bis 1960“, in: Patrick Werkner (ed.), *Kunst in Österreich 1945-1995. Ein Symposium der Hochschule für angewandte Kunst im April 1995*, Vienna 1996, 64 - 83, 65.

The field of the not inconsiderably state-subsidised and influenced entertainment industry (pop-“folk“ music, popular music in general, film), and popular culture as well, is dominated by the trading of clichés – providing the illusion of homeland and an ideal world – that are targeted on making mass culture function for the requirements of tourism, but which also play a not inessential role in the context of civic education and upbringing.

On the other hand, there were nevertheless alliances between forces of political reform (to the same extent in both the conservative and social-democratic camps) and representatives of the intellectual, cultural and artistic sphere. In fine arts there was patronage from broad-minded church circles for radical avant-gardists; Styrian regional politicians linked themselves with the literary and architectural avant-garde. At the end of the 1960s, in the course of a Europe-wide politicising and radicalisation, these avant-gardes became a political factor and to some extent involved in the preparation of a change of government through the social-democracy of Bruno Kreisky, which promised a modernisation and reform of every area (everyday culture) of Austrian life. The decades-long association with the SPÖ of many artists also has its origins in these years of integration and recognition of (contemporary) art and culture as policy fields that are of political-democratic relevance, but since the mid-1990s this has progressively lost its basis of trust.

Among other things, a country’s politico-cultural climate can also express something about the (circum)stance of the civil public. In Austria, in this sense, only since a phase of economic consolidation from the end of the 1960s has it been possible to speak of an open politico-cultural climate. For a long time after 1945, the Second Republic was to a large extent characterised by a public life that was corporatist-based, determined by *Proporz* (proportionality) thinking in all its social ramifications (education, media, the state sector). An expression of this corporatism was the fact that party politics determined and organised most of non-governmental interest groups: „Everything for the citizen, nothing by the citizen“. The Austrian system of social partnership (as it was and to some extent still is effective in the media and cultural sector), which was politically and economically successful until the late 1990s, functioned as a „secret government“. „Social partnership“ in its Austrian version (institutionalised since 1957) means the negotiation of all policy issues in a pre-democratic space between (usually) male representatives of (strong) interest groups, i.e. employee and employer representatives (on the socialist „red“ side the Austrian Trade Union Federation and the Chamber of Workers, on the Christian-Social, conservative „black“ side the Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Agriculture). In this sense, a precondition for an understanding of Austrian policy since 1945 is a concise understanding of the specific interlocking of associations, parties and (strong) interest groups as the dominating expression of the „social partnership aesthetic“<sup>34</sup> (Menasse). In the 70s the social movements – Green, peace, anti-nuclear and women’s movements – radically questioned this paternalistic form of politics and initially attempted to counter-act and break it through local and regional initiatives. The *Alternative Liste*, precursors of the Green Party first stood in parliamentary elections in 1983.

### 3. 3. „Culture for All“: Austria in the 1970s

In its statement of government policy, the Social Democrat government that took office in 1970, emphasised that it was aiming for „cultural policy in the widest sense“. Its aim was an extended understanding of culture covering all expressions of life, and an understanding of cultural policy as the principle of all policies, i.e. a political definition of cultural affairs. Cultural policy was also to be understood as „a version of social policy“.

A „catalogue of cultural policy measures“ adopted in 1975 by what was then the Federal Ministry of Education and Arts, in many respects a model for community culture reform policies in the Federal Republic of Germany from the end of the 1970s onwards, summarised these Utopian dreams.<sup>35</sup> The impetus for this catalogue came from a representative survey of cultural behaviour in Austria commissioned by the ministry, which found a „cultural supply deficit“ and a „lack of cultural awareness“ in wide sections of the population. The catalogue was to contribute towards improving the „cultural behaviour of the population“. There was general consensus on the link between cultural behaviour and education and on the need to reduce the educational divide between town and country. This was to be changed through increased „cultural marketing“ to help break down the barriers to participation in cultural life. Outside the traditional

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Cf. also Gert Kerschbaumer, „Der kalte Krieg gegen die Moderne“, in: the same/Karl Müller, *Begnadet für das Schöne. Der rot-weiß-rote Kulturkampf gegen die Moderne*, Wien 1992, 117 - 204.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Robert Menasse, *Das Land ohne Eigenschaften. Essay zur österreichischen Identität*, 2nd ed., Wien 1993

<sup>35</sup> *Kulturpolitischer Maßnahmenkatalog. Erste Ansätze für eine Verbesserung des Kulturverhaltens*, BMUK, Vienna 1975.

agencies, a „cultural services office“ (ÖKS) in the ministry was to bring artists and creators of culture to schools, adult education institutions, companies and cultural centres. (Schedule of cultural places, training of facilitators, improved access to federal theatres for visitors from the *Länder* (provinces), adult education, development of music schools etc.)

Usually when one speaks of the cultural-policy turning point in the 1970s it is in the sense of the first active dialogue between government, artists and providers of culture. Successively developed and refined over the last thirty years, the decisive directions for the system of public arts and cultural support practised since then were set out in these years. Similar to the issues in education, so in the cultural sphere the central question was one of democratisation of the cultural support decision-making, which was to be arrived at through the setting up of advisory bodies with particular decision-making powers in culture administration (advisory bodies, juries and commissions, and, since the early 1990s, curators<sup>36</sup>). At the same time, various intermediary bodies sprang up, under government control and to some extent based in the private sector. From 1971, the four Austrian federal theatres (State Opera, Volksoper, Burgtheater and Akademietheater) came under the administration of the Association of Austrian Federal Theatres which was converted into a limited company, Theaterholding GmbH, in 1998.<sup>37</sup> According to a very recently published survey on „cultural behaviour of Austrians“,<sup>38</sup> some things have changed for the better over the last 25 years. There has been a clear increase in the importance of arts and culture. In total, 53 per cent of Austrians describe themselves as being interested in culture; in 1990 the figure was 38 per cent. What is surprising here perhaps is that above all it is „fine arts“ and exhibitions that apparently most appeal to Austrians' cultural needs. At the same time, however, on the question of which Austrian cultural achievements people are „particularly proud“ of, as before, classical music and the performing arts come first.

Although during and after the Kreisky era most of the promotional funding went to the prestige cultural institutions (theatre, opera, festivals), considerable freedom for contemporary arts was nevertheless also established through the appropriate measures and funding. The explicit promotion of contemporary art and literature indicates not least the politico-democratic necessity and important endeavour for a public subsidy concept to include new art and literature that were either ignored by part of the population or else came in for massive criticism. And the Arts Promotion Act,<sup>39</sup> passed by parliament in 1988, defines „contemporary art, its intellectual transformations and diversity“ as the focus of support policy. The system of advisory bodies practised in various branches since 1973 was anchored in a discretionary clause (expert juries to carry out preliminary consultation and preliminary decisions). The call for more transparent and understandable arts policy is met through the obligation to present an annual report on government activities in the field of arts subsidy (*Kunstbericht*).

Some things also changed for those involved in the arts and cultural field. The generally increased public visibility of arts and culture meant that in the 1970s and early 1980s, artists and creators of culture – in various branches, some with more, some with less success – were able to consolidate and extend their own associations and interest-group representation. Particularly worthy of mention here are the authors' and translators' interest group (*IG Autorinnen Autoren; Übersetzungsgemeinschaft*), which is active on cultural policy matters, as well to some extent as the free theatre groups (*IG Freie Theaterarbeit*), film-makers and media artists (*Dachverband österreichischer Filmschaffender*), who together were able to achieve a range of reforms and improvements (copyright, social security scheme for artists, etc). In this sense it was possible, even if belatedly, to give an audible public voice to arts and culture, well known as extremely difficult sectors to organise. Since these years of first „cultural awareness“, the artists' and culture creators' interest groups have been part of the critical public – still too small in Austria owing to

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<sup>36</sup> These curators for the „visual arts“ and „contemporary music“ cannot be compared with exhibition or museum curators working in the fine arts. The „curator model“ introduced by Minister Rudolf Scholten in 1993 was an experiment aimed to help circumvent the cumbersome administrative structures. They were appointed by the minister for two years and had a budget of ATS 15m per year. They were to ensure that federal art promotion would not merely be based on „applications submitted“ but would itself become active and take specific measures to improve structures and initiate and support exemplary projects. For example, new cultural spaces for art theory and social practice were developed (Depot, Vienna) and for art documentation/discussion (artistic databases, etc.) (basis Wien, Vienna).

<sup>37</sup> Theaterholding GmbH is a holding company owned by the Federal Government, which has four subsidiaries organised as private limited companies: Burgtheater GmbH, Wiener Staatsoper GmbH, Volksoper Wien GmbH and Theaterservice. From 2004 onwards, shares in the company (up to 49 per cent) are to be sold.

<sup>38</sup> Fessl Institut survey for the *Initiative Wirtschaft für Kunst*, January 2000 (*Mittagsjournal* [radio programme], 18.1.99).

<sup>39</sup> This Act states that the necessary funds for public funding of the arts are to be earmarked in the Federal Finance Act, [i.e. the national budget].

the limited media diversity – that comments critically on the general political developments in the country and engages actively for democracy and integration policy issues.

### 3.4. Cultural policy sketch of the 1990s

The following short description of cultural policy emphases is oriented first and foremost on the question of support, development and guaranteeing of „cultural diversity“, i.e. cultural policy measures such as the culture initiatives and the maintenance of the (Austrian) publishing and film scene will be more strongly accentuated than the (privatisation) reforms of the Association of Austrian Federal Theatres or the Federal Museums which for the 1990s have very long-lasting structural effects in the field of high culture.<sup>40</sup>

A 1993 Council of Europe report,<sup>41</sup> which started on the premise of a strongly federalist understanding, complained that Austria's cultural policy was „disguised centralism“. The Austrian constitution is indeed federalist in principle, with regard to cultural affairs too, but in practice in all cultural sectors the federal government carries much more weight in structural measures than the provinces do. The 1988 Federal Arts Promotion Act expressly states that conflicts of responsibility between the federal government and the provinces are to be avoided – under the „subsidiarity principle“, the authority closest to a particular support is the one that should be responsible. The federal government, however, supports activities and projects selectively or at regional level if they are „of supra-regional interest or suited to having an exemplary effect, are of an innovative nature or are supported in the context of a homogeneous support programme.“ This means that federal arts support in Austria sees itself as an active promoter of new, not-yet-established arts and culture.<sup>42</sup> The cultural support tasks of the provinces are more clearly related to their own geographical areas, and cultural support laws passed by the provinces between 1974 and 1992 usually also included a definition of culture or cultural activity as well as the socio-political task of cultural policy. All eight of these laws<sup>43</sup> include the provision that activities and projects to be financed must relate to the province in question.

Cultural expenditure by all territorial bodies in Austria has risen dramatically since the 1950s, however, and particularly since 1970. In the 1980s there was a real „culture boom“ – new festivals and exhibition formats emerged, the amount of culture on offer rose sharply. Criticism of the „festivalisation“ of arts and culture has since been a regular feature of cultural-policy debates. In the 1990 government policy programme, the grand coalition (SPÖ-ÖVP) undertook to give preferential budgetary treatment to the arts and culture (a promise that was actually fulfilled when the arts budget was increased over the following years until 1995) in order to improve the cultural infrastructure and to create conditions „in which the autonomy of the arts can develop“. Structural improvements in publishing and film-making, a reformed copyright law and the „decided advocacy of unconventional, including disturbing creation of art“ were intended to contribute to this. The „subsidising“ of the arts was to be replaced by „financing“. Further points of emphasis were the re-building programme for the federal theatres, the promotion of architecture and design and the promotion of „new cultural initiatives“. The qualitative improvement of structures in the individual arts sectors was aimed at strengthening them in the face of policy fluctuations and dependencies. The 1996 coalition working agreement again included the continual support and social safety-net for cultural institutions as well as placing the

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<sup>40</sup> After the ÖVP and SPÖ had formed another grand coalition in 1986 (previously 1945 - 1966), discussions and privatisation efforts were also stepped up in the field of cultural policy. The 1987 government policy statement was dominated by „modernisation“. The ÖVP insisted on adding a „closer partnership between art, the government and the private sector“ to the cultural platform of the government's working agreement. Public debate ostensibly focused on „culture sponsoring“, which nevertheless continues to be of marginal importance when it comes to culture financing in Austria (approx. 2 per cent of all cultural subsidy). Options for enhancing market orientation, especially with regard to those areas of prestige culture (musicals, popular operas, museums) that could demonstrate improved market fund-raising ability on international comparisons were hotly debated. An attempt was made to put marketing on a more private-sector basis through granting museums part legal capacity status. Public discussion continually centred on issues such as how to make theatre management more efficient, especially that of the Association of Austrian Federal Theatres (including the current divestment of the federal theatres). The 1996 agreement then included specific reorganisation and rationalisation measures in the federal theatres in the direction of „partial legal capacity status“ and the introduction of measures to strengthen the economic independence of the theatres.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Hans Rudolf Dörig, *Cultural policy in Austria. Report of the European panel of experts*, ed. Council of Europe. Cultural Policy and Action Division, Strasbourg 1993 (CC-CULT (93) 18 B, project: European Programme for the Evaluation of National Cultural Policies); Michael Wimmer, *Kulturpolitik in Österreich*, Wien 1995.

<sup>42</sup> Until the beginning of 2000. Specific support for the creation of contemporary art and culture is no longer part of the new FPÖVP government's programme.

<sup>43</sup> Of the nine Austrian provinces only Vienna does not have its own cultural support law.

accent on producing and experimental arts, increased contacts at international level and the propagation of contemporary and experimental arts abroad.

### 3.4.1. *Cultural policy – cultural diversity: new forms of support for cultural initiatives and international cultural exchange*

As a result of a parliamentary motion in 1990, a new division was created at the Arts Department for the „promotion of cultural development and regional art and culture initiatives“. The new division supports interdisciplinary, particularly multicultural arts and cultural projects as well as organisers and initiatives encouraging new cultural developments and which are not public institutions. As outlined in Section 2 (2) of the Arts Promotion Act, projects to be supported should be „of supra-regional interest or suited to having an exemplary effect, or be of an innovative nature.“ Since the 1970s, long before the new division at the Arts Department was established, cultural initiatives forming a „new cultural sector“ have sprung up all over Austria. These range from regional events, multicultural, interdisciplinary and experimental arts and culture projects from the perspective of integration of socially disadvantaged groups, to service provision and associations facilitating improvement in the sphere of organisation and management of these arts and cultural initiatives. Even if the funding for the department (1998: ATS 50m, €3m) is relatively modest compared to other expenditures, the cultural initiatives have acquired increasing importance in public cultural policy discussion over recent decades. Many of them have meanwhile become medium and small enterprises working professionally and on a par with traditional established culture.

Despite all their diversity they have been affected over the past two decades by changing paradigms that have led away from the „countercultural“ and „sociocultural“ aims of their origins (e.g. inclusion of amateur art, as was still stated in the 1991 guidelines catalogue): institutionalisation, professionalisation and specialisation, as well as networking among one another – these are the general trends that have asserted themselves particularly strongly in the cultural initiatives. But often, rather than putting culture on an everyday, provincial level, it is possible to find great avant-garde cultural and arts policy ambitions, such as the claim to regionalisation of the avant-garde, in these initiatives and their projects. Others, however, have become institutionalised as regional agencies of a flat, supply-and-event culture.<sup>44</sup> Both at federal (*IG Kultur* /Interest Group for Culture) and at regional level (for example in the *Kulturplattform* (KUPF) in Upper Austria) the cultural initiatives have united to form to some extent very active interest groups, sending representatives to advisory bodies, drawing attention in studies to their politico-democratic and cultural-economic importance and playing a prominent part in the formulation of guidelines for cultural policy. Throughout the 1990s decentralised cultural initiatives remained a cultural-policy focus for the government and in recent years have seen new tasks in the further development to regional centres for the development of media skills, and would like to become effective through free and public access to the Internet in the sense of the provision of new cultural technologies. In this sense, the cultural initiatives are linking old and new conceptions of cultural diversity: on the one hand, places for ethnic and social minorities, on the other hand, places whose programmes and activities create a broad spectrum of cultural diversity which – above all in rural areas – had previously not existed to this extent. What is also interesting is that the regional cultural initiatives are to some extent taking over the tasks of adult education institutions and are offering new educational and communications opportunities. The active participation of some cultural initiatives in the new Austrian „free-radio scene“ underlines their positioning as areas where cultural and media diversity is implemented.

*Cultural exchange – cultural diversity*: Founded in the early 1990s, organised by the private sector and funded by the Ministry for Education and Art, *KulturKontakt*<sup>45</sup> is an institution that should be mentioned here on account of its many-sided activities promoting European cultural exchange and „cultural diversity“ as a result of their activities in building up new cooperation between the arts and culture and artists in central, south-east and eastern European countries and Austria. The programme concept includes artists' studios for eastern and central European artists in Vienna as well as the offer of structural support for the development or extension of new cultural institutions (management, further education) on site.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Rainer Vesely, *Eine Szene im Wandel. Österreichische Kulturinitiativen Anfang der 90er Jahre*, ed. Österreichische Kulturdokumentation. Internationales Archiv für Kulturanalysen, Wien 1993.

<sup>45</sup> Since the division of the Ministry for Education and Arts, *KulturKontakt* has been funded by two ministries: Subsidies for the cultural and arts activities come from the Arts Department in the Federal Chancellery (1998: ATS 19m) and for projects in the field of education from the Ministry for Education and Cultural Affairs (1998: ATS 19m)

### 3.4.2. *S(t)imulation of a market - promotion of the Austrian cultural industry(ies)*

In contrast to the 1970s, when government attempted to pursue a policy of „improving cultural behaviour“, in the 1990s it has returned to concentrating on arts policy in the narrow sense. The „democratisation“ paradigm has been relegated to the background by efforts towards modernisation and more efficient management, to achieving quality, joining international trends and presenting Austrian arts abroad.

Under minister Scholten, the policy was to increase funding in some fields (film, contemporary music) and to extend aid to new fields (publishing, galleries) with the aim of using subsidies to provide a „substitute“ for a to some extent non-existent market. The borderline between supporting the arts and granting hidden social welfare benefits (official purchases of works of art) or furnishing economic support to organisations which would not survive on the market (cinemas, galleries, publishing companies) is obviously not always easily definable.

Austria is a small country of eight million inhabitants and with a large neighbour speaking the same language. This means that all Austrian cultural industry markets are characterised by this pronounced imbalance.

Structurally, the most interesting measure in the support of literature is the publishing subsidy for Austrian literary publishers, initiated in 1992 and later extended to publishers of books for children and young people. To a certain extent for politico-cultural reasons, the aim was to support a market in order to retain or extend its many-sided range of products. Something similar happened a few years later in the arts market: a gallery subsidy was introduced in 1996. These new subsidy levels introduced in the 1990s are among the classical range of cultural-industry state support policy and should among other things be interpreted as measures for maintaining „cultural diversity“.

The „cultural diversity“ argument was also important for the retention of the cross-border book-price agreement in the continuing case before the EU Directorate-General on competition policy (previously DG IV) concerning the admissibility of this already 100-year-old practice in the book trade in Austria and Germany. Austrian cultural policy has repeatedly pointed to the urgency and necessity of the book-price agreement – fixed sales prices in all outlets, regardless of whether they are chain stores or small bookshops – as a positive cultural policy measure for the continuation of small and medium-sized publishing houses as well as bookshops (above all in small countries with large neighbours who speak the same language). These efforts were apparently in vain. As a result of these EU competition-law objections, the cross-border book-price agreement must be replaced by a system of national book-price agreements (e.g. on the French pattern) by June 2000.

What happened in the film sector in the 1990s? The 1993 amendment to the Austrian Film Subsidy Act was aimed at improving the economic basis of Austrian films and to make international co-productions easier. The Austrian Film Institute was founded. A cinema subsidy was also introduced – since Austria joined the EU in 1995, the EU support programme (Media II) has been open to Austrian applicants. The building of massive new multiplex centres which has been going on for two years now, above all in Vienna and in the provincial capitals, will leave lasting changes in the cinema landscape. The independent cinemas and new festivals which guarantee „cultural diversity“ apart from the mainstream films, are thereby acquiring ever greater significance. A private initiative was also set up last year to „save“ the old cinemas from being sold off to the market dominating leasing companies (in Vienna primarily Constantin Film).<sup>46</sup> If cultural policy is also to continue to be interested in „cultural diversity“ in the film sector, then supporting the independent cinemas and the (mainly small) leasing companies linked to them remains one of the main cultural political tasks of federal and provincial policy.<sup>47</sup>

The relationship between the subsidy expenditure for a few large cultural institutions (federal museums, federal theatres) and those for the support of other creative activity in fact, however, still remains unbalanced. Almost ATS 16bn, €1,16bn (1998), or 1.4 per cent of public expenditure, is indeed devoted to culture and the arts as a whole in Austria, which is high by international standards. More than 60 per cent of federal cultural expenditure, however, goes to the federal theatres and federal museums. The funds available to the Arts Department itself are comparatively modest (ATS 1.15bn, €835,737 (1998)).

<sup>46</sup> Cf. „Der Sprung ins große ‘Abenteuer’. Die neue Wiener Kinokette ‘city cinemas’ wird bewährte Standorte aufrüsten“, in: *Der Standard*, 24.9.1999.

<sup>47</sup> Cf., for example, the Vienna independent cinemas: *Votiv-Kino* and *Filmladen* (leasing company), or the *Film Casino* and *Polyfilm* leasing.

The parliamentary cultural committee, set up in 1994, can be interpreted as an indicator of an increased interest in cultural policy reform on the part of all political parties represented in parliament. Since its establishment, this committee has concerned itself among other things with questions of reform of the federal theatres and with problems of the federal museums. The cultural committee instructed the Ministry for Education and Cultural Affairs (BMUKA) to draw up a „culture report“ comparable to the publicly accessible „arts report“ for its area of responsibility (*inter alia*, federal museums, public monuments and buildings, National Library). The first „culture report“ appeared at the end of 1996. Until 1999 the chair of this cultural committee was held by the Liberal Forum party. Even before the formation of the new government, the naming of an FPÖ culture committee member as the new chair led to vehement protests from the Austrian cultural and arts scene.

### 3.4.3. *End of the 1990s: White Paper on the reform of cultural policy in Austria*

Since the mid 1990s, Austrian federal culture and arts agendas have experienced a lively migration between old and new ministries. Between 1995 and 1997 they changed repeatedly between the respective areas of responsibility.<sup>48</sup> In 1997 the „Department for Arts Affairs“ was finally settled in the Federal Chancellery (BKA) and there, under the aegis of the Chancellor as the minister responsible in the January 1997 Klima government, belongs to the area of the State Secretary for EU affairs and sport. The devaluation of the role and status of culture in Austria and abroad that this entailed gave rise to withering criticism from groups of artists. On the other hand, the Chancellor emphasised in his government policy statement, the bringing together of the arts and the media in the Federal Chancellery was completely sensible. To put arts and culture as a „priority issue“ under the patronage of the Federal Chancellor was a conscious signal that they were seen as being in the national interest. In Klima's government policy statement, there was also a recognition of the public authorities' obligation to provide „the material resources for an exciting, controversial, and also a disturbing form of arts creation.“

In autumn 1997 the Federal Chancellor initiated a broad discussion on the necessary structural reforms in arts/culture administration and support, resulting in a „White Paper on the Reform of Cultural Policy in Austria“, published in book form in 1999. Around 200 people from the culture and arts sector were involved in the discussion process. „Political and economic developments in the mid-1990s have necessitated a reconsideration of the old image of cultural policy. The regulation of media distribution possibilities has now become at least as important as the funding of arts production,“<sup>49</sup> says the introduction to the White Paper. The concept fields of arts and culture have changed – today, culture can mean almost everything (e.g. „the culture of a company“) and the word „art“ is continually changing its meaning. „Art can only be what people want it to be. That is, however, not a question of broad consensus; it is rather that groups form themselves depending on their particular conception of art, i.e. on what people wish to understand by art. They find a common understanding of art in the way they find groups representing their attitude to morality, religion or tulip-growing. Public recognition is thus a question of short-term, fragile understanding that no longer reaches the whole of society. These groups, with their different conceptions of art, also continually challenge each other. Like political parties in a continuous election campaign. True, it never comes to a vote, but otherwise it is all the same. The power of the media plays a big role, [as does] money, upbringing and education.“<sup>50</sup> This quotation, too, comes from the introduction to this White Paper, and may serve to underline the explosive nature of the culture- and arts-policy discussion with regard to its societal and politico-democratic significance. And further: „Culture also does not have to be understood as an agent of national identity formation and normality. A much more attractive role is exactly the reverse: the most diverse forms of scepticism and critical transcending of everything considered normal. . . . Cultural policy must assume a responsibility that goes far beyond everyday policy

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<sup>48</sup> On 1 January 1995, most of the responsibilities allocated to the Arts Department of what was then the Federal Ministry of Education and Art were transferred to what became the Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Art in the course of minister Rudolf Scholten's transition from education to science. In compensation, the federal museums, historic monuments and the National Library switched from the science to the education ministry. Since the setting up of the science ministry in 1970, the administration of „dead art“ (cultural heritage), as well as the art colleges, has been its responsibility. Until the 1990s, federal support for „living art“ (contemporary arts and culture) was always the responsibility of the ministry for „education and the arts“. The 1996 coalition agreement and government policy statement then specified the creation of the large Ministry of Science, Transport and the Arts, which was to link innovation, technology, infrastructure, science, research and culture. This ministry also retained responsibility for arts issues.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Weißbuch zur Reform der Kulturpolitik in Österreich, ed. Republik of Austria represented by the Federal Chancellor (arts affairs), Vienna 1999, 14. („white paper“)

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 16.

and which is not oriented on quotas but on diversity and the readiness to experiment.“ This recognition of experiment and diversity is absent from the cultural programme of the new government (February 2000).

We described the cultural-policy situation at the beginning of the Austrian republic in the 1920s under the term *Kulturkampf*. At the beginning of the 21st century, because of the political developments in Austria, we again face a situation that has to be described under the ‚old‘ term *Kulturkampf*. The Second Republic was a republic of consensus, and at the moment that no longer exists. Polarisation and politicisation processes are under way that are fundamentally altering the whole political and cultural-policy landscape of Austria. Culture and arts organisations, and science and research too, the whole critical public and agencies of civil-society, are challenged to counteract this development and to provide civil resistance.

The central significance of the general political conditions for the state of cultural policy in a country may again be highlighted by this example. Cultural policy means policy for or against creators of arts and culture. It is the general political conditions and the political players themselves who decide the degree of freedom and opportunities for expression.

### 3.5. Cultural diversity and media diversity: notes on some democratic<sup>51</sup> aspects

The relationship between „cultural diversity“ and „media diversity“ is structurally relevant to the question of „cultural diversity and cultural policy“, because in an age of „media democracies“, it is precisely cultural policy conceptions without the integration of the media policy framework that fail to account for a central level of cultural diversity. The general division, or non-consideration of media policy agendas in the context of setting cultural policy priorities massively distorts the view of the altered structural challenges facing cultural policy in media democracies. The current question of broad public access and articulation possibilities in the media – be it print, audio-visual or the Internet – is to a certain extent the critical point of an integrative discussion of the enabling of cultural diversity. This level of the discussion on „cultural diversity“ is interesting not least because the government responsibility for shaping the general conditions shows itself particularly sharply in this field of interaction between the cultural industry (or cultural industry branches) and cultural policy.

The fact is also, however, that in most European countries, cultural and media policy issues are seldom perceived or administered in an integrative way. Thus, not in Austria either.<sup>52</sup>

The following is a necessarily very cursory (sketchy) outline of central areas and selected instruments of the Austrian media policy field of activity.<sup>53</sup>

#### - ORF – Österreichischer Rundfunk (state radio and television)

Parallel to the corporatist structure of the country, a strong party-political influence on the public statutory (television and radio) broadcaster ORF – founded in 1924 as RAWAG, and from 1955/57 pilot project/official TV operator) – can be assumed. The slogan used in the early sixties, „black airwaves, red screen“ (i.e. People’s Party (ÖVP) = radio, Socialists = TV) may serve to indicate the party-political division of the ORF. As in other areas, the media policy of Austria’s „grand coalition“ (ÖVP-SPÖ) essentially consisted in leaving as little „coalition-free space“ as possible. „The expression *Proporzwirtschaft* only inadequately describes the fact that between 1947 and 1966 practically all economic, social and cultural switch-points were controlled by the SPÖ and ÖVP party centres.“<sup>54</sup> Thus an understanding of the party-political association of daily newspapers also belongs to the basic knowledge necessary to an understanding of Austrian media

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<sup>51</sup> in the sense of "demokratiepolitisch".

<sup>52</sup>The government cultural departments in Austria after 1945 were never responsible for media policy affairs. The huge information- and opinion-forming significance of the media, in particular statutory public broadcasting, has always made media policy issues „top priority“, which means they come under the Federal Chancellor himself. Media affairs – a task of great politico-cultural significance – are handled by the Federal Chancellery. Its Department V (Constitutional Law) includes media affairs and the promotion of journalism and political parties. This acts as the office of the commission established as the watchdog for the Radio Act, and, as of July 1997, of the commission established as watchdog for the Cable and Satellite Broadcasting Act. It also includes an „advisory council to promote civic education activities on the part of political parties“, an „advisory council to promote journalism“, and a „commission for the promotion of the press“.

<sup>53</sup> All further mentioned component sections would require a specific discussion, which cannot be provided here. The aim of this section is to include the general conditions of media production, distribution and consumption in Austria in a roughly sketched cultural policy inventory of „cultural diversity“.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Siegfried Matzl, „Die regulierte Demokratie“, in: Wolfgang Kos, *Inventur 1945/55, Österreich im ersten Jahrzehnt der Zweiten Republik*, 345 - 362, 358.

policy. In this sense it is also necessary and interesting to enquire into the party-political motives of the petition for a referendum on an independent ORF, initiated by the print media in 1964. With more than 800,000 signatures, this counts as one of the most successful such petitions in the Second Republic. The broadcasting reform that came from it (1967) brought a re-structuring of the ORF; a consortium of parties and significant „social partners“ was set up. The monopoly position of Austrian broadcasting has thus made a lasting mark on the history of the Second Republic and remained untouched until the 1990s.<sup>55</sup> Plurality of opinion was thus to a certain extent self-manufactured within the ORF: in the year 2000 there are two TV channels (ORF 1 and ORF 2) and four radio channels, each addressing different target audiences. But media diversity is also measured, among other things, by the accessibility to radio and television (for consumers as well as producers). At the beginning of the 1990s, Austrian media policy – which many critics said did not actually exist but just happened (Thurnher, Hummel)<sup>56</sup> – was no longer able to ignore the European development of the dual broadcasting system. What was noticeable was that in the working agreement of the 1994 coalition government (SPÖ/ÖVP), the situation in the audio-visual media, too, was treated in far greater detail than it had been in previous years. The Austrian ruling parties for the first time quite expressly admitted a dual system of statutory public and private commercial audio-visual media on equal terms. A simultaneous amendment of the ORF Act meant specifically that an extension of the legally regulated length of the advertising slots was to guarantee the economic basis of statutory public television in this situation of intensified competition. It was also argued that – because of cable TV and satellite TV broadcasts from abroad – the ORF, *de facto*, even before its legal liberalisation as completed in its first stage in the 1993 Regional Radio Act, „only“ held a transmitting and charging monopoly. By the end of 1997, 73 per cent of Austrian households could receive foreign programmes by cable or satellite. The Regional Radio Act passed by parliament in 1993, which for the first time licensed one private radio channel per province and two for Vienna, in which the print media had a significant holding – again increasing media concentration – was successfully vetoed by licence applicants who had not been taken account of and eventually the frequency plan was rescinded by the Constitutional Court as being in breach of the constitution. An amended Regional Radio Act then came into force only in 1997. On the granting of licences (November 1997), the non-commercial private radios, the so-called „free radios“, finally got their turn. Since 1998, eight local „free radios“ have gone on air.

In the private television sector since the end of the 1980s it has primarily been a question of negotiating around the desires of the Austrian print media (1989 agreement between ORF and VÖZ (Austrian Newspaper Publisher's Association)). Private television in Austria has long been available only by cable or satellite. The terrestrial TV broadcasting monopoly continues to be reserved for ORF. The first private domestic TV channel to be transmitted and received Austria-wide by cable – ATV (Austrian Television) – started on 17 January 2000.

Media diversity does not, however, mean media quality: the decisive question is not – as is often argued – that there is more, but what is on offer? And the competition structure decides the quality of media diversity.

### **- Print media, concentration processes and media diversity**

“Press diversity – a foreign word in Austria“ was one of the answers to the question communications studies researchers posed to journalists and newspaper publishers in 1991: „press diversity – what is it?“ In 1946 there were still 36 daily newspapers with full editorial offices, but by 1996 this had shrunk to 16.<sup>57</sup> The total print run doubled in this period.

The concentration process in the print media sector intensified sharply from the mid-1980s. In 1987, the *West German Allgemeine Zeitung* (WAZ) took a share in Austria's biggest tabloid daily, the *Neue Kronen Zeitung*. „Not one stone will remain on another“, said its majority owner, publisher and editor-in-chief Hans Dichand.<sup>58</sup> In 1988, WAZ took a share in the third-largest

<sup>55</sup> Hans Heinz Fabris, „Der ‘österreichische’ Weg in die Mediengesellschaft“, in: Reinhard Sieder, Heinz Steinert, Emmerich Tálos (eds), *Österreich 1945 - 1995*, Vienna 1995, 641 - 654.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Armin Thurnher, *Schwarze Zwerge. Österreichs Medienlandschaft und ihre Bewohner*, Wien 1992; Roman Hummel, „Einfalt statt Vielfalt. Pressepolitik und -situation der 70er und 80er Jahre“, in: Peter Pelinka, Wolfgang Duchkowitz, Fritz Hausjell (eds), *Zeitungs-los. Essays zu Pressepolitik und Pressekonzentration in Österreich*, Salzburg 1992, 43 - 54, 43.

<sup>57</sup> Armin Thurnher, *Die schwarzen Zwerge. Österreichs Medienlandschaft und ihre Bewohner*, Vienna 1992, 17.

<sup>58</sup> The extremely high significance of relations between politicians and media makers is only noted here in an exemplary form. A comprehensive analysis from a communications studies viewpoint does not exist either. What is clear is that the gender balance is clearly in men's favour. Cf., for example, Marie Luise Angerer, „Ohne Echo - ohne Hall. Medialer Feminismus am Beispiel des österreichischen Rundfunks“, in: the same / Erna Appelt *inter alia*, *Auf glattem Parkett*, Vienna 1991, 111-134. Heinz Fabris also points emphatically to this noticeable male dominance in Austrian media (companies): „Medien als Männerwelt“ in: Fabris, *Der „österreichische“ Weg*, 645.

Austrian daily, the *Kurier*. The joint marketing company that came out of this, Mediaprint, led to concentration in the print media sector unrivalled in west-European comparison. More than 50 per cent of the Austrian population are reached daily by magazines and dailies of one company (the distribution of the *Kronen Zeitung* alone comes to 42 per cent). What had contributed much to this press uniformity was not least the very successful Austrian (social and) economic model, the social partnership, which consists (consisted) essentially of not arguing out conflicts and differences of interest publicly, i.e. in the media, but negotiating them at the so-called „green table“.

Since its amendment in 1993, the Austrian Cartels Act has also included special media-specific regulations, intended to help ensure not only economic competition but also media diversity. A closer interpretation of „media diversity“ continued to remain unclear. Many experts naturally said that Austria could have done with this law much earlier, as a retrospective unpicking of market-dominating media concerns is not envisaged. On top of this there is also a very high ratio of foreign investment in Austrian print companies, above all by German capital.<sup>59</sup>

This has not just affected the print media. „For the Second Republic it is possible . . . to speak of a continuous media-cultural, media-political and media-economic western integration. The effects of this ‘development in dependence’ are manifold. They range from the advantages of participation in the big German media market and from the influx of capital to an often only very limited opportunity for the development of an Austrian media-cultural identity and an occasionally ruinous competition for domestic media companies.<sup>60</sup>

*SOS Medienfreiheit* („SOS media freedom“) is the name of an initiative started by journalists in 1996 urgently demanding a „new media order“ for print and ORF. The object, in view of the economic interweaving of print and radio, was the holding of an official constitutional petition for a referendum to call for publishing diversity and independence in the face of state and economic pressure. „Democracy in the media society“ was the central point, because Austrian media policy, as always, was dominated by electoral tactics and media-economic interests. A separate parliamentary media committee was called for, together with a commission of inquiry and an annual report on the situation of media and communications policy. What is interesting is that the „media reports“ are issued by the Salzburg *Institut für Publizistik und Kommunikationswissenschaften* (Faculty of Journalism and Communications Studies), not by the responsible department in the Federal Chancellery as is usual for example for the arts and cultural sphere, in order to make the government’s policy development and subsidy activities more transparent. Announced in 1996, this official petition for a referendum went the way of many initially ambitious media-policy initiatives: a referendum never actually took place. The politico-democratic relevance of the new Internet medium was still taken little account of in this initiative.

Since 1995 the editor-in-chief and co-owner of the Vienna weekly city journal *Falter* - Armin Thurnher - has been closing his editorials with the same sentence: „*Apart from which, I’m of the opinion that Mediaprint must be completely broken up.*“

### **- Promotion of journalism and the press**

The press subsidy which has existed since 1970 is presented here as an example (paradox) of government support policy in the media sector. In 1972 the Austrian Newspaper Publishers’ Association (VÖZ) demanded compensation for the introduction of Value Added Tax (1971) and received it in the form of a „general press subsidy“. <sup>61</sup> Following economic logic, the deciding

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Manfred Knoche, „Medienpolitik als Konzentrationsförderpolitik. Auch Österreich tappt in die Privatisierungsfalle“, in: Medien Journal. Zeitschrift für Kommunikationskultur, vol. 21, no.2, 1997, 14 - 25, 14 ff. and Harald Fidler / Andreas Merkle, *Sendepause*. Medien und Medienpolitik in Österreich, Oberwart 1999, 404:

WAZ:	50% of <i>Kronen-Zeitung</i> ,
monthly	49,6% of the <i>Kurier</i> group (daily <i>Kurier</i> , weekly magazine <i>Profil</i> and <i>Trend</i> ).
Gruner+Jahr:	75% of the News publishing group ( <i>News</i> , <i>TV-Media</i> , <i>Format</i> )
Gruner+Jahr/Bertelsmann:	25 % of <i>Tele</i> (weekly television guide)
Süddeutscher Verlag:	49% of the daily <i>Der Standard</i>
Axel Springer Verlag:	65% of the daily <i>Tiroler Tageszeitung</i>
Verlagsgruppe Passau	57% of the Oberösterreichische Landesverlag publishing house
Gong-Gruppe	51% of the monthly magazines <i>Wiener</i> and <i>Wienerin</i>
Bauer-Verlag	100% of the weekly <i>Bazar</i>

Further foreign holdings: Bonnier (Sweden) in the daily *Wirtschaftsblatt* (50%); Wolters Kluwer (NL) in the Bohmann Verlag (70%), Monitor-Verlag (100%), D+R-Verlag (80%) and Manz Verlag (40%) as well as Reed Elsevier (GB/NL) in the Orac-Fachverlag (100%).

<sup>60</sup> Fabris, *Der „österreichische“ Weg*, 664.

<sup>61</sup> Press Promotion Act, 1974

criteria for receipt of the subsidy were not media diversity or quality, but Austria-wide distribution and size of circulation. Thus, the higher the circulation, the higher the compensation payment, which is called „press subsidy“. What is repeatedly apparent in the print sector, as in many other cultural industry sectors (publishing, film production (see above)), is the structural capital weakness of the Austrian private sector, which lost its most active entrepreneurs and patrons through the forced emigration or murder of the Austrian Jewish middle class during the Nazi regime. The smallness of the Austrian market was and is another reason for the „subsidised“ Austrian media economy. Thus in 1997, for example, the nationally distributed dailies with the biggest circulation, *Neue Kronen Zeitung* (in relative terms the world's biggest daily) and the *Kurier*, received a subsidy of ATS 4.2m (€305,200m) resp. ATS 3.4m (€247,000). In total some ATS 91m (€6,61m) was handed out in the framework of the „general press subsidy“, only payable to supra-regional dailies. In the 1980s, in addition to this general subsidy, a „special press subsidy for the maintenance of media diversity“ was introduced, available to daily papers „of particular significance for political opinion- and intention-forming but which do not occupy a dominant market position,“ which had mainly been intended as a subsidy for the party newspapers. Approximately ATS 150m (€10,09m) was available for this in 1997.<sup>62</sup> The demand that had been raised for decades, that a „real“ press subsidy ought to be oriented on the criteria of „media diversity“ and „media quality“, reappears in the 1999 White Paper on the reform of cultural policy in Austria.<sup>63</sup>

In the system of Austrian press subsidy, the numerous monthly or quarterly journals published as the organs of cultural and political groups or associations and which are generally associated with press diversity,<sup>64</sup> i.e. also with cultural diversity, come under the heading of „journalistic subsidy for newspapers serving civic education“, (introduced in the early 1970s), and in contrast to the „general“ and „special“ press subsidy is a modest ATS 7m (€508,700) (1997). Interestingly, in spite of this, the cause of public political dispute is not the „big“ press subsidy, but these small support contributions. Thus in a parliamentary question to the Federal Chancellor in 1997, the smaller coalition partner, the ÖVP, complained that – as was stated – subsidies were going to radical left-wing newspapers who would not act on the basis of the Austrian constitutional state. Mentioned among these were a feminist monthly magazine which was accused of propagating lesbian love and radical left-wing views. A similar polemic was raised against the lesbian and gay newspaper *Lambda* and against the paper for conscientious objectors.<sup>65</sup> This parliamentary question comes from 1997 and contributed among other things to the amendment of the journalism subsidy (1998 – incorporation of a „censorship clause“). Critics speak of an openly intensified „party-political influencing control“ on journalistic diversity.<sup>66</sup>

### - „Free Radios“ – trial broadcasting systems and media diversity

The example of the local and regional „free radios“ since 1998 shows the extent of the interlinking of media and cultural diversity particularly clearly. For everyone – consumers, receivers and producers – the „free radios“<sup>67</sup> are namely the most obvious media-policy change of the 1990s and represent, among other things, what can be understood as the „promotion of cultural diversity“: media participation opportunities for many, above all for social, cultural and ethnic minorities.

<sup>62</sup> After the great dying away of party newspapers at the end of the 1980s, subsidies from this pot have gone primarily to the quality press (*Der Standard, Die Presse, Neue Zeit*).

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *Weissbuch. Zur Reform der Kulturpolitik in Österreich*, Vienna 1999, 83 - 85.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Johanna Dorer, Matthias Marschik, Robert Glattau (eds), *Medienverzeichnis 1992/93. Gegenöffentlichkeit und Medieninitiativen in Österreich*, Vienna 1992.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. 1602/J - *Publizistikförderung für linksradikale und linksalternative Zeitschriften. Schriftliche Anfrage des Abgeordneten Dr. Andreas Khol*. Cf. [http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/pd/pm/XX/J/his/016/J01602\\_.html](http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/pd/pm/XX/J/his/016/J01602_.html).

<sup>66</sup> VAZ (*Vereinigung alternativer Zeitschriften und Zeitungen* - Association of Alternative Magazines and Newspapers), documentation: *Zur Umwandlung der Publizistikförderung in ein politisches Repressionsinstrument*, Vienna 1997.

<sup>67</sup> Five free radios received a full licence: Orange 94.0 (Vienna, broadcasting since 17.8.1998); Radio FRO (*Freier Rundfunk Oberösterreich*), (Linz, broadcasting since 6.9.1998); *Freies Radio Salzkammergut* (since 31.3.1999) limited licence: freequEEens 100.8 (Liezen, Styria, since 1.4.1999).

PRO – TON 194.6 (Hohenems, Vorarlberg, since 31.3.1999).

The following initiatives received limited licences, i.e. together with commercial private radios:

- AGORA 105.5 (Klagenfurt, Carinthia, broadcasting since 11/1998).
- Antenne 4, MORA 106.3 (Association for multilingual open radio, Burgenland, Großwarasdorf and Pinkafeld, Burgenland).
- Radiofabrik 94.0 (*Verein Freier Rundfunk Salzburg*, since 8/998).

There have been pirate radios, beyond the statutory public ORF, since the late 1970s.<sup>68</sup> With the 1997 Regional Radio Amendment Act, it was possible for the pirates to be transformed into a „citizen’s“ radio. The Association of Free Radios of Austria acts as an interest-group representative for the affairs of the free radios. It calls for the establishment in law in the framework of a regional radio law as well as a continuing public subsidy of this third sector – alongside statutory public radio and commercial private radio – which is characterised by „public access“, as „non-commercial“, and „non-profit making“. „In numerous countries it is usual that the government provides various support measures for non-commercial broadcasting. The reason lies in the specific services provided by non-commercial radio in relation to cultural diversity and diversity of opinion. In most cases, non-commercial radio is local radio and fills precisely those niches that are neglected by statutory public and private commercial broadcasters. Examples of this are programmes for rural areas, for minorities and marginalised groups, for universities and programmes in regional and minority languages.“<sup>69</sup> A model for this is Switzerland, for example, where part of the broadcasting licence fees as well as advertising income from private commercial radios is made available to the non-commercial free radios. Free radios see themselves as a communication medium in local and regional areas and function as promotion platforms for regional creators of arts and culture.<sup>70</sup> The free radios’ actively promoted multilingual policy offers cultural and ethnic minorities the opportunity to take an active part in media information and communication forums and to present their concerns and interests (*Augustin*, the programme of the homeless, *FM Afrique*). Thus the multilingual programmes in the FRO free radio has opened new communications perspectives for immigrants living in the Linz area. The structure of these indeed somewhat very unprofessional but refreshingly presented programmes, primarily made by young people, is characterised by public access. Put differently, with the free radios new publics have emerged, of the sort which (because of different historical capital- and social development) have long contributed to a polyphonic cultural mix in other European countries, the Netherlands for example.

The formation of a federal media institute of experts, as well as the establishment of a parliamentary media commission are among the structural requirements in Austria’s media policy demanded by *SOS Medienvielfalt* and the Association of Free Radios of Austria. The free radios are calling for participation in the radio and TV licence fees in the sense of establishing media diversity in law, because their open programming and the absence of forming and quota pressures means they facilitate articulation opportunities „for all“.<sup>71</sup> In 1999 the free radios were finally granted a one-off payment of a total of ATS 4m (€290,691) from funds of the „cultural policy measures catalogue“ of the Federal Chancellery department for the arts.

### - Networks-Cultural Spaces

The convergence of media and techno-political questions has been accelerating since the mid 1990s as a result of the steep rise in the penetration of the Internet and is thus also changing the media cultural political radius of action, if the new virtual space of the net can be termed a „new public“, the first fundamental precondition of which is an easier or „free access“ and the comprehensive acquisition of media competence as a socio-political and in this sense also a cultural-political objective will have to be formulated and pursued. In 1998 an Advisory Council for the Internet and New Media was set up in the Federal Chancellery’s Department for Media Affairs (V/4), in which Internet providers, consumers’ and young people’s representatives advise on the ministry’s or the government’s activities affecting the information economy and industry. „We want access,“ „We want bandwidth,“ as the media culture-initiatives themselves formulated it: „In accordance with the nature of the digital network, low-threshold, decentralised structures with social permeability must be set up as interfaces to the emancipatory use of the new information technologies.“<sup>72</sup> This further leads back to the „cultural initiatives“ mentioned above, which will

<sup>68</sup> The beginnings of pirate radio go back to the 1920s; cf. Eva Brunner-Szabo, „Die Geschichte der Arbeiter-Radio-Bewegung in Österreich“, in: Johanna Dorer / Alexander Baratsits (eds), *Radiokultur von morgen. Ansichten. Aussichten. Alternativen*, Vienna 1995, 194-211.

<sup>69</sup> Johanna Dorer, „Freies Radio in Österreich. Chancen für ein triales Rundfunkmodell“, in: *Medien Journal. Zeitschrift für Kommunikationskultur*, No 2/1998: „Rundfunkliberalisierung in Österreich“, 19 - 24, 22 - 23.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. „Charta des Verbandes Freier Radios“, in: *sektor3medien99. Kurskorrekturen zur Kultur- und Medienpolitik*, eds Gerald Raunig und Martin Wassermair, Vienna 1999, 149-152.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. „Virtuelle Plattform Österreich, Verband Freier Radios Österreich, Vereinigung alternativer Zeitungen und Zeitschriften, Kulturplattform Oberösterreich und IG Kultur Österreich: Linzer Erklärung 1999. Kurskorrekturen zur Kultur- und Medienpolitik“, in: Gerald Raunig, Martin Wassermair (eds), *sektor3medien99. Kurskorrekturen zur Kultur- und Medienpolitik*, Vienna 1999, 171 - 173.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. *Netz. Kultur. Österreich*, status 18/02/99.

be able to use such new culture-network platforms for the acquisition of media competences as a new cultural technology.

Moreover, Internet providers who are interested in strengthening public domains could become much more strongly represented in the cultural and educational policy concepts, because as net platforms they are acquiring central mediator functions in the production of new publics, which could drive forward the civic social structure in a fundamental way. Participation in these new net publics should not be left to commercial interests alone, because the net as an interactive medium represents a new quality of diversity of opinion.<sup>73</sup>

To summarize, facing the new challenges of future cultural policy which promote cultural diversity we have to broaden the frameworks of traditional cultural diversity policies to meet new global developments. Currently, cultural diversity is on the top agenda of the Portuguese EU presidency - they are discussing protection measures for European culture confronted with the global flow of cultural products, the AV industry in particular. In this sense, it is also important to emphasize ethnically marked diversity in the context of media diversity as an issue of cultural diversity. The question of representation of social minorities in public or private TV and radio is as crucial as minority arts programmes supported by the government, etc..

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<sup>73</sup> The „Blackbox“ was one of the first culture domains at the beginning of the 1990s, to be followed by many more, silverserver, servus, public netbase t0.

## 4. CULTURAL POLICY RESPONSES

### 4.1 General characteristics

A sketch of Austrian cultural policy reveals the dominant role of the nine Austrian provinces in this field as opposed to the relatively minor role of the federal institutions. The Austrian provinces exhibit strong regional cultural traditions, which – with the exception of the province of Burgenland, which was created and joined to Austria during the peace negotiations after World War I – go back for centuries. As late as 1934 the different provinces regulated the design of various folk versions of formal men's and women's traditional dress, the *Steireranzug*, *Salzburgeranzug*, *Tirolerdirndl*, etc. Subsidies for traditional music bands and folk traditional costume associations, the *Trachtenvereine* usually account for a significant part of the cultural budget of the different provinces, a tendency which started even before the turn of the century and was further strengthened by the marketing of local traditions through the rise of the tourist industries, which accounts for roughly a third of the GNP of most Austrian provinces.

This is accompanied by a strong emphasis on the local dialects of the different provinces. Literature in these regional dialects is regarded as a much valued branch of Austrian literature and national heritage in general. It is heavily subsidised at provincial level and also supported by different federally funded programmes and institutions, such as the programme for *Mundartautoren* (colloquial authors). Prose and especially poetry written in regional dialects plays a major role in regional literary journals such as *Schlern* in the Tyrol or *Sterz* in Styria. Unlike many European countries the literature is written in the different provincial and local dialects. In the province of Vorarlberg the use of the local dialects – which differ significantly from the High German standard speech – is even protected by a special clause in the regional constitution. Speeches and quotes in local dialect during sessions of the regional government are even transcribed in dialect in the official minutes of the meetings.

Strong regional traditions and independent approaches to questions of cultural policy account for the significant differences in this field as exhibited by different Austrian provinces. The responses to cultural diversity can differ from marginalisation and virtual repression to multicultural coexistence at regional and local level. The provincial government of Styria for example refuses to recognise the rights of the Slovene language minority in the province, although they are guaranteed by a constitutional law.

In the province of Carinthia the picture varies from one place to another. Whereas some cities or villages promote joint German- and Slovenian-speaking cultural activities, others try to limit Slovenian or bilingual cultural activities as far as possible, or refuse funding. The provincial government of Carinthia tends to segregate its population's German- and Slovenian-speaking cultural activities in order to restrict Slovenian speaking cultural activities as far as possible to areas and communities which, have been designated as bilingual areas under the Carinthian *Ortstafelgesetz*, the provincial law on road signs. Within the provincial administration the *Volksgruppenbüro*, a separate unit for the ethnic groups, has been set up to fund and organise conferences on topics relevant to the minorities and selective cultural activities of the Carinthian Slovenes. At the same time the provincial government and some local authorities tend to boycott provisions for organisations of Carinthian Slovenes by administrative hedging or postponing decisions.

Since the fall of the communist regimes and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, revived economic ties with Slovenia have somewhat depoliticised the language question, Slovene evening classes have become quite popular and on a local level the use of Slovene has to some degree entered the public sphere, although never on an official provincial level. On the other hand, vociferous anti-minority pressure-groups like the *Kärntner Heimatdienst*, the Carinthian Home Service, with strong ties into the governing parties, still exert considerable political influence within the local government and regularly publicly attack intercultural activities and the Carinthian Slovenes in general. The official commemoration ceremonies of the 1920 plebiscite on the question whether the bilingual parts of Carinthia should join the then newly founded Yugoslav state also tend to provoke anti-minority attitudes in Carinthia, even though the Slovene population voted to remain with Austria at the time.

In contrast, the province of Burgenland does not segregate cultural funding and cultural policies according to its four recognised ethnic groups, Austrians, Croats, Hungarians and Romany. The villages in this region usually exhibit markedly differing local cultures, a German-speaking village often being situated right next to a Hungarian- and a Croatian-speaking village. Their so called „village ethnicity“, with different languages being used in different villages in daily life, serves as

the basis for local customs and traditions. In cases of intermarriage newcomers to the village often feel forced to learn the language of their new place of residence, at least to some extent. Local authorities, which since the 1960s have usually consisted of several villages, tend to reflect this ethnic mix in their public ceremonies. Bilingual and even trilingual public ceremonies have become the norm rather than the exception.

Although the tendency to segregate cultural funding has been markedly more pronounced in Carinthia, this practice depends largely on cooperation between local communities to put this segregation into effect. In recent years many communities in Carinthia have adopted the practice widespread in Burgenland of not differentiating between Slovene or German cultural activities and funding, and bilingual initiatives are clearly on the rise in Carinthia.

Apart from small financial subsidies to ethnic cultural associations, Vienna with its four recognised ethnic groups, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians and Romanies – shows a cool face of nonchalant indifference towards all of them. Approaches to safeguarding the cultural diversity of immigrant minorities vary considerably from province to province. In general, there is no organised response to the cultural diversity of immigrant groups in Austria and cultural activities mainly have to rely on private initiatives and funding. The legal framework governing the right of stay, access to the labour market and naturalisation being strongly assimilative, cultural activities only attract funding decided on a day-to-day basis without any legal rights. Thus groups working in the field of immigrant minority culture tend to be short-lived and often cease their activities after two or three years even if they have been well received by the public and the press. The main cultural institutions such as libraries, theatres or documentation centres neither regularly collect cultural products of minorities nor set up initiatives to promote immigrant minority cultures. Cultural policy towards immigrant groups thus directly reflects the exclusionist tradition of Austria's immigration policy and its general policy towards immigrants already living in this country.

#### 4.2. Federal cultural policy towards officially recognised ethnic groups

In 1976 this disparaging provincial approach to cultural diversity was to a certain extent counter-balanced by a federal law on the rights of the officially recognised ethnic groups and by an institutionalised form of allocation of funds for them. The Austria Chancellery invites such representatives of ethnic minorities as it sees fit – and probably convenient – to sit on an advisory council called the *Volksgruppenbeirat*. This consists of a certain number of representatives thus nominated and of the same number of representatives of political parties represented in the Austrian parliament. The major function of the respective councils has been the allocation of subsidies and funds for the various organisations and projects which apply to the Chancellery for funding. Members of these councils are not elected in any way. Sometimes councils for particular ethnic groups have been defunct for years, because the people and organisations invited by the Chancellery could not agree on who should be included or excluded. Sometimes, as in the case of the Hungarian minority council for example, the council has repeatedly not been reconvened for years. The funds these councils distribute are allocated to them to the extent that the Chancellery deems it necessary or politically convenient. Dominated by endless squabbles about procedure and accounting for the uses of allocated funds these councils constitute feudal remnants within the administrative procedures of a statist everyday machinery of Austrian democracy. The influence of these councils on the cultural, educational or any other - affairs of the respective ethnic group are negligible to non-existent. After ten years of participating in this council, the president of the Hungarian ethnic council – the council with the longest record – declared that the time there had been wasted.<sup>74</sup> Other groups had for decades refused or simply not bothered to send representatives and were only forced to do so by virtually non-existent or insufficient funding at provincial level. For many groups, the grants from the Chancellery are virtually the only source of funding that they have. The amount currently allocated to all the seven groups is 52m Austrian schillings (€3,784,000), which covers all federal subsidies and thus leaves the institutions of the ethnic minorities chronically underfunded.

##### 4.2.1. Schooling

In the educational sector the responses to cultural diversity are also marked by a strong variations at provincial level, both regarding the policy responses towards the officially recognised autochthonous ethnic groups as well as towards the different ethnic groups of migrants living in Austria. Primary education is regulated by provincial law, secondary education by federal law, but administered by provincial administration.

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<sup>74</sup> Ludwig Szeberenyi, "Burgenland", in: *Motolla*, July 1989, 5.

Primary education in the languages of the officially recognised ethnic minorities has been a politically controversial issue for decades. The question of bilingual education in Carinthia has been one of the fiercest political battlegrounds in Austrian post-war politics, where in general the federal institutions have tried to defend the constitutional rights of the Slovene ethnic minority against German nationalist propaganda and openly anti-Slovene provincial policy. Currently 3,262 pupils attend German/Slovenian bilingual education in the province. The right to open a Slovenian-speaking private primary school outside the limits of the bilingual areas has had to be fought right up to the highest courts. Children attending – the constitutionally guaranteed – primary education in Slovenian are strictly segregated from non-Slovenian speakers even at the level of the 64 primary schools in the villages.

In secondary education, which is regulated by federal law, the teaching of Slovenian – a highly politicised question up till 1995, when Austria in accordance with a European agreement introduced a bill allowing the languages of all of neighbouring countries to be taught in any Austrian school<sup>75</sup> – is in fact limited to a handful of secondary schools. Today 18 lower secondary schools, *Hauptschulen* and three higher secondary schools offer German/Slovenian bilingual tuition. Attendance at a bilingual school is considered a clear political statement against the predominant German nationalist cultural hegemony in this province. Nevertheless, in 1999 336 pupils chose Slovenian as an optional subject in a number of schools outside the bilingual area.

The province of Burgenland with its Hungarian, Roma and Croatian ethnic minorities has had a very clear minority schooling law for its non-German villages, the *Minderheitenschulgesetz*, on a clearly non-segregationist concept. It states that in any village where an ethnic minority constitutes over 25 per cent of the population, primary education for all children attending school has to be bilingual, either using the minority language as the language of instruction, using it for a certain number of lessons per week or offering it as an obligatory subject. The revised 1994 provincial education law makes it possible for children to opt out of bilingual education. In the 1998/99 school year 1408 pupils attended a form of bilingual Croatian/German education in primary schools throughout the province, although only 411 of them gave an ethnic minority language as their mother tongue. Hungarian was taught in 17 primary schools in the province, two primary schools having Hungarian as the second language of tuition in all subjects. At the same time the new education law reduced the number of a pupils needed in order to open tuition in a minority languages to just five. And last but not least, tuition in Romany, the language of the Romany population of Burgenland, was introduced into the school system.<sup>76</sup>

There are no such legal provisions for bilingual education in secondary education, apart from the above-mentioned provision for all languages of neighbouring states to be taught in any Austrian school. Since Croatia does not have a common border with Austria, Croatian is only taught at a few lower secondary schools and some „Gymnasia“, mostly in the form of an obligatory second foreign language, an optional foreign language, more rarely within the framework of bilingual experimental curricula, the *Schulversuche*. Since 1991 there has been a bilingual secondary school, a Gymnasium with a Croatian/German and a Hungarian/German section in Oberwart in southern Burgenland.<sup>77</sup> A non-profit organisation is providing a new form of supplementary tuition for children from the Romany ethnic group – which for decades had been relegated to classes for handicapped children because of their language problems. Tuition in the Romany language was first introduced into the school system in Burgenland in the 1999/2000 school year, thus making use of the fruits of federally funded standardisation programme of this until now only verbally transmitted language.

Although bilingual kindergarten education is offered in many villages in different languages, the number of ethnic minority native speakers in Burgenland is decreasing rapidly.<sup>78</sup> Special programmes are subsidised by local and federal governments to develop specific teaching materials for bilingual education in Burgenland.<sup>79</sup>

In the province of Styria, especially in the Bad Radkersburg district, local initiatives have attempted to establish the teaching of Slovenian in schools, but these initiatives have been

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<sup>75</sup> 12th amendment to the Schools Act (*Schulorganisationsgesetz*) BGBl. 467/1990.

<sup>76</sup> Martin Ivancsics, *Zac ili zasto ne? Argumenti za dvojezicno skolstvo / Warum nicht? Argumente für das zweisprachige Schulwesen*, Eisenstadt 1998, 11.

<sup>77</sup> *Zweisprachiges Bundesgymnasium / Dvojezicno saveza gimnazija / Ketnyelvű szűvetsegi gimnazium – jahresbericht 1998/99*, Oberwart 1999.

<sup>78</sup> Dietmar Larcher, Peruska Krcmarzova und Anna Kathrin Hänel, *Das zweisprachige Schulwesen im Burgenland / Dvojezicno skolstvo u Gradiscu*, Eisenstadt 1997.

<sup>79</sup> ZORA, – Verein der burgenländischkroatischen Pädagogen in Eisenstadt.

hindered, rather than supported by the local and provincial authorities, who refuse to recognise the existence of a Slovenian-speaking minority in the province.

The Czech minority in Vienna finances an –albeit federally subsidised – private educational institution with a kindergarten, a primary and a lower secondary school. There are no schooling facilities for Slovak children. The city of Vienna finances Slovak tuition in two classes of nine pupils each and a vocational secondary school offers Slovak as a foreign language. Adult education institutions offer courses in both languages throughout the city.

Various adult education institutions constitute an important contribution to cultural diversity in the provinces, where the different ethnic minorities run their own adult education institutions funded under the Austrian adult education law. These include the Slovene adult education institute in Carinthia, and in Burgenland a Hungarian, a Croatian and since December 1999 a Romany adult education institution.

#### 4.2.2. *Press and Media*

The Slovene ethnic minority in Carinthia has a long print-media tradition with well established papers and journals. Although there is no daily paper, three Slovenian weeklies are published, one of them by the province's Roman Catholic diocese. Two local publishing houses publish two monthly magazines as well as a number of books in Slovenian and run two Slovenian bookshops in the provincial capital of Klagenfurt/Celovec. Apart from this there is a bimonthly journal for teenagers and a number of local or regional bilingual quarterlies published by a political platform of Slovene local council representatives in the bilingual area of southern Carinthia. The provincial branch of the Austrian state radio and TV association – ORF –broadcasts 60 minutes daily in Slovenian as well as a 30-minute TV programme. In the neighbouring province of Styria only a small bimonthly journal is available through the local Slovene association.

The Croatian ethnic minority in Burgenland is catered for by two weekly papers, one of which is published by the province's Roman Catholic diocese, a publishing house and a number of monthly journals published by various cultural clubs and associations. A large number of Croatian or bilingual books have always been published by local councils and initiatives, often with provincial funding. Since 1992, when the Croatian associations of Burgenland agreed to participate in the *Volksgruppenbeirat* at the Chancellery in 1992, the number of publications has significantly increased through the additional federal funds available. Significant in this context is the number of publications for children and juveniles. The ORF broadcasts 23 minutes in Croatian per day and a weekly 25-minute TV programme. The existence of separate Croatian programmes very often leads to a compartmentalisation of cultural products. The ORF has a very popular provincial radio programme called *Wunschkonzert*, „request concert“, where listeners can send birthday greetings accompanied by a music request. Since the introduction of Croatian programmes requests for Croatian music are regularly relegated to the Croatian programme and no longer dealt with in this prime-time programme.

The print media available to Burgenland's Hungarian ethnic minority over the last decade has amounted to a meagre two quarterly journals and a handful of teaching materials. Public radio provides a 22-minute weekly programme and a quarterly 25-minute TV programme broadcast only within the province. This means that Hungarians in Vienna– who in contrast to the many more Croats in the city are an officially recognised ethnic minority – can never officially see the programme. Austrian public radio is still very reluctant to allow broadcasts in the various ethnic-groups languages . A Hungarian radio project, *Becsi Magyar Radio*, Hungarian Vienna Radio, which wanted to participate in a otherwise open cooperation experiment between the Vienna ORF and independent cultural initiatives was not allowed to go out in 1998, the argument being, that a 25-minute broadcast in Hungarian was unacceptable to the German-speaking majority, although Hungarian is among the officially recognised minority languages in the province of Vienna. On the other hand, Vienna has a bimonthly Hungarian paper which is available at news-stands in Vienna but usually only circulates among subscribers in Burgenland.

The Czech ethnic minority in Vienna has two biweekly papers, two monthly journals as well as a bimonthly educational journal. Apart from this, several organisations circulate a number of Czech publications among their members on an irregular basis. There are no radio and TV programmes at all for this substantial group in Vienna, nor are there for the city's second Slav ethnic minority, the Slovaks. Neither are there any regular papers or journals. Once a year the cultural association prints 1,200 copies of a newsletter, a joint endeavour with the province's Roman Catholic diocese.

The Roma ethnic minority, the only one recognised throughout the whole federal territory of Austria, has three monthly journals, one published in Oberwart/Erbate in southern Burgenland and

two in Vienna. So far they have not been catered for by public radio or TV. But the liberalisation of the electronic media in Austria after 1995 and the rise of independent, commercial radio has enabled two Roma cultural associations to broadcast one weekly bilingual radio programme in cooperation with local adult education institutions in Vienna. Romany broadcasts in Burgenland are limited to one hour a week within the framework of a private radio initiative by young Croatians, Hungarians, Romanies and Germans in cooperation with a local private radio station, producing the first multicultural radio channel in Austria and broadcasting daily in four languages. This station is the outcome of a private radio initiative MORA –*Mehrsprachiges Offenes Radio*, multilingual open radio – which was started by young minority activists in Burgenland with Croatian, Hungarian and Roma backgrounds. The right to set up this private radio station had to be fought through court, since Austrian Post Office Authority, responsible for allocating bandwidths to private stations, had rejected the project. Only when threatened with an appeal to European courts – since the decision violated several international agreements ratified by Austria, did the authorities relent. The distribution of private radio bandwidths in Burgenland had to be reorganised accordingly. Private radio stations have considerably enriched the ethnic media sector, for example in Carinthia, where two private all-day Slovene radio-stations now supplement the media provision. All in all, Austria's<sup>80</sup> ethnic minorities seem to have substantially benefited from the recent liberalisation in the sector.

#### 4.2.3. Publishing

Austria has an elaborate and well funded federal programme, the *Presseförderung* to ensure print media diversity and the survival of the relatively small Austrian print media within the German-speaking market. While hundreds of millions of Austrian schillings are thus allocated to the various print media in the majority language, none of the ethnic minority media qualifies for supplementary funding under this heading since only daily papers or national weeklies can apply. The ethnic minority print media's circulation ranges between only 1,000 and 5,000. Slovenian and Croatian publishing houses have existed in Austria for decades, some even since the 19th century, which has resulted in an independent Slovenian and Croatian literary scene in the provincial capitals of Klagenfurt/Celovec and Eisenstadt/Zeljezno as well as in the university cities of Vienna/Dunaj/Bec and Graz/Gradec. The two Slovenian publishing houses in Klagenfurt/Celovec reflect the opposing political orientation of the Slovenian-speaking population, the Drava publishing house catering for the Social Democratic and Liberal wing, the Mohorjeva publishing house catering for the more Conservative-oriented element. Wieser Verlag, a new publishing house specialising in translations from south-east European languages, has today become one of Austria's leading literary publishing houses. In Burgenland the *Hrvatsko Nakladno Društvo*/Croatian Publishing Association together with the *Hrvatsko Stamparsko Društvo*/Croatian Printing Association have long been publishing books and newspapers. None of the other ethnic minorities living in Austria have so far been able to follow their example. In the last twenty years the trend seems to be going towards many small publishing initiatives, which have sprung up all over Austria and are sometimes only short-lived, but have nevertheless published an astonishing number of books and journals.

### 4.3. Cultural policy responses towards immigrant groups

#### 4.3.1. Schools and intercultural education

In general, primary education is the provincial authorities' responsibility, whereas secondary and higher education is the federal government's. Thus the approaches towards intercultural education, native-language tuition and similar measures to safeguard cultural diversity of immigrant minorities vary considerably from province to province.

The history of native-language tuition goes back to the seventies and eighties and the beginning of family reunification of migrant workers – originally primarily recruited in the former Yugoslavia and Turkey. The general principle of the instruments developed was based on the idea that the children of the so-called *Gastarbeiter* – guest-workers – would sooner or later return to their countries of origin and thus should to be trained in their mother tongue and be taught the history of their parents' homelands. The first programs were introduced in the province of Vorarlberg, where additional language - tuition in Serbo-Croat, Turkish and Slovenian has been offered since 1972. Between 1975 and 1980 optional language-tuition was introduced in all Austrian provinces.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>80</sup> See also free radio scene in chapter 3.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. Ottokar Seifert, *Gastarbeiterkinder in österreichischen Schulen*, Vienna 1978

Between 1976 and 1989/1990 bilateral Austrian/Yugoslav and Austrian/Turkish commissions developed a framework for native-language tuition in Austrian schools that was primarily oriented on the re-integration of the children into their parents' countries of origin. This native language teaching was oriented on the „preservation of the cultural connection with the homeland“ and intended to prepare the children for a life there. The teaching materials were provided by the respective national governments.<sup>82</sup>

In the eighties, several pilot projects concerning the support and supplementary tuition of children with non-German mother tongues were developed. At the end of the eighties the prevailing reintegration approach came under severe criticism from teachers and academics, who pointed to the fact that the second-generation of the immigrants would stay in Austria and that the prevailing model was thus completely inadequate. In February 1991 the Ministry of Education informed the Yugoslav embassy that the question of integrating foreign children would be put on a new basis and the bilateral cooperation was stopped.

The reintegration approach was replaced by an „intercultural education“ approach, introduced in 1991 as an *Unterrichtsprinzip*, an „educational principle“ at all educational levels. In 1992/93 all pilot projects in this field became part of the mainstream school system in primary schools, secondary schools, schools for the disabled as well as vocational schools. Simultaneously, curricula for German as second language and for the mother tongues of the largest groups were developed.<sup>83</sup> According to local circumstances, schools are free to offer German as a second language either in parallel in supplementary classes or integrated into the general timetable, with two teachers working with the whole class. It is estimated, that about 25 to 30 per cent of all immigrant children attend these classes. According to the principle of intercultural education, native-language tuition should not only provide acquisition of the respective mother-tongue, but also „further and support the development of a personal identity, based on the affiliation with the language and culture of the parents.“<sup>84</sup> The actual classroom teaching should be based on the principle of equivalence between the respective mother tongue and German. Generally, literacy in the mother tongue should precede literacy in German. The child's mother tongue can either be taught as an optional subject in separate classes or integrated into the general timetable by a team of teachers including a native-language teacher. Whereas team teaching is the common model in Vienna, separate classes are given precedence in the other provinces. The number of lessons may vary from two to six per week.

In 1996/97 a total of 80,258 pupils attending primary schools throughout Austria did not have German as their mother tongue (58 per cent in primary schools, 35 per cent in secondary schools). 39 per cent were attending schools in Vienna, where the municipal statistics also differentiate between the pupil's mother tongue. Turkish or one of the languages of former Yugoslavia were the mother tongues of about three quarters of all non-German native speaker pupils in Vienna.

In 1993/94, 90 per cent of native-language teaching was offered as a non-compulsory subject. In 1998/99 the following languages were offered: Albanian, Arabian, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian Bulgarian, Hungarian, Kurdish, Polish, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Turkish. In principle, any language can be offered if enough children register for it – depending on the province between 12 - 15 pupils – and if trained teachers are available. In 1998/99, 291 teachers were employed for native language education in Austria, about half of them in Vienna. 169 were teaching Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian, Serbo-Croat and 94 were teaching Turkish. In total. 22,474 pupils attended mother-tongue teaching, about half of them in Vienna. 11,861 were taught in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, 9,268 in Turkish, 736 in Albanian and 248 in Polish. For all other languages mentioned above the number of pupils remained under a hundred.<sup>85</sup>

Although the curriculum stresses the balance and of German and the respective native language of the children, native-language-teaching often remains an extra-curricular, non-compulsory subject along with typing or learning a musical instrument. In team-teaching the priority is usually also

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<sup>82</sup> Dilek Cinar und Ulrike Davy, „Von der Rückkehrförderung zum Interkulturellen Lernen. Rahmenbedingungen des muttersprachlichen Unterrichts“, in: Dilek Cinar (ed.), *Gleichwertige Sprachen ? Muttersprachlicher Unterricht für die Kinder von Einwanderern; = Bildungsforschung des Bundesministeriums für Unterricht und kulturelle Angelegenheiten* vol.13, Innsbruck / Vienna 1998, 23 - 81.

<sup>83</sup> Elfie Fleck, „Intercultural Education in Austria“, in: Yitzhak Berman (ed.): *Integration and Pluralism in Societies of Immigration*, Vienna (European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research) = Eurosocietal Report 54/1995, 129 - 137

<sup>84</sup> BGBl. 1992/528, Add. 10.

<sup>85</sup> Harald Waldrauch, „Muttersprachliche LehrerInnen in Österreich. Statistische Auswertung für das Schuljahr 1998/99“, Vienna (BMUK - *Informationsblätter des Referats für Interkulturelles Lernen* No.5)

put on the teaching and learning of German. Secondary education leading to university-entrance level does not normally value immigrants' mother tongues, and secondary schools such as the various forms of the „Gymnasium“ only rarely offer Turkish or Croatian as a regular or optional second language. Native-language teachers work on temporary contracts in a legal position vastly inferior to that of regular teachers and often earn considerably less than their Austrian colleagues, since their teaching qualifications earned abroad are often not accepted as being equivalent to the respective Austrian degrees. Intercultural education is only an optional subject at teacher-training colleges and is totally absent at universities. Similarly, future German teachers do not need to attend courses in German as a second language.

#### 4.3.2 *The role of Islam in immigrant cultures*

As in many European immigration countries, the religious affiliation of the immigrant minorities has again put religion on the political and cultural agenda. Muslim minorities in particular are often regarded as culturally distant from the majority population with Islamophobia emerging as a new disguise of xenophobia and racism.

There are no official figures on the numbers of Muslims living in Austria. Muslim religious authority estimates speak of up to 200,000 people, a 90 per cent majority of them Sunni Muslims from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey, together with some small groups of Shiites and Alevis mainly living in Vienna.<sup>86</sup>

Islamophobia was exploited as part of the xenophobic 1999 election campaign of *the Freiheitliche Partei* (FPÖ), the „Freedom Party“ – considered right-wing populist by many political scientists. The argument that Islam is alien to the Austrian culture currently is becoming more and more prominent in public discourse.

Contrary to public opinion, the legal position of the Islamic religious organisations has a long tradition in Austria and is quite strong. Sunni Islam was officially recognised as a religion in 1912,<sup>87</sup> and the right to be instructed in Sunni Islam in Austria was introduced in 1982/83, with a specific curriculum drawn up by the Austrian school authorities, with German serving as the language of instruction and the Koran being recited in Arabic. According to the privileges of a recognised religion the teachers, who have to have the Austrian citizenship, are paid by the Austrian state but are nominated by the official Muslim representatives in Austria, who control and regulate the teaching. Austria's first private denominational Islamic secondary school was founded in Vienna in 1999.

#### 4.3.3 *Immigrant culture and media*

As the funding of cultural activities is mainly a task of the provincial governments, the situation differs considerably from province to province. Regular and substantial funding of multicultural and intercultural activities can be found only in the City of Vienna, which also has set up a specialised body dealing with the situation of its immigrant groups, the *Wiener Integrationsfonds*. Although primarily funding German as Second-Language-Courses and giving legal advice to immigrants, the *Wiener Integrationsfonds*, together with the municipal department of culture, regularly funds immigrant minorities' cultural activities. The funding is concentrated on subsidies for cultural events with an intercultural approach, like musical and literary „youth-culture“ events.

The City of Vienna cultural department funds the *Interkulttheater*, a private theatre concentrating on productions with immigrant or minority backgrounds and other theatrical activities mainly aimed at the minority population and people interested in intercultural affairs.

Intercultural approaches are common in the socio-pedagogical programmes organised for teenagers by the City of Vienna. As the municipal youth centres are mainly frequented by teenagers from immigrant backgrounds, they have developed a concept of intercultural youth work and employ social workers with immigrant backgrounds. The city also funds some privately organised intercultural initiatives in the field of youth-work, such as the intercultural youth – organisations „Echo“, which runs a cultural centre, produces a monthly magazine and a radio-programme, and „Back on Stage“, which concentrates on intercultural youth-activities in parks and public places or training in the field of Internet and the media organised by the

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<sup>86</sup> Wolfdieter Bihl, „Zur Stellung des Islam in Österreich“, in: Österreichische Osthefte. Zeitschrift für Mittel-, Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung, Volume 33 (1991), no. 3, 585 - 598.

<sup>87</sup> RGBL 159/1912.

*Volkshochschule Ottakring* (an adult education institute in the Ottakring district). The *Wiener Integrationsfonds* has recently set up an intercultural youth-training centre called Interface, for the Internet, theatre and new media. This is co-funded by the City of Vienna's EU-sponsored „Urban“ - programme, which has already funded several initiatives aimed at the improvement of immigrant minorities' living conditions.

The state broadcaster, ORF, runs a weekly half-hour TV-programme, *Heimat, Fremde Heimat* reporting on developments among immigrant minorities. The programme is broadcast at midday Sunday in all provinces except Carinthia and Burgenland. A weekly 30-minute radio-programme with the same title is broadcast by the ORF's Vienna radio station. The private station Radio Orange regularly broadcasts programmes by and for minority groups.

There are no print-media published in Austria in the languages of the immigrant minorities, but print media from the successor states of former Yugoslavia have become increasingly available at Austrian news-agents. The *Wiener Integrationsfonds* publishes two monthly journals in Serbo-Croatian and in Turkish, which mainly inform on legal matters affecting immigrants and on the policies of the Councillor for Integration of the City of Vienna. The youth - organisation „Echo“ publishes a monthly magazine in German written by immigrant teenagers themselves. Creative-writing-seminars for immigrant youth are regularly organised by the *Amerlinghaus*, a cultural initiative in Vienna. The association *Intiative Minderheiten (Minorities Initiative)*, founded in 1988) publishes the quarterly *stimme von und für minderheiten (voice for and of the minorities)* which addresses crucial questions of participation of minorities in culture and politics. *Minorities and the Media* (vol. 32/1999) was a main theme in 1999.

#### 4.4. The collapse of communist eastern Europe

The democratic revolutions in eastern Europe, the fall of the iron curtain and the war in Bosnia as well as a growing demand for cheap labour in the boom-years of 1990-1992 led to an upsurge of immigration to Austria. Between 1989 and 1993 the number of foreign citizens resident in Austria rose from 387,000 to 690,000. Since 1994 a restrictive immigration policy has been enforced which has considerably slowed down the population influx.

The increase of immigration was used by right-wing parties to fuel anti-immigrant and anti-minority prejudices, but has at the same time also led to the formation of an anti-racist civil-rights movement. In 1993, the FPÖ launched an initiative for an anti-immigration referendum, demanding to halt all immigration, which was accompanied by racist and xenophobic propaganda against immigrants. In reaction, the civil-rights umbrella group *SOS Mitmensch* was formed, which organised the „sea of lights“ torchlight demonstration against xenophobia and racism, the largest demonstration in Austria since 1945. In 1992 the City of Vienna also established the *Wiener Integrationsfonds*, the Viennese Fund for Integration, with the task of improving conditions for integration of immigrants in Vienna. Immigration and asylum policy remained high on the political agenda in the nineties. The 1992 and 1993 alien and asylum laws drastically worsened the legal position of immigrants and were severely criticised by human-rights groups working in the field of immigration. Several Constitutional and the Administrative Court rulings declared parts of the new residence and asylum law to be unconstitutional and amendments to the law in 1995 and 1997 have again somewhat improved the situation, but the legal position of immigrants in Austria is still weaker than in most other European countries.<sup>88</sup> Since the beginning of the nineties, xenophobic propaganda has stressed that immigration was causing the *überfremden* (swamping with foreigners) of Austria's cultural make-up. The topic became a regular issue in the FPÖ election campaigns, but has also influenced other parties' positions with regard to immigration and integration policies. In contrast to developments in other European countries, the governing parties do not argue in favour of cultural pluralism and cultural rights for immigrant minority groups; this position supported mainly by the Green and Liberal opposition parties.

Another effect of the collapse of the communist regimes was felt mostly by the minority organisations that had received financial support from their respective mother countries, such as the Slovene, Croatian or Czechoslovak, and to a lesser degree the Hungarian organisations. After 1989 the new democratic governments in these countries were more than willing to continue support for the minorities but economically unable to continue funding them under the now ridiculously inflated exchange rates for their new currencies. Austrian ethnic minorities

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<sup>88</sup>Dilek Cinar, Ulrike Davy, Harald Waldrauch: „Rechtliche Instrumente der Integrations von Einwanderern im europäischen Vergleich“, in: Heinz Fassmann/Helga Matuschek/Elsiabeth Menasse: *abgrenzen-ausgrenzen-aufnehmen. Empirische Befunde zu Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Integration*, Klagenfurt/Celovec 1999, 43 - 75.

organisations, which until then had retained some kind of independence from Austrian government funding now became completely dependent on it.

#### 4.5. Re-ethnification of ethnic groups

In the last twenty years, ethnicity has re-emerged as a major topic of everyday politics. The idea of „assimilation“, which long inspired the policies of countries with large minorities of immigrant origin, proved unrealistic, and several models of accommodation of the cultural needs of ethnic minorities were developed. It may be wishful thinking that, according to Nathan Glazer, „we are all multiculturalists now“,<sup>89</sup> but the idea of cultural group rights has found acceptance in many countries with large immigrant populations or populations of immigrant origin, especially in Canada, Australia, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The logic of cultural group rights implicates a reappraisal of ethnicity as an organising factor in the sphere of political interests.

Although the resurgence of ethnicity is one of the global tendencies of the late 20th and beginning of the 21st century, it is the political framework set by the state which forms the opportunity structure for ethnic mobilisation. As Patrick Ireland<sup>90</sup> has shown, variables of citizenship law, naturalisation procedures and social, cultural and political rights shape the patterns of the collective organisation of minorities and immigrants. If the state sets criteria defining the rights of certain ethnic groups and minorities, it will be rational for them to stress these criteria and to organise along ethnic lines, whereas an assimilationist setting without specific rights for minorities might foster organisation on the basis of class or religious divisions. As Paul Statham<sup>91</sup> convincingly demonstrates for Britain, the framework set by the state is by far the most relevant variable to explain the way minorities organise themselves.

In the Austrian case, the Ethnic Groups Act was the most decisive factor in reorienting of Austria's autochthonous language populations to organise along ethnic lines. Whereas in the seventies ideas of intercultural action and a critical approach towards ethnic organisations prevailed among the organisations, the beginning of the eighties brought a new emphasis on the respective ethnicity and culture by the ethnic minority organisations in order to secure funding. Intercultural activities were significantly reduced.

Developments among the immigrant groups were different. The break-up of Yugoslavia led to the splitting of the former Yugoslav immigrant organisations into organisations affiliated to the new nation states and in most cases supporting the respective national governments. Within the immigrant communities from Turkey, ethnicity plays a major role in the self-organisation of the Kurds, whereas Turkish organisations are most often formed along the political lines dividing the Turkish political system. Here the growth of religious affiliation and the development of an organisational network of Islamic centres and mosques - fostered by the strong legal position of Islam is the most important development in recent years.

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<sup>89</sup> Nathan Glazer, *We Are All Multiculturalists Now*, Cambridge Mass., 1977.

<sup>90</sup> Patrick Ireland, *The Political Challenge of Ethnic Diversity: Immigrant Politics in France and Switzerland*, Cambridge Mass., 1994.

<sup>91</sup> Paul Stratham, „Political mobilisation by minorities in Britain: negative feedback of ‚race relations‘?“ in: *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol 25/4, October 1999, 597-626.